THE  JUSTICE 

OF 

THE    MEXICAN    WAR 

A  REVIEW  OF  THE  CAUSES  AND   RESULTS  OF  THE 

WAR,  WITH  A  VIEW  TO  DISTINGUISHING  EVIDENCE 

FROM  OPINION  AND  INFERENCE 


BY 

CHARLES  H.  OWEN 

M.A.  (Yale),   LL.B.  (Harvard) 

Formerly  of  Staff  Fourth  Division,  Second  Corps, 

Army  of  Potomac 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW   YORK   AND  LONDON 

Ebc    Itnicfcerbocfcec    press 

1908 


COPYRIGHT,  1908 

BY 
CHARLES  H.  OWEN 


Ubc  fwfcfcetbocfcet  prew,  Hew 


i 


PREFACE 

N  this  volume  I  have  aimed,  by  a  review 
correcting  the  misapprehensions  of  his 
torians  relative  to  the  involved  and  contradic 
tory  movements  of  the  period  of  the  Mexican 
War,  to  vindicate  the  justice  of  that  war; 
to  acquit  the  United  States,  as  a  nation,  of 
the  most  serious,  if  not  the  only,  charge  ever 
laid  against  her  honor;  and  to  remove  the 
cloud  from  her  just  title  to  her  largest 
possession. 

I  feel  sure  that  I  have  stated  grave  reasons 
for  impeachment  of  the  methods  and  some 
of  the  conclusions  of  many  prominent 
historians.  In  considering  their  books  I 
have  criticised  them  when  they  followed 
what  seemed  to  me  a  bad  method;  and  have 
done  so  partly  from  a  belief  that  to  correct 
a  bad  method  in  the  writing  of  histories  is 
of  more  consequence  than  to  correct  false 
impressions  as  to  a  given  period  of  history, 
even  of  so  important  a  period  as  that  which 


191184 


iv  Preface 

culminated  in  the  Mexican  War.  To  make 
either  correction  involves  antagonizing  writers 
of  established  reputation  and  recognized 
ability  so  numerous  and  influential  that  a 
general  criticism  of  their  methods  unaccom 
panied  by  illustrations  would  be  inadequate; 
while  to  dispute  their  conclusions  by  the 
bare  statement  of  other  conclusions  would 
be  presumption. 

There  has  seemed  to  me,  therefore,  to  be 
no  way  open  for  proper  criticism  other  than 
to  present  some  arguments  against  accepted 
fallacies.     The  result  is  a  monograph  which  a 
friend  has  quite  correctly  characterized  as  "a 
lawyer's  brief,"  and,  he  was  kind  enough  to 
add,  "a  brief  that  proves  its  point."     I  hope 
I  shall  have  readers  who  will  agree  with  him. 
It  has  been  my  endeavor  to  sift  the  evidence 
introduced    by  historians  and  not  so  much 
to  confront  their  conclusions  with  contra 
dictory  evidence  as  to  distinguish  actual  evi 
dence  from  opinion,  assumption,  or  mistaken 
a    priori    reasoning.     The    subject    of    the 
causes  of  the  Mexican  War  lends  itself  well, 
by  way  of  illustration,  to  this  purpose,  be 
cause  it  is  one  about  which  there  has  been 
written  much  that  is  erroneous,  and  much 
that  is  traceable  to  prejudice. 


Preface  v 

It  is  noticeable  that  the  errors  of  historians 
occur  chiefly  in  their  rapid  summarizing  of 
historical  settings  for  their  main  subjects. 
The  Mexican  War  was  earlier  than  the  period 
to  which  Mr.  Rhodes  directs  his  research; 
and  Professor  Woolsey's  statements  as  to 
the  premature  recognition  of  Texas  are 
remotely  incidental  to  the  subjects  he  had 
under  special  consideration  in  his  work 
upon  International  Law.  On  the  other 
hand,  John  M.  Niles,  Pease,  Williams,  and 
Yoakum,  having  Mexico  and  Texas  under 
direct  observation,  are  not  chargeable  with 
other  than  minor  errors;  and  I  desire  to 
acknowledge  a  free  use  of  their  works. 

Criticisms  of  my  own  errors  I  cordially 
invite.  Indeed  by  criticising  others  I  have 
challenged  criticism  of  myself.  If  a  critic 
will  support  his  statement  of  an  error  by 
proof,  his  criticism  will  be  received  with 
gratitude;  and  to  make  an  acknowledg 
ment  of  such  error  will  be  a  chief  reason  for 
any  possible  new  edition  of  this  book.  I 
confess  myself  to  be  in  love  with  my  con 
clusions.  But  I  sincerely  trust  that  I  and  all 
who  dare  to  attempt  the  writing  or  altering 
of  a  line  of  history  are  more  in  love  with 
the  truth.  I  should  do  great  injustice  to  my 


vi  Preface 

feelings,  if  I  did  not  express  gratitude  for  the 
generous  encouragement  I  have  received 
from  Professor  George  Pierce  Garrison  of  the 
University  of  Texas,  the  leading  authority 
on  the  history  of  Texas  and  her  admission  into 
the  Union,  who  pointed  out  to  me,  after  a 
necessarily  hurried  examination,  what  he 
was  kind  enough  to  call  "errors  in  relatively 
unimportant  details." 

C.  H.  O. 

HARTFORD,  CONN. 
March  15,  1908. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 
I 


INTRODUCTION 

I 
NILES'  OPINION      . 

II 
CHARACTER  is  EVIDENCE  3° 

III 
THE  WOLF    .  34 

IV 
THE  WOLF'S  CUB  4* 

V 
THE  LAMB  .  72 

VI 
ANTICIPATIONS  OF  TROUBLE  IN  TEXAS      .       86 

VII 

THE  LAMB  ASSAULTS  THE  CUB  .       9§ 

vii 


viii  Contents 

PAGE 

VIII 
RECOGNITION         .          .          .          .  T-2 

IX 

MIXED  MOTIVES 

142 

X 

CLAIMS  AND  CORRESPONDENCE  .          .      j64 

XI 
CORRESPONDENCE  .          .  jgt- 

XII 
BOUNDARIES.          .          .  2I4 

XIII 
FOREIGN  INTERVENTION  AND  ANNEXATION     237 

XIV 

WAR  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  .          „      254 


THE 
JUSTICE  OF   THE  MEXICAN  WAR 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 
\b 


THE  JUSTICE  OF  THE 
MEXICAN  WAR 


INTRODUCTION 

THERE  is  no  rule  of  International  Law  by 
which  casus  belli  is  definable.  The 
justice  or  injustice  of  a  war  can  be  deter 
mined  only  by  ethical  standards,  which  are 
subject  to  great  individual  variation  in 
their  acceptance.  There  is,  therefore,  great 
license  allowable  in  approving  or  condemning 
any  given  resort  to  war ;  and  in  this  day  of  an 
enlightened  feeling  that  all  war  is  a  loss 
to  civilization,  whose  objects  ought  to  be 
attained  by  more  humanized  means,  such 
condemnation  is  far  more  easily  extended 
than  limited;  and  it  should  be  so. 

When,  therefore,  General  Grant,  or  Presi 
dent  John  Quincy  Adams,  or  Cyrus  Town- 


2  The  Mexican  War 

send  Brady,  LL.D.,  the  latest  historian  to 
develop  the  topic,  expresses  an  opinion  that 
the  war  waged  by  the  United  States  with 
Mexico  was  unjustifiable,  or  that  exorbi 
tant  terms  of  peace  were  exacted  at  its 
close,  one  is  obliged  to  concede  the  right  to 
hold  that  opinion,  with  some  regret,  perhaps, 
at  the  manner  of  its  expression;  and  is  put 
upon  inquiry  as  to  how  unrelenting  a  whig 
or  abolitionist  'the  contemporary  of  the 
events  in  question  was,  how  well  the  historian 
has  weighed  opposing  opinions  and  evidence, 
and  how  far  he  has  been  biased  by  some 
given  school  of  research  or  overwhelmed 
by  the  numbers  and  vehemence  of  its 
exponents. 

Historians  and  biographers  should  not  rant 
in  lurid  phraseology,  nor  use  such  phrases  as 
"  harpies  of  the  United  States,"  or  "Folk's 
ferocious  war  message  with  its  howling  cata 
logue  of  grievances," 1  or  "the  sin  against  the 
political  Holy  Spirit."2  When  they  quote 
the  opinions  of  partisans  as  authoritative 
sources;  indulge  in  inference,  innuendo,  or 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Schouler,  Boston, 
1889,  vol.  iv. ,  p.  306. 

2  The    Constitutional    and    Political    History  of    the 
United  States,  H.  Von  Hoist,  Chicago,  1881,  vol.  ii.,  p. 
167. 


Introduction  3 

defamation  of  dignitaries  without  citation 
of  detailed  evidence,  their  methods  and 
conclusions  certainly  invite  review,  both  of 
conclusions  and  methods. 

How  nearly  uniform  are  the  denunciations 
of  the  Mexican  War  expressed  by  historians, 
and  how  difficult  a  task  is  their  confutation, 
may  be  inferred  from  Goldwin  Smith's  brief 
account  of: 

"The  quarrel  with  Mexico,  which  formed 
as  striking  an  illustration  as  history  can 
furnish  of  the  quarrel  between  the  wolf  and 
the  lamb,  and  which  no  American  historian 
of  character  mentions  without  pain."  1 

For  although  Dr.  Smith's  reckless  use  of 
the  general  negative  commits  him  to  the 
equivalent  of  a  denial  of  character  to  Yoa- 
kum,  Williams,  John  M.  Niles,  Memucan 
Hunt,  Stephen  F.  Austin,  and  Presidents 
Tyler  and  Polk;  and  although  all  he  says 
relative  to  the  Mexican  War  can  be  refuted; 
his  sweeping  summary,  though  untrue,  does 
not  misrepresent  the  trend  of  a  majority  of 
American  publications,  and  those  which 
advertising  or  the  position  of  the  writers  has 
rendered  most  prominent. 

i  The  United  States  Politcal  History,  Goldwin  Smith, 
New  York,  1893,  p.  211. 


4  The  Mexican  War 

Their  own  opinions,  instead  of  the  ulti 
mate  facts  on  which  their  opinions  are 
based,  are  freely  expressed  by  modern 
writers,  many  of  whom  print  a  long  list  of 
books  in  a  bibliography  of  their  subject, 
and  then,  without  further  reference  thereto, 
proceed  with  a  consecutive  and  entertaining 
narrative,  in  which  cause  and  effect  is 
traced  between  one  set  of  events  and  another ; 
too  often  making  a  mistaken  estimate  of 
a  priori  probabilities  pass  for  actual  evidence 
of  occurrences  which  never  occurred. 

Sometimes  the  unexpected  happens. 

This  so-called  philosophical  method  in 
history  is  certainly  commendable,  so  far 
as  it  gives  incentive  and  means  for  testing 
doubtful  authority  by  the  light  of  credibility, 
inquiring  whether  in  view  of  times  and 
places  and  the  logic  of  events,  it  seems  sup- 
posable  that  certain  alleged  transactions  took 
place;  accepting  the  allegations  as  fact 
only,  if  they  have  the  stamp  of  likelihood 
or  of  proof.  But  it  is  dangerous  error  not  to 
cast  aside  always  anything  in  the  nature  of 
conjecture,  when  proof  can  be  had;  and  a 
failure  to  cite  chapter  and  page  of  authorities 
puts  upon  a  reviewer  the  burden  of  nearly 
as  extended  reading  for  a  conscientious 


Introduction  5 

criticism  as  was  required  in  making  the  book 
itself. 

I  shall  follow  the  philosophical  method 
of  inquiry  into  probabilities  in  the  acceptance 
of  evidence  sufficiently  to  assume  that,  in 
a  long  list  of  American  statesmen,  the  people 
seem  to  have  evinced  sufficient  discrimination 
in  their  estimate  of  public  characters  to  have 
seldom  elected  a  convicted  and  unmitigated 
liar  to  distinguished  position.  I  shall  be 
actuated  by  the  presumption  that  the  burden 
of  responsibility  and  duty,  acknowledged 
formally  by  an  official  oath,  has,  with  almost 
entire  uniformity,  been  accompanied,  or 
followed,  by  decorum  and  decency  in  the 
public,  and  generally  in  the  private  conduct 
of  our  highest  officials.  I  shall  assume  that 
the  desire  and  ability  of  a  first  magistrate  and 
his  immediate  assistants  must  be  so  great 
to  exhibit  a  creditable  and  successful  ad 
ministration,  and  make  for  themselves  honor 
able  reputations,  that  he  and  they  will  be 
kept,  at  least  as  to  foreign  relations,  from 
ridiculous  and  manifestly  untruthful  public 
statements;  and  that,  for  instance,  when 
a  President  freed  from  temptation  to  court 
popular  favor  addresses  in  secret  session  the 
senior  branch  of  Congress — his  coequal  in 


6  The  Mexican  War 

the  diplomatic  action  of  the  State — his 
relation  (after  the  seal  of  secrecy  has  been 
removed)  is  to  be  accepted  as  more  reliable 
than  the  tirade  of  an  outvoted  political 
opponent,  the  lament  of  transcendent alists, 
or  the  skit  of  a  lampoonist  of  however  keen 
a  wit,  or  poetic  and  literary  charm.  I  shall 
assume  that  when  a  writer  cites  mere  opinions 
from  such  a  tirade  or  skit  as  historical 
authority,  he  indicates  a  poverty  of  reliable 
evidence  to  support  what  he  asserts,  and  a 
bias  which  puts  his  conclusions  under  grave 
suspicion. 

I  shall  take  it  for  granted  that,  when 
National  leaders  and  diplomats  are  accused 
of  fraud  in  conducting  the  administrative 
functions  prescribed  for  them,  and  of  so 
misconducting  the  international  relations, 
intrusted  to  their  observances  of  propriety 
and  good  form,  that  the  result  is  a  mass 
of  correspondence  denounced  as  a  disgrace  to 
their  Nation  and  their  people,  if  it  is  not 
incumbent  on  the  accusers  to  be,  themselves, 
governed  by  such  rules  of  court-martial,  or 
civil  courts,  as  would  throw  out  their  charges 
unless  reduced  to  answerable  specifications, 
they  are  at  least  amenable  to  ordinary  rules 
of  logic  and  fair-play.  I  shall  assume  that 


Introduction  7 

such  accusations  are  unworthy  of  belief,  or 
of  any  respectful  attention,  unless  substan 
tiated  by  evidence  of  some  fact.  And  I 
shall  not  accept  as  evidence  of  a  fact  which, 
if  it  is  a  fact,  can  be  exhibited  by  record,  the 
opinion  of  any  person,  not  even  of  a  much- 
badgered  ex-President. 

The  burden  of  proof  is  always  with  the 
accuser.  However  the  weight  of  evidence 
may  shift,  the  burden  of  proof  remains  always 
upon  the  accuser,  whether  in  the  role  of 
public  prosecutor  he  pleads  to  the  bench,  or 
in  the  assumed  role  of  the  historian,  brings 
his  impeachment  before  the  tribunal  of 
public  opinion.  In  no  case  can  an  accuser 
force  upon  the  defence  the  assumption  of 
the  general  negative. 

If,  in  any  case,  I  have  taken  the  trouble 
to  point  out  any  facts  inconsistent  with 
general  and  unsubstantiated  allegations,  it 
is  more  because  I  have  wished  to  make 
smoother  the  path  of  whoever  shall  event 
ually  write  a  history  of  the  United  States, 
than  because  I  feel  compelled  to  answer  a 
general  complaint  by  anything  other  than 
a  general  denial,  or  to  join  issue  when  no 
issue  is  legitimately  presented. 

I  do  not  by  any  means  forget  that,  in  any 


8  The  Mexican  War 

just  and  formal  court,  a  motion  to  amend  or 
a  demurrer  would  be  sustained  by  an  order 
to  strike  out  as  "irrelevant"  and  "imperti 
nent"  the  great  mass  of  conjectures,  in 
nuendoes,  insinuations,  hints,  which,  with 
much  valuable  and  often  reliable  statement, 
has  gone  to  make  up  the  enormous  aggregate 
bulk  that  has  passed  for  history  of  the  causes 
of  the  Mexican  War.  But  it  is  because  of  the 
bulk  of  such  literature  that  it  may  seem, 
to  some,  worth  while  to  offer  an  occasional 
illustration  of  how  far  an  approximation  to 
research  may  result  in  exhibiting  the  contrary 
of  what  has  been  asserted  in  unpardonably 
general  terms,  and  with  substantial  unan 
imity,  by  a  class  of  writers  unable  to  free 
themselves  from  the  bias  of  some  very  noble 
sentiments,  or  from  adulation  of  some 
eminently  respectable  men.  In  this  con 
nection  it  is  not  necessary  to  furnish  illus 
trations,  save  as  they  appear  in  the  order  of 
events  discussed  or  recorded. 

This  work  purports  to  be  a  review  of  con 
clusions  as  well  as  of  methods.  It  is,  or 
ought  to  be,  a  very  dear  wish  of  the  historian 
to  make  apparent,  if  true,  the  right  of  the 
American  citizen  to  say  to  his  boy :  ' '  Your 
country  never  fought  an  unjust  nor  an 


Introduction  9 

inglorious  war."  It  may  be  a  more  import 
ant  matter  that  the  reviewer  impeach  the 
manners  and  language  of  the  exponents 
of  the  modern  school  of  history,  could  they 
only  be  persuaded  to  never  indulge  in  in 
nuendo,  never  to  intimate  or  imply  anything ; 
but  state  it  in  such  form  that  it  can  be 
supported,  or  overthrown,  by  the  truth. 
The  style  of  speech  of  the  frontier  guide 
and  cowboy  is  commended  to  their  imita 
tion:  "He  never  hints;  he  either  says  or 
shuts." 

As  it  is  impossible  for  the  most  veracious 
witness  not  to  give  to,  no  matter  how  simple, 
a  portrayal  of  facts,  something  of  color, 
so  it  is  impossible  for  the  best  intentioned 
and  best  trained  historian  or  biographer— 
or  expert  with  the  telescope — not  to  give 
something  of  personal  equation  to  what 
he  sees,  or  thinks  he  sees,  and  so  reports; 
and  it  would  be  well,  could  the  reader  and 
student  always  get  behind  the  printed 
page  and  have  some  knowledge  of  the  writer 
of  a  history,  and  so  be  able  to  make  the 
proper  discount  from  the  results  announced. 

For  this  reason,  there  is  a  long  credit 
mark  to  be  drawn  against  the  name  of 
James  Schouler,  in  that  he  offers  some 


io  The  Mexican  War 

data,  however  insufficient,  for  elimination 
of  any  errors,  the  results  of  his  personal 
equation.  In  his  notice,  prefixed  to  volume 
iv.  of  his  very  valuable  History  of  the  United 
States,1  he  says  of  himself: 

"It  is  not  in  my  nature  to  be  impartial  as 
between  right  and  wrong,  honorable  and 
dishonorable  public  conduct.  .  .  .  All  men 
and  all  political  parties,  I  have  constantly 
sought  to  interpret  by  the  atmosphere  of 
their  times." 

If  Mr.  Schouler  failed  to  be  impartial  also 
in  discriminating  first  what  was  right  and 
what  wrong,  what  honorable  and  what 
dishonorable,  or  on  what  evidence  he  based 
his  assertions,  it  may  have  been  because  of 
his  having  placed  himself,  as  well  as  "all 
men  and  all  political  parties,"  at  a  mistaken 
point  of  view  in  "the  atmosphere  of  their 
times." 

The  blue  light  of  whig  and  abolition 
defeat  was  not  a  colorless  medium  through 
which  to  see  events,  any  more  than  was 
the  red  glow  of  border  war  and  slaveholding 
domination,  both  of  which  atmospheres 
were  characteristic  of  those  times.  It  needs 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  iv.,  James  Schouler, 
Boston,  January  i,  1889. 


Introduction  n 

the  clearer  light  of  later  times  for  a  medium 
through  which  to  see  historic  truth. 

As  later  writers  have  with  great  uniformity 
not  only  followed  Mr.  Schouler  almost 
blindly,  but  adopted  his  language  to  an  extent 
which  in  itself  is  a  proper  matter  for  criti 
cism  of  them  and  compliment  to  him,  it  is 
doubly  desirable  to  be  furnished  with  the 
data  by  which  any  necessary  allowance  should 
be  made  for  the  effects  of  the  atmosphere 
in  which  Mr.  Schouler  chose  his  point  of 
view.  It  is  enough,  in  this  page,  to  note 
that  his  style  of  narration  and  his  choice 
of  epithets  are  sufficient  of  themselves  to 
show  that  the  atmosphere  through  which  he 
chose  to  see  the  causes  of  the  Mexican  War 
was  pre-eminently  whig. 

How  greatly  mere  opinion,  at  one  date  or 
another,  has  been  made  to  color  alleged  his 
tory  of  the  Mexican  War,  appears  almost 
humorously  from  the  pages  of  no  less  a  writer 
than  James  Ford  Rhodes,  to  whom  the 
public  is  indebted  for  so  much  really  good 
work.  Among  the  sources  or  authorities 
he  cites  to  justify  his  condemnation  of  the 
Mexican  War,  are  earlier  opinions  by  no 
means  so  valuable  or  well-trained  as  his 
own:  the  opinion  of  General  Grant  (by  his 


12  The  Mexican  War 

own  description  an  irreconcilable  whig,  and 
too  overwhelmed  with  the  executive  work 
of  a  life  of  almost  unexampled  activity  to  have 
studied  any  debatable  public  events  not 
coupled  with  his  own  performance) ;  the 
opinion  of  some  fictitious  characters  in 
James  Russell  Lowell's  Biglow  Papers,  in 
which  the  poet  satirized  the  National  armies 
and  their  objects  in  terms  so  opprobriously, 
as  well  as  wittily,  discouraging  of  enlist 
ments  that,  if  employed  in  1862  by  one  op 
posing  the  far  greater  and  higher  cause  which 
was  then  the  Nation's — a  cause  greater  and 
higher  perhaps  than  any  other  that  any 
nation  ever  espoused — they  would  have 
probably  prompted  Lowell  himself  to  de 
mand  the  author's  imprisonment  in  Fort 
Lafayette.  Some  men  were  sent  there  for 
less  cause. 

Of  course  it  was  wise  in  the  forties  to  let 
the  poet  have  his  fling ;  the  recruiting  sergeant 
could  keep  "eyes  front"  whoever  recited: 

Ez  fer  war  I  call  it  murder, 
or 

You  '11  hev  to  rattle 

On  them  kittle-drums  o'  yourn; 
'Tain't  a  knowin'  kind  o'  cattle 

Thet  is  ketched  with  mouldy  corn. 


Introduction  13 

But  while  there  may  have  been  only  arro 
gance  and  not  incipient  secession  in 

Massachusetts,  God  forgive  her, 
She  's  a  kneelin'  with  the  rest, 

there  was  assuredly  no  diploma  of  Ph.D. 
ever  awarded  to  Hosea  Biglow,  to  warrant  his 
acceptance  as  an  unbiased  judge  of  a  hotly 
contested  case  of  National  honor.  Mr.  Low 
ell  makes  Hosea  Biglow  put  the  secession 
doctrine  rather  unmistakably : 

Ef  I  'd  my  way  I  hed  ruther 
We  should  go  to  work  an'  part, — 
They  take  one  way,  we  take  t'other — 
Guess  it  would  n  't  break  my  heart ; 
Men  had  ough'  to  put  asunder 
Them  that  God  has  noways  jined; 
An'  I  should  n  't  gretly  wonder 
Ef  there  's  thousands  o'  my  mind; 

to  which  the  imaginary  reverend  editor, 
parson  Homer  Wilbur,  adds:  The  " first 
recruiting  sergeant  on  record  I  conceive 
to  have  been  that  individual,  who  is  men 
tioned  in  the  Book  of  Job  as  going  to  and 
fro  in  the  earth  and  walking  up  and  down 
in  it." 

But    Mr.    Rhodes    has    a  climax   of   this 
sort  of  proof  in  store:     "Sir  Charles  Lyell 


14  The  Mexican  War 

met  no  one  in  society  who  approved  the 
war."  i 

Is  it  possible  that  the  eminent  British 
scientist  missed  an  introduction  to  Caleb 
Gushing,  or  to  George  Bancroft,2  or  to 
any  of  the  party  then  dominant  politi 
cally  and  socially?  Or  was  it  the  irrecon- 
cilables  only  who  substantiated  their  claims 
to  being  "in  society"  by  entertaining  a  dis 
tinguished  guest  with  their  version  of  a 
political  dissension? 

Had  Grant's  opinion  been  cited  on  a  ques 
tion  of  the  strategy  to  be  the  basis  of  action 
of  department  commanders,  had  Lowell's 
judgment  been  given  as  to  the  justification 
of  an  " Americanism"  by  its  use  in  the  poems 
of  Chaucer  or  Shakespeare,  or  had  a  theory 
in  geology  received  Lyell's  sanction,  it 
would  have  made  a  reviewer  very  busy  to 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Ford  Rhodes, 
New  York,  1900,  vol.  i.,  p.  88. 

2  It  was  George   Bancroft,  the  historian,   who    per 
suaded  the  Massachusetts  Democratic  Convention  to 
pronounce  for  the  annexation  of  Texas ;  and  it  was  his 
order  as   Secretary  of    War  that  sent  Taylor  to  the 
frontier  of  Mexico,  as  near  to  the  Rio  Grande  as  prac 
ticable. — Life  and  Letters  of  George  Bancroft,  M.A.  De 
Wolfe  Howe,  New  York,  1908,  vol.  i.,  pp.  287   to  291; 
and  Executive  Documents,  ist  Session,  3oth  Congress, 
No.  60,  p.  81. 


Introduction  1 5 

find  the  testimony  on  which  either  of  them 
could  be  confuted;  for  such  opinions,  if  not 
logically  shifting  the  burden  of  proof,  would 
go  very  far  toward  capturing  a  popular 
verdict;  and  would  require  something  much 
more  than  opposing  opinions  of  less  distin 
guished  observers  to  refute  them. 

But  in  view  of  all  that  either  of  Mr. 
Rhodes's  authorities  knew,  or  was  capable 
of  understanding  from  the  very  biased 
position  in  which  he  made  his  observations, 
Mr.  Rhodes  might  as  well  have  quoted 
General  Grant's  notions  of  geological  periods, 
Sir  Charles  Lyell's  ideas  of  language  forma 
tion,  or  Hosea  Biglow's  (not  Lowell's)  views 
as  to  military  strategy. 

I  am  most  appalled  at  the  necessity  of 
confronting  this  opinion  of  so  accurate  a 
writer  as  David  A.  Wells:  "For  this  war 
the  judgment  of  all  impartial  history  will 
undoubtedly  be  that  there  was  no  justifi 
cation  on  the  part  of  the  United  States"; 
though  he  says:  "  It  may  be  that  what 
happened  was  an  inevitable  outcome  of 
the  law  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  as 
exemplified  among  nations,"  and  contrasts 
the  "development  of  California,  Texas, 
and  Colorado  with  the  stagnant,  poverty- 


1 6  The  Mexican  War 

stricken  condition  of  Chihuahua,  Sonora, 
Coahuila."  * 

Mr.  Wells  does  not,  however,  examine 
into  the  causes  of  the  war.  The  only  evi 
dence  he  gives  of  its  wrongfulness  is  that 
there  is  a  monument  at  Chapultepec  to  the 
Mexican  Cadets,  who  well  deserved  that 
honor,  and  the  bravery  of  the  undisciplined 
Mexican  troops,  which  there  is  no  object 
in  disputing.  Furthermore  Mr.  Wells  fur 
nishes  indisputable  authority — to  be  cited 
later — of  a  condition  in  Mexican  affairs 
which  goes  far  to  eliminate  criticisms  on  any 
interference  with  them  whatever,  in  view  of 
his  descriptions  of  the  victims  of  peonage. 

To  have  recognized  the  desirability  of 
knowing  the  personal  point  of  view  from 
which  others  write,  makes  it  almost  a  matter 
of  good  faith  to  disclose  whatever  might  color 
the  medium  through  which  I  have  observed 
events  and  looked  for  historic  data  while  pre 
paring  this  volume.  It  is  not  fair  to  throw 
stones  without  setting  up  a  glass  house. 

My  earliest  recollection  of  anything  akin 
to  politics,  is  of  receiving  my  father's  assist 
ance  in  constructing  a  Polk  and  Dallas  flag; 

i  A  Study  of  Mexico,  David  A.  Wells,  New  York, 
1887,  pp.  70  and  71. 


Introduction  17 

but  as  I  was  at  the  date  of  Folk's  election 
only  six  years  old,  and  my  father  was  an 
early  Free-soiler,  I  am  unable  to  trace  any 
political  bias  to  the  circumstance.  I  was 
later  an  employee  of  the  "underground 
railroad,"  and  was  guilty  of  so  much  breach 
of  legal  and  constitutional  observance  as 
to  have  occasionally  found  the  way  through 
an  unfrequented  tract  of  wood  and  brush- 
pasture  for  a  few  persons  who  with  great 
unanimity  were  curious  to  know  "Which 
way  is  Nothe?"  and  were  uniformly  of  dark 
complexion.  We  were  invariably  met  at 
nearly  the  same  spot  by,  so  far  as  I  could 
distinguish  in  the  dusk,  the  same  man,  whose 
general  appearance  had  been  previously 
described  to  me,  and  to  whom  they  repeated 
the  question:  "Which  way  is  Nothe?"  My 
intellectual  development  at  that  period  had 
not  been  so  scanted  in  the  absorption  of  the 
frontier  novel  that  I  did  not  begin  to  plume 
myself  at  being  engaged  in  an  occupation 
in  which  a  signal  or  a  pass-word  seemed  to 
be  an  essential.  But  although  I  have  been 
a  practising  lawyer,  schooled  by  Joel  Parker 
and  Emory  Washburn,  and  have  asked  myself 
the  question,  I  was  and  am  unable  to  perceive 
any  obligation  to  ascertain  a  stranger's  pedi- 


1 8  The  Mexican  War 

gree  or  his  profession, before  answering  a  polite 
inquiry  about  the  indications  of  the  compass. 
At  a  very  early  period  my  father  had 
impressed  upon  me,  by  the  good  old  Puritan 
method,  the  advisability  of  keeping  my 
mouth  shut  as  to  matters  of  other  people's 
business;  and  when  it  became  evident  that 
I  had  (and  have  until  this  writing)  restrained 
my  impulses  to  boast  of  my  dark  deeds  of  the 
night,  I  was  trusted  as  an  errand  boy  of 
Senator  Francis  Gillette;  Gideon  Welles; 
Joseph  R.  Hawley;  Charles  Dudley  Warner; 
the  Connecticut  war  governor,  William  A. 
Buckingham;  James  Wolfe  Ripley,  U.  S.  A., 
Inspector  General  of  Department  of  New 
England;  John  M.  Niles;  and,  later,  for 
isolated  occasions,  by  Governor  Morgan  of 
New  York,  and  General  C.  C.  Augur,  U.  S.  A., 
commanding  Department  of  Washington. 
I  was  also  a  volunteer,  and  after  a  time  a 
commissioned  aide-de-camp  (which  I  found 
to  be  a  more  dignified  name  for  errand  boy) 
for  General  Robert  O.  Tyler,  U.  S.  A.,  from 
the  days  of  his  independent  command  at 
Fairfax  to  Spottsylvania  with  the  Fourth 
Division,  Second  Corps — Hancock's — which 
for  a  few  days  indulged  in  the  anomaly  of 
four  divisions;  and  to  Cold  Harbor,  where 


Introduction  19 

I  got  my  discharge  and  exemption  together. 
I  worked  for  Fremont,  voted  for  Lincoln  and 
Grant — twice  each,  and  for  several  more 
Republican  presidents. 

I  recognize  nothing  in  my  personal  ex 
periences  which  would  tend  to  pervert  one 
to  an  undue  liking  for  the  ways  of  the  slave 
holders,  or  to  influence  the  acceptance  of 
evidence  of  the  failures  or  successes  of 
National  administrations,  unless  it  be  a 
strong  impression  made  by  General  Hawley's 
repeated  expression:  "Uncle  Sam  is  a  gentle 
man." 

Perhaps,  though,  it  is  only  just  to  add 
that  nobody  who  has  not  been  a  pensioner 
of  the  United  States  and,  with  his  own 
wounds  cared  for  by  his  country,  seen 
veterans  of  Wellington  by  Nelson's  Monu 
ment  or  survivors  of  Austerlitz  by  the 
Hotel  des  Invalides  holding  out  braided  caps 
for  alms,  can  fully  feel  how  grand  a  gentle 
man  is  Uncle  Sam,  or  understand  what  should 
be  the  glow  of  indignation  with  which  an 
American  could  hear  him  maligned.  Only 
when  anything  said  against  him  is  proved  can 
it  be  received  in  silence — and  with  sadness. 


CHAPTER  I 

NILES'    OPINION 

THE  analysis  of  the  atmosphere  througn 
which  the  material  for  this  review 
has  been  observed,  may  have  passed  too 
far  the  verge  of  the  autobiographical;  but 
it  ought  to  clear  the  reviewer  from  the  sus 
picion  of  uncontrollable  bias  for  the  methods 
of  the  slavocracy;  and  it  may  serve  for  the 
introduction  of  a  man  who,  in  the  compari 
sons  of  opinions  of  the  Mexican  War,  should 
have  the  casting  vote,  and  from  whose  printed 
accounts  of  facts  the  pages  of  this  volume 
borrow  much. 

Opinions  of  any  date  are  not  conclusive. 
It  is  the  main  object  of  this  review  to  protest 
against  taking  opinions,  as  controlling  evi 
dence.  But  it  may  help  a  reader  in  accepting 
such  protest,  in  a  receptive  frame  of  mind, 
to  exhibit  the  fact  that  the  opinions  of 
men  of  the  time  were  not  unanimous  in 


22  The  Mexican  War 

condemning  the  Mexican  War,  as  a  dis 
grace. 

John  Milton  Niles  affected  no  graces  of  ora 
tory.  He  had  not  the  natural  advantage 
of  the  " God-like  presence,"  which  it  was  the 
fashion  of  that  day  to  extol  in  this  or  that 
idol  of  the  popular  homage — a  fashion  that 
it  is  the  pernicious  habit  of  present-day 
biographers  to  imitate,  to  the  confusion  of 
their  sense  of  proportion  and  the  unbalancing 
of  the  scales  in  which  they  weigh  evidence. 

None  the  less  he  was  the  peer  of  Webster, 
Clay,  Calhoun,  and  Benton;  and  a  country 
would  be  safer  and  more  wisely  led  by  the 
perfect  integrity  and  common  sense  of  such 
Senators  as  he,  than  by  those  who  waged  the 
wordy  "wars  of  the  giants." 

I  remember  him  as  an  undersized,  some 
what  withered,  keen-eyed  old  man,  a  little 
stooped  or  sloping-shouldered,  with  a  pene 
trating  rather  than  a  powerful  voice,  a 
crisp  enunciation,  rapid  and  forcible  yet 
deliberate  utterance,  almost  without  any 
figures  of  speech,  save  those  of  Whittier's 
Abraham  Davenport — the  Ten  Arab  Signs; 
with  statistics  and  facts  in  full  command; 
his  reasoning  irresistible,  and  simple  enough 
for  public  understanding. 


Miles'  Opinion  23 

His  favorite,  so  far  as  I  can  recollect, 
his  only,  gesture  was  to  plunge  both  hands 
almost  to  the  elbows  into  the  side  pockets 
of  a  long,  loose,  bottle-green  sack  coat — from 
either  of  which  pockets  he  could  produce  a 
pinch  of  snuff. 

He  was  not  an  orator,  unless,  as  a  reasoner, 
in  something  the  same  way  that  Lincoln 
was,  but  he  was  that  much  greater  and  more 
instructive  force  in  a  republic, — an  unex 
celled,  even  in  the  Senate  of  that  day,  an  al 
most  unrivalled,  debater.  I  knew  him  best 
in  his  pear  garden,  where  he  was  an  expert. 

He  was  born  in  Windsor,  Connecticut,  in 
1787.  Too  poor  to  obtain  a  college  training, 
he  got  his  legal  education  by  work  in  a  lawyer's 
office,  and  began  practice  at  the  Hartford 
bar  in  1817.  In  the  same  year  he  established 
the  Hartford  Times,  for  now  almost  a 
century  a  leading  democratic  paper  of  the 
State.  In  1820  he  was  made  Judge  of  the 
county  court,  in  1829  postmaster.  From 
December  31,  1835,  to  March  3,  1839, 
he  was  United  States  Senator  by  appoint 
ment,  and  from  December  4,  1843,  to  March 
3,  1849,  by  election.  From  May  19,  1840, 
to  March  6,  1841,  he  was  Postmaster  General 
of  the  United  States.  Appointed  at  a  time 


24  The  Mexican  War 

when  the  Department  was  laboring  under 
serious  embarrassments,  he  introduced  the 
great  reforms  of  reduced  postage  and  increased 
mail  facilities  which,  as  he  had  boldly  and 
wisely  predicted,  resulted  in  increased  reve 
nue.  He  was  the  pioneer  of  the  present 
liberal  postal  system. 

Opposed  to  a  national  bank  as  a  centraliz 
ing  force  incompatible  with  his  democratic 
principles,  he  was  even  more  strenuously 
opposed  to  extension  of  slavery,  which  he 
fought  against  within  party  limits  as  long 
as  there  remained  hope  of  success;  then 
broke  with  his  party,  to  which  he  had  been 
a  stout  but  unhaltered  adherent;  founded 
The  Press  in  1856,  the  Free-soil  paper  of 
Gideon  Welles,  Joseph  R.  Hawley,  and 
Charles  Dudley  Warner;  and  made  his  last 
public  appearance  at  the  Connecticut  State 
Republican  Convention  in  the  same  year. 

Of  his  fitness  to  judge  the  principal  National 
event  of  his  day  one  may  learn  some 
thing  from  the  estimates  put  upon  him  by 
most  distinguished  associates  of  his  public 
labors. 

His  was  the  most  ready  and  accurately  dis 
criminating  mind  in  the  Senate. 

John  C.  Calhoun. 


Niles'  Opinion  25 

Not  only  were  his  opinions  eminently  sound 
and  correct,  but  his  political  and  moral  courage 
exceeded  that  of  his  associates. 

Thomas  H.  Benton. 

I  always  distrusted  the  accuracy  of  my 
own  conclusions  when  they  differed  from 
Senator  Niles's. 

Silas  Wright. 

Niles  spoke  as  Franklin  wrote. 

Martin  Van  Buren. 

His  marked  traits  were  good,  practical  com 
mon  sense  without  pretension,  unassumingly 
but  honestly  and  fearlessly  expressed. 

Gideon  Welles. 1 

It  is  a  curious  character  study  to  note 
how  each  of  these  most  distinguished  men 
assigns  Judge  Niles  to  the  front  rank  in  the 
qualifications  for  which  he  was  himself 
conspicuous. 

The  general  fitness  of  such  a  man  for 
judgment  of  the  current  events  of  his  day 
had  been  especially  trained  for  discriminating 
as  to  Mexican  affairs.  Not  only  as  a  journal 
ist,  a  Senator,  and  a  cabinet  officer  had  the 

»  History  of  Ancient  Windsor,  Henry  R.  Stiles,  Hart 
ford,  1859,  vol.  ii.,  p.  725.  Note  by  Gideon  Welles  is 
full  authority  for  all  statements  herein  as  to  Senator 

Niles. 


26  The  Mexican  War 

details  of  public  life  been  familiar  to  him,  but, 
among  other  books  and  pamphlets  he  had 
published  was  Niles'  Civil  Officer,  which  for 
half  a  century  was,  and,  with  modern 
statute  adaptations,  still  is,  the  authority 
for  the  Connecticut  sheriff  or  magistrate, 
covering  a  branch  of  legal  knowledge  in  which 
absolute  accuracy  must  go  hand  in  hand 
with  appreciation  of  individual  rights  and 
the  foundation  principles  of  good  government 
in  their  most  practical  and  frequent  appli 
cations. 

Of  more  consequence  to  the  present 
discussion,  he  had  published  a  history  of  the 
Spanish  American  governments,  including 
Mexico,  with  a  short  history  of  Texas,  cred 
ited  to  his  brother-in-law,  L.  T.  Pease. 
What  was  his  feeling  and  spirit  of  appreciation 
for  these  neighbors,  let  his  own  writings 
manifest. 

After  recording  the  Mexican  revolution 
and  constitution  of  1824,  he  closes  his  history 
for  the  time  in  these  words: 

It  is  no  longer  prophecy  to  say  that  the  time 
is  not  far  distant  when  there  will  be  two  great 
republics  in  North  America,  each  uniting 
numerous  subordinate  republics,  and  possessing 
a  vast  population  free  and  enlightened,  enjoying 


Niles'  Opinion  27 

all    the    blessings    of    liberty    and    republican 
institutions.  * 

After  Bustamente's  rebellion  had  ended 
in  a  bloody  dictatorship,  he  resumes: 

After  a  contrast  so  unfavorable  to  the  char 
acter  of  the  Mexican  people,  if  the  reader  finds 
himself  compelled  to  surrender  the  hopes  which 
he  had  cherished  in  their  behalf,  however 
painful  he  may  find  the  sacrifice,  let  him  be  as 
sured  that  it  was  no  less  painful  to  the  historian, 
and  that  truth  alone  could  have  forced  him  to 
make  it.  2 

And  of  the  ''presidency"  in  1835  of  Santa  L 
Anna,  he  adds : 

Congress  proceeded  to  abolish  the  constitution 
of  1824,  abolishing  at  the  same  time  all  the  state 
constitutions  and  state  authorities.3 

It  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  man  more  fit 
in  1848  to  form  a  deliberate  and  intelligent 
judgment  upon  this  subject,  or  more  abso 
lutely  to  be  relied  on  for  an  honest  and 
fearless  one,  than  Senator  Niles.  In  a 
speech  upon  the  question  of  a  reduction 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  Hon.  John 
M.  Niles,  Hartford,  1837,  p.  191. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  202.  3  Ibid.,  p.  205. 


28  The  Mexican  War 

of  forces  in  Mexico,1  just  a  week  after  the 
Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo  had  been 
signed,  and  California  and  Texas  ceded  to 
the  United  States,  he  gave  that  opinion 
formally.  He  declared  that  he  "  had  reluc 
tantly  voted  for  annexation": 

Not  that  I  doubted  the  right  so  far  as  Mexico 
was  concerned  to  receive  Texas  into  this  Union, 
but  my  difficulties  arose  from  the  form  of  the 
proceedings,  from  constitutional  scruples,  from 
apprehensions  of  trouble  with  Mexico,  and  an 
unwillingness  to  deliver  up  the  whole  of  the 
country  to  slavery. 

We  stand  well  in  relation  to  this  war  before 
the  world  and  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the 
impartial  judgment  of  posterity.  It  was  just 
in  its  commencement,  it  has  been  prosecuted 
with  signal  success,  and  it  now  only  remains 
that  we  bring  it  to  its  close  in  a  manner  equally 
consistent  with  our  national  rights  and  honor, 
and  a  just  regard  to  the  interests  of  humanity. 

That  the  final  settlement  by  which  we 
retained  Texas  to  the  Rio  Grande,  California, 
and  New  Mexico,  seemed  just  to  Senator 
Niles,  appears  from  his  vote  March  7,  1848, 
in  favor  of  "the  ten-regiment  bill,"  which 
provided  for  equipment  of  a  force  to  hold 

i  Senate,  3oth  Congress,  February  9,  1848. 


Niles'  Opinion  29 

that  territory;  and  from  his  speech  of  the 
preceding  pth  of  February,  in  which  he  re 
gretted  "reference  to  manifest  destiny  or 
Anglo-Saxon  blood,  as  if  we  were  to  tread 
in  the  footsteps  of  our  savage  ancestors"; 
and  opposed  maintaining  all  the  posts  then 
occupied  in  Mexico,  which  would  have 
taken  all  her  territory.  "  Does  the  Military 
Committee  desire  to  make  an  India  of  Mexico 
and  send  some  Warren  Hastings  there  whose 
financial  abilities  would  be  only  second  to  his 
rapacity?"  It  was  due  to  the  influence  of 
the  comparatively  temperate  counsels  and 
appeals  of  Senator  Niles  and  such  as  he,  that 
Mexican  autonomy  was  not  totally  extin 
guished  in  1848. 


CHAPTER  II 

CHARACTER  IS  EVIDENCE 

A  READER  should  not  need  to  be  told 
^*  that  opinions,  of  any  date  and  from 
however  competent  or  unbiased  judges,  are 
not  to  be  taken  as  by  any  means  conclusive. 
History  must  be  almost  altogether  a  record 
of  facts — national  advance  and,  as  Taine 
says,  "the  previous  efforts  of  men"  are  facts. 
By  no  statement  of  opinion  is  it  here  purposed 
to  enlist  the  sympathy  or  to  bias  the  judg 
ment;  but  to  clear  away  in  some  degree  the 
smoke  of  partisan-prompted  volley-firing, 
and  induce  a  fair  consideration  of  facts,  by 
having  exhibited  that  opinions  are  not  so 
altogether  unanimous  as  to  render  examina 
tion  of  their  foundations  necessarily  unpro- 
xfitable  or  hopeless.  It  is  to  be  remembered 
that  the  election  of  Polk  probably  exhibited 
that  the  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United 

3° 


UNIVERSITY   I 

Character  is  Evidence          31 

States  favored  the  annexation  of  Texas.] 
And  afterward  that  people  enthusiastically 
sustained  the  war. 

If  some  patience  is  demanded  of  a  reader 
and  the  tale  seems  long,  of  so  comparatively 
brief  an  episode  in  the  march  of  a  nation's 
greatness,  it  must  be  remembered  that  in 
the  field  of  Mexican  affairs,  for  more  than 
one  generation  nearly  every  new  historian 
or  biographer  has  searched  for  some  new 
matter  of  indictment  to  give  original  bitter 
ness  to  his  charges ;  and  it  is  a  long  process  to 
answer  even  the  most  objectionable  errors. 

Moreover,  the  importance  of  the  subject 
is  not  measurable  by  the  lapse  of  years  in  our 
differences  with  Mexico;  the  question  is  of 
our  honorable  title  to  the  largest  territorial 
accession  ever  made  by  the  nation,  to  an 
area  exceeding  even  that  of  the  Louisiana 
purchase.1  And  the  defence  of  Uncle  Sam 
will  not  ask  for  anything  like  the  space  or  time 
which  has  been  accorded  to  the  prosecution. 

Trial  of  fact  before  the  great  tribunal  of 
public  opinion  must  have  much  analogy 
to  ancient  trial  by  jury,  a  jury  of  peers  of 
the  accused,  a  jury  of  the  vicinage.  Whether 

1  For  comparison  of  areas  see  Conquest  of  the  South- 
west,  Cyrus  Townsend  Brady,  New  York,  1905,  p.  256, 


32  The  Mexican  War 

the  infringement  of  modern  practice  be  for 
better  or  worse  in  requiring  of  a  juryman 
almost  entire  ignorance  of  the  parties  as 
well  as  fairness  of  intention,  it  is  unquestion 
ably  a  departure  from  the  earlier  law  and 
its  intent.  The  insistence  on  a  jury  of  one's 
peers  and  of  the  vicinage  was  deliberately 
designed  to  make  it  easy  for  triers  to  take 
into  consideration  the  character  of  the 
parties — easy  and  intimate — because  of  their 
personal  knowledge  of  their  neighbors  and 
associates.  By  statutes  providing  for  the 
punishment  of  habitual  criminals,  by  im 
peachment  of  witnesses  on  evidence  solely 
of  "general  reputation  as  to  truth  and 
veracity,"  by  increased  penalties  for  re 
peated  offences,  and  remarks  of  police  judges  : 

citing  figures  of  John  H.  Ficklin,  Acting  Commissioner 
U.S.  Land  Office: 

Area  of  Texas 389,795  sq.  miles. 

"     ceded 53°»°49 

Gadsden  purchase 29,964         " 


Total 949,8o8 

Area   taken    by    Louisiana 

purchase 825,715  sq.  miles. 

To  balance 124,093        *' 


Total 949,808 


Character  is  Evidence          33 

"I  have  seen  you  here  too  often,"  it  is  ob 
vious  that  modern  trials  do  not  fail  to  make 
character  a  weighty  presumption. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  in  the  deter 
minations  of  public  opinion  general  character 
goes  far,  and  ought  to  go  very  far,  toward 
making  people  incredulous  of  charges  of 
baseness  made  against  men  of  honorable 
repute.  It  would  do  no  hurt  to  life  in 
civilized  lands,  were  slander  and  libel  met 
with  greater  incredulity. 

No  apology  is  due,  therefore,  for  some 
inquiry  as  to  the  character  of  the  "wolf 
and  the  lamb,"  as  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  United  States  of  Mexico, 
of  the  forties,  are  designated  by  the  average 
historian  and  biographer  in  description  of 
those  times,  and  of  the  dissensions  between 
the  great  Republic  and  that  other  alleged 
"sister  republic."  1 

1  Many  writers  follow  Schouler,  apparently  with 
school-boy  glee,  in  adapting  the  well-worn  ^Esop  fable 
for  application  to  our  Mexican  relations;  although 
Schouler  says  in  one  place  that  Mexico  was  the  lamb, 
and  in  another  (History  of  the  United  States,  James 
Schouler,  Boston,  1889.,  vol.  iv.,  p.  519)  that  she  '*  was 
not  the  lamb  dumb  before  her  shearers." 
3 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  WOLF 

HTHE  general  character  of  the  American 
A  people  will  receive  short  comment  in 
this  necessarily  limited  review.  President 
Roosevelt  is  quoted  for  authority  that  west 
ern  settlers  were  believers  in  that  "  manifest 
destiny,"  allusion  to  which  Niles  and  Benton 
deprecated  in  the  Senate. 

But  the  piety  of  the  controlling  minds  in 
these  colonies  gave  lasting  respect  for  good 
conduct  and  honorable  dealing;  and  the 
institutions,  governmental  and  educational, 
which  they  at  once  put  in  force,  were  not 
such  as  to  cultivate  greed,  insolence,  or  bad 
fellowship.  Since  1638  and  the  adoption  in 
Connecticut  of  the  first  written  constitution, 
manhood  suffrage  and  representative  dem 
ocracy,  to  be  followed  soon  and  logically 
by  practical  religious  independence,  have 

34 


The  Wolf  35 

furnished  the  precedents  on  which  progress 
in  all  humane  and  civilized  governments 
has  been  guided ;  while,  dating  only  from  the 
National  Constitution  of  1787,  our  Govern 
ment  has  maintained  a  normal  outgrowth 
of  its  institutions  long  enough  to  have  become 
the  oldest  of  the  civilized  governments  under 
one  fundamental  law. 

Free  institutions  naturally  lead,  through 
appreciation  of  peoples,  to  kindly  foreign 
relations. 

When  kings  and  nobles  governed,  their  sym 
pathies  were  with  crowned  heads;  when  the 
people  were  admitted  to  a  share  in  the  govern 
ment  (in  1832),  England  favored  constitutional 
freedom  in  other  states,  and  became  the  idol 
of  every  nation  which  cherished  the  same 
aspirations  as  herself.1 

Limited  as  has  been  the  share  of  her 
people  in  the  government  of  England,  and 
controllable  as  is  the  idolatry  of  her  in  other 
nations,  there  can  be  little  question  that 
May  announces  a  correct  principle,  and  that 
it  was  to  have  been  anticipated  that  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  United  States,  how- 

1  The  Constitutional  History  of  England,  Thomas 
Erskine  May,  C.B.,  Boston,  1863,  vol.  ii.,  p.  577. 


3 6  The  Mexican  War 

ever  informally  conducted,  should  have  been 
on  the  whole  singularly  peaceful  and  friendly 
— as  has  proved  to  be  the  fact. 

It  has  frequently  been  sought  to  make  an 
exception  of  Indian  affairs,  and  with  too 
much  reason. 

But  for  occasional  occurrences  on  what 
was  for  a  long  time  an  almost  inaccessible 
border,  a  central  government  cannot  be  held 
to  severe  responsibility,  nor  for  the  outbreaks 
of  hostility  of  savages.  There  were  failures 
necessarily  in  disciplining  remote  offenders, 
and  mistakes  in  the  appointments  of  agents 
who  too  often  proved  lax  or  corruptible. 

High  official  action  and  policy,  however, 
such  as  is  properly  classed  as  national,  has 
been,  even  in  Indian  affairs,  for  the  most 
part  commendable. 

It  was  a  mistake,  perhaps,  to  have  rec 
ognized  at  all  the  tribal  relations,  and  to 
have  entered  into  treaty  with  native  coteries 
which  had  not  sufficient  organization  or 
cohesion  to  compel  the  observance  of  treaty 
stipulations  by  their  own  tribesmen  or  by 
trespassers  from  adjacent  tribes. 

But  this  mistake,  if  it  were  one,  was  made 
in  the  honorable  attempt  to  acknowledge 
the  rights  of  the  ignorant  and  the  vanquished ; 


The  Wolf  37 

and  was  in  admirable  contrast  to  the  manner 
in  which  most  of  the  territory  of  savages  had 
been  acquired  by  other  civilized  nations, 
from  Palestine  to  Peru. 

There  was  also  the  almost  unique  credit 
to  be  given  to  the  Nation,  to  the  States  it 
embraced  and  to  the  colonies  which  created 
them,  that  they  took  the  lands  they  occupied 
only  by  purchase  from  the  aborigines  or  as  the 
prize  of  defensive  wars  waged  with  no  limit 
but  annihilation.1 

Nomads  set  no  mere-stones,  and  keep  no 
records  of  surveyed  and  definite  boundaries. 
Misunderstandings  were  almost  unavoidable 
as  to  land  titles,  even  between  the  original 
parties  to  transactions  of  purchase  and  sale. 
This  was  especially  true  of  Mexican  grants, 
and  produced  many  of  the  questions  of  bound 
ary  and  rights  of  exploration  which  became 

i  "The  settlers  of  New  England  had  paid  for  their 
lands  in  every  case  except  that  of  the  Pequods." — 
The  Fall  of  New  France:  Essays  Historical  and  Literary, 
John  Fiske,  New  York,  1902,  vol.  ii.,  p.  95.  "It  was 
the  invariable  custom  of  European  settlers  on  the 
Atlantic  coast  to  purchase  the  lands  on  which  they 
settled,  and  the  transaction  was  usually  recorded  in  a 
deed  to  which  the  Sagamores  set  their  marks." — John 
Fiske  in  Atlantic  Monthly  and  New  France  and  New 
England,  pp.  237  and  238.  See  also  various  town 
records. 


38  The  Mexican  War 

embarrassing  later.  There  were  also  inter 
tribal  feuds,  and  irreconcilable  claims  ante 
dating  the  coming  of  the  white  man  to 
American  shores. 

If  a  Huron's  father  had  hunted  or  fished  in 
a  region,  he  claimed  that  region  as  his  hunting 
grounds,  whatever  other  tribe  might  have 
possessed  or  sold  it.  If  it  brought  a  good 
price,  he  would  be  the  surer  to  claim  it. 

And  his  first  notice  of  an  action  of  eject 
ment  against  settlers  was  quite  likely  to  be 
the  tomahawking  and  scalping  of  women  and 
children,  or  at  least  the  firing  of  barns  and 
dwellings. 

So  that  frequent  border  battles  were  un 
avoidable  by  the  most  peace-loving  pilgrims. 

It  is  difficult  for  the  dweller  in  the  ease  of 
our  modern  opulence,  with  its  especial 
dislike  of  sins  of  violence,  to  put  himself 
in  the  place  of  a  soldier  on  scout  duty,  or  of 
a  borderer  of  the  wilderness. 

It  shows  in  the  aggregate  an  exceptionally 
honorable  people,  that  never  has  a  native 
tribe  been  forced  away  from  its  inhabited 
possessions  but  after  our  government  had 
been  made  to  believe  that  it  had  by  arson  and 
murder,  secret  or  avowed,  made  its  neigh 
borhood  in  the  highest  degree  undesirable 


The  Wolf  39 

if  not  impossible;  and  even  then  it  was  paid 
for  its  lands  at  what  was  regarded — per 
haps  by  prejudiced  appraisers — a  reasonable 
valuation. 

There  have  been  many  and  just  regrets  that 
more  friendly  relations  have  not  been  uni 
formly  maintained  with  our  neighbors  on 
the  north  of  the  great  lakes  and  rivers.  But 
when  the  ambitious  character  is  considered 
of  two  enterprising  populations,  each  having 
savage  dependents,  in  juxtaposition  across 
an  imaginary  line — the  longest  international 
boundary  in  the  world,  and  in  many  places 
remote  from  either  centre  of  control — there 
remains  cause  for  congratulation  and  ad 
miration  of  the  mannerly  respect  for  mutual 
rights  manifested  on  either  side  of  the  line. 

The  history  of  American  diplomacy  is  a 
record  of  just,  frank,  and  friendly  dealing 
with  other  powers  to  such  extent  that, 
to-day,  the  methods  of  Franklin  are  said  to 
have  become  quite  the  fashion  of  the  civilized 
nations,  whose  chiefs  also  now  talk  with 
each  other  by  telegraph  instead  of  by  the 
mouths  of  ambitious  functionaries. 

The  history  of  our  foreign  relations  is  of 
some  five  or  ten  years  of  war  in  a  century 
and  a  quarter — three  or  four  wars,  the 


40  The  Mexican  War 

humbling  of  Barbary  and  Chinese  pirates, 
and  a  few  Indian  policing  campaigns,  as 
compared  with,  for  instance,  Great  Britain's 
twenty-six  wars,  with  rarely  a  peaceful  year, 
during  the  single  reign  of  Victoria. 

Our  position,  among  the  nations,  is  rec 
ognized  as  one  of  friendliness  to  all  men, 
with  a  strong  penchant  for  minding  our 
own  business  and  desiring  that  others  shall 
do  the  same,  especially  as  to  American 
republics. 

The  condemnation  of  the  Mexican  War,  by 
our  historians,  is  itself  evidence  of  tenderer 
conscience  than  is  common  to  ambitious 
peoples;  and  when  Dr.  Brady  adds  to  the 
stock  phrases:  "spoliation  of  a  weaker 
power"  and  "no  truly  patriotic  citizen  can 
think  of  it  without  a  sense  of  shame,"  it  is 
"  the  one  serious  blot  on  our  national  history," 
— or  as  one  would  say  in  a  police  court:  "  it 
is  his  first  offence" — he  strongly  endorses 
the  general  good  character  of  the  wolf — that 
wolf  which  in  international  relations  stands 
at  the  head  of  all  stipulators  for  free  high 
way  over  the  seas  and  the  rights  of  neutrals. 
First  to  extend  (at  Stony  Point)  the  privi 
leges  of  prisoners  of  war  to  a  garrison  taken 
by  assault  and  in  the  night.  First  to  give 


The  Wolf  41 

universal  amnesty  to  conquered  rebels  what 
ever  their  mistake.  First  in  all  advocacy  of 
arbitration  to  take  the  place  of  war.  And, 
in  the  very  case  in  question,  submitting  to 
arbitration  claims  against  Mexico  for  destruc 
tion  or  confiscation  of  the  property  of  Ameri 
can  merchants  and  the  imprisonment  and 
murder  of  American  citizens. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  WOLF'S  CUB 

'T'EXAS  was  a  legitimate  child  of  the 
1  United  States  and  one  to  be  almost 
unqualifiedly  proud  of.  She  followed  closely 
the  parent  traditions  of  peaceful  settlement 
manfully  defended.  It  has  not  seemed  so  to 
all  historians.  The  Texans  have  been  de 
scribed  as  "hardy  adventurers  from  our 
southwestern  States,  who,  despite  the  fact 
that  Mexico  had  abolished  slavery,  by 
presidential  decree,  took  their  slaves  with 
them"1;  although  people  of  the  character 
istic  colony  settled  under  express  guarantees 
of  protection  and  disclaimed  a  spirit  of 
adventure2;  many  settlers  came  from  the 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Ford  Rhodes, 
New  York,  1900,  vol.  i.,  pp.  70  and  88. 

2  Speech    of    Stephen    F.    Austin,    Louisville,    Ky., 
March  7,  1836.     History  of  South  America  and  Mexico, 

42 


The  Wolfs  Cub  43 

Atlantic  States,  notably  the  famous  scout, 
Deaf  Smith,  from  New  York,  the  diplomat 
Ashbel  Smith  and  the  Austins  originally 
from  Connecticut;  and  several  of  the  leaders 
were  from  "the  mouldering  State  of  Vir 
ginia,"  1  as  Schouler  describes  the  State 
which  he  invaded  with  the  3d  Mass. 

The  presidential  decree  abolishing  slavery 
in  Mexico  was  of  doubtful  validity.2  It 
not  only  exceeded  the  powers  of  the  President, 
but  the  Texans  were  at  once  notified  that 
the  order  did  not  apply  to  Texas  3  (the  only 
part  of  Mexico  in  which  there  were  slaves). 

They  had  taken  their  few  slaves  and  family 
servants  with  them  before  the  decree  was 

J.  M.  Niles,  Hartford,  1838,  vol.  ii.,  p.  270  and  infra 
pp.  96-7. 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Schouler,  Bos 
ton,  1889,  vol.  iv.,  p.  455. 

2  Niles,  vol.  i.,  p.  199. 

3  "On  September  15,  1829,  Guerrero,  then  the  Presi 
dent  or  Dictator,  published  a  decree  abolishing  slavery 
in  the  territory  of  the  Mexican  Republic,  which  was 
immediately  ratified  by  the  Congress  then  in  session. 
The  Texans  protested  against  this  decree,  and,  in  conse 
quence,  the  Department  of  Texas  was  exempted  from 
its   operation   on   December   2,    1829.    .     .     .    All   the 
enactments  regarding  slavery  were  aimed  at  Texas,  in 
asmuch  as  the  only  slavery  in  Mexico  existed  in  Texas 
among  the  American  colonists. — "Conquest  of  the  South 
west,  Cyrus  Townsend    Brady,  New  York,   1905, p.  33. 


44  The  Mexican  War 

issued,  and  not  only  by  the  permission  of  the 
Mexican  authorities,  but  by  such  a  standing 
invitation  incorporated  in  the  organic  law 
as  conferred  a  bonus  of  eighty  acres  of  land 
for  each  slave  imported  by  the  settlers.1 

Another  version  of  the  origin  of  Texas  is: 
"Mexico  emancipated  her  slaves  in  1827, 
but  her  northern  province,  Texas,  refused 
to  do  so,  and  soon  after  revolted  under  the 
leadership  of  Sam  Houston,"2 — who  did 
not  lead  until  the  revolution  was  complete, 
and  indeed  there  was  no  revolution — but  a 
strict  defence  of  vested  rights. 

Goldwin  Smith  says:  "Houston,  an  Ameri 
can  filibuster,  an  old  coinrade  of  Jackson, 
with  a  body  of  intrusive  Americans"  [he 
went  alone]  *  *  had  planted  himself  in  Texas, 
which  belonged  to  the  Republic  of  Mexico,"3 

1  History   of   the   Pacific   States  of   North   America, 
Hubert  Howe  Bancroft,  34  vols.,  San  Francisco,  1882- 
1890,  vol.  xvi.,  p.  60,  citing  White's  Colonial  Laws,  vol. 
i.,  pp.  586  and  587. 

2  History  of  the  United  States,  Henry  William  Elson, 
New  York,  1904,  pp.  496  and  497. 

Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1887, 
vol.  ii.,  p.  87. 

3  The   United  States,  Goldwin  Smith,  D.C.L.,  New 
York,  1893,  p.  209. 


The  Wolfs  Cub  45 

nation  which  "was  never  a  republic 
in  the  Saxon  interpretation  of  the  word,"1 
and  against  which  Houston  offered  no  violence 
until  in  a  strictly  defensive  war  he  obeyed 
the  orders  of  the  only  government  of  any 
sort  in  Texas,  as  the  chosen  commander  of 
its  army.  Both  these  and  other  writers,  not 
ably  Sumner,2  make  President  Andrew  Jack 
son  a  probable  conspirator  with  Houston.3 
Professor  Sumner,  generally  very  outspoken, 
adopts  the  style  of  history  by  innuendo. 
"That  Jackson  did  connive  at  an  enterprise 
of  Houston,  his  Florida  companion-in-arms, 
for  revolutionizing  Texas"  he  is  frank  enough 
to  say  "cannot  be  established  by  proof,  but 
is  sustained  by  very  strong  inference." 
Sumner  shows  himself  capable  of  that  very 
strong  inference.  He  acknowledges  indebt 
edness  to  a  "  Dr.  Mayo,  a  hanger-on  in 
Washington,  for  a  little  book  in  which 
most  of  the  Texan  intrigue  is  laid  bare." 
' '  Mayo  was  in  the  way  of  picking  up  certain 

1  The  United  States,  Edwin  Earle  Sparks,  New  York, 
1904,  part  ii.,  p.  130. 

2  Andrew  Jackson,  William  Graham  Sumner,  Boston, 
1882,  p.  354. 

3  Rhodes  quotes  Schouler,  vol.  iv.,  p.  251,  who  quotes 
John  Quincy  Adams'  opinion, 


46  The  Mexican  War 

information,  and  more  came  to  him  by 
accident."  Of  course  as  Sumner  concedes 
that  there  was  no  proof  of  even  connivance, 
whatever  that  may  be,  at  revolutionizing 
Texas,  which,  as  the  government  of  that 
country  was  in  decadence,  would  have  been 
in  one  sense  eminently  desirable  and  proper, 
"certain  information"  must  be  interpreted 
to  mean  "information  of  a  certain  sort." 
And  that  always  means  the  reverse  of  in 
formation  which  is  certain  in  the  sense  of 
trustworthy.  And  whether  Dr.  Mayo  was 
"in  the  way  of  picking  it  up"  through 
keyholes,  or  it  "came  to  him  by  accident" 
over  transoms,  is  not  stated. 

Sam  Houston,  as  he  always  called  himself, 
was  not  a  temperate  man  in  any  position 
except  in  command  of  troops,  where  he 
assuredly  kept  his  head  and  was  never 
criticised  for  lack  of  prudence.  It  may 
be  that  such  a  picker-up  of  information 
as  Dr.  Mayo,  was  intimate  with  him,  in  his 
own  opinion;  or  even  may  have  heard 
some  boastful  speech  of  the  old  hero,  who 
in  fact  had  been  a  brave  and  reliable  "com 
panion  in  arms"  of  the  President  in  his 
Florida  campaign ;  but  there  is  no  probability 
that  Houston  was  ever  intimate  with  Mayo, 


The  Wolf's  Cub  47 

and  Sumner's  introduction  does  not  tend 
to  give  weight  to  Mayo's  testimony.  The 
only  evidence  worthy  of  consideration,  which 
indicates  that  Jackson  lent  aid  to  Texan 
independence  is  the  fact  that  in  a  later  ad 
ministration  many  armed  men,  and  a  few 
organized  military  companies,  went  from  the 
United  States  into  Texas  and  joined  the 
Texan  forces  after  they  were  at  war  with 
savages.  Any  "strong  inference"  to  be 
made  from  the  ordering  of  General  Gaines 
to  the  Sabine  belongs  to  another  chapter. 
That  order,  too,  was  eminently  proper,  by 
reason  of  conditions  to  be  exhibited  in  their 
place. 

Yet  Sumner  so  vindictively  pursues  Jack 
son  through  three  administrations  as  to 
charge  that:  "The  Texan  intrigue  and 
the  Mexican  War  were  full  of  Jacksonian  acts 
and  principles.  .  .  .  The  army  and 
navy  were  corrupted  by  swagger  and  insub 
ordination  and  by  the  anxiety  of  the  officers 
to  win  popularity  by  the  methods  of  which 
Jackson  had  set  the  example."1  For  this 
insult  to  the  diplomatic,  military,  and  naval 
service  of  the  country,  Sumner  cites  not  a 

1  Andrew  Jackson,  Win.  Graham  Sumner,  Boston, 
1882,  pp.  358-9. 


48  The  Mexican  War 

single  authority,  and  gives  but  a  single 
instance — that  which  he  stigmatizes  as 
"Commodore  Porter's  outrage  at  Foxardo, 
Porto  Rico,  for  which  he  was  cashiered  in 
1824,"  a  generation  before  the  Mexican  War. 

David  Porter  was  suspended  from  com 
mand  six  months  for  having  resented,  the 
government  thought  too  hotly,  an  insult  to 
his  flag. 

The  one  irresistible  answer  to  any  attack 
upon  either  American  war  service  is  the 
record  of  the  campaigns  of  Scott  and  Taylor 
and  Kearney  and  their  Naval  supports; 
but  words  also  confront  Sumner  of  the 
highest  authorities.  "A  more  efficient  army 
for  its  number  and  armament  I  do  not 
believe  ever  fought  a  battle  than  the  one 
commanded  by  General  Taylor  in  his  first 
two  engagements  on  Mexican  (or  Texan) 
soil."1 

"Rarely  if  ever  was  there  a  better  disci 
plined  or  a  more  thoroughly  instructed  little 
army  than  the  one  commanded  by  General 
Taylor."2 

>  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,  New  York,  1895, 
vol.  i.,  p.  44,  note. 

3  History  of  the  Mexican  War,  General  Cadmus  M. 
Wilcox,  Washington,  1892,  p.  34. 


The  Wolfs  Cub  49 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  first 
railroads  were  built  during  Jackson's  ad 
ministration,  and  that  the  telegraph  was  not 
made  practicable  by  the  Morse  invention 
until  1844,  so  that  no  foreign  enlistment  act, 
however  strict,  could  have  been  enforced  in 
territorial  dimensions  such  as  were  those  of 
the  United  States,  and  upon  a  people  whose 
sympathies  and  passions  were  greatly  roused. 
Before  an  order  from  Washington  could 
reach  their  neighborhood  volunteers  would 
be  across  the  border.  Yet  from  this  period 
there  began  the  pursuance  of  what  Ladd, 
with  philosophic  discrimination,  character 
izes  as  a  "  double  policy."1  The  endeavor 
was  made  to  conciliate  Northern  anti- 
slavery  elements  by  soft  words  to  Mexico, 
while  urging  a  purchase  of  a  portion  of  her  I 
territory  and  claims  of  indemnity  for  breaches  j 
of  international  obligation,  which  had  South 
ern  approval. 

Anything  like  inconsistency  and  double 
policy  has  always  an  undignified  look,  and 
for  so  much  the  domestic  politics  of  the  day 
are  open  to  criticism.  It  does  not  follow 
therefrom  that  there  was  any  ground  for 

1  History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Horatio  O.  Ladd, 
New  York,  1883,  p.  35. 
4 


50  The  Mexican  War 

complaint,  to  adopt  Judge  Niles's  language, 
"  so  far  as  Mexico  was  concerned." 

Discrimination  between  an  unwise  foreign 
policy  and  an  unjust  one  was  something 
of  which  few  other  than  Niles  seem  to  have 
been  capable  amid  the  passions  of  his  day; 
but  it  is  surely  time  for  historians  to  recognize 
that  what  might  be  inconvenient  for  the 
republic  might  not  necessarily  be  a  crime 
against  its  neighbor,  and  that  an  undignified 
trimming  to  political  breezes  at  home  gave 
no  proof  that  the  batteries  of  the  ship  of  state 
were  being  trained  on  an  innocent  adversary 
abroad.1 

It  is  sad  that  one  so  capable  of  historic 
discrimination  as  to  have  pointed  out  the 
' 'double  policy"  of  administrations  should 
fall  into  so  gross  error  as  does  Mr.  Ladd 
in  his  estimate  of  Texan  character.  Con 
demning  the  war  as  a  pro-slavery  measure, 
he  justly  records  that  "such  tragedies  as 
those  of  Goliad  and  the  Alamo  gave  to 
Mexican  character  a  most  hateful  repu 
tation  in  the  United  States;  but"  (he  con- 

1  "The  right  of  the  war  was  altogether  a  different 
thing  from  the  expediency  of  it." — Letters  and  Times 
of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner  Tyler,  Richmond,  1885, 
vol.  ii.,  p.  444. 


The  Wolfs  Cub  51 

eludes)  "  there  was  little  difference  in  this 
respect  between  the  rough,  border  Texans 
of  those  days  and  their  Mexican  neigh 
bors."  i 

For  this  censure  on  the  early  Texans,  Mr. 
Ladd  quotes  not  a  line  of  authority,  nor 
points  out  a  single  instance  of  Texan  breach 
of  rules  of  honorable  warfare.  Indeed,  he 
cites  no  authorities  for  any  of  his  statements. 
And  the  fairly  careful  reader  of  any  of  the 
accounts  of  border  warfare  in  Texas  would 
be  tempted  to  denounce  the  author  of  such  a 
slur,  as  either  unpardonably  ignorant  of  the 
matter,  or  incapable  of  discerning  more  than 
a  "  little  difference"  between  paroling  prison 
ers  of  war  and  murdering  them,  and  giv 
ing  to  slaughter  and  ravage  women  and 
children. 

But  there  has  been  some  natural  confusion 
as  to  the  character  of  Texan  settlements. 
In  the  efforts  made  by  Spain  to  establish 
her  right  to  a  northerly  boundary  on  the 
Sabine  or  the  Mississippi,  early  colonies  were 
planted  between  the  Rio  Grande  and  the 
Sabine,  and  the  district  called  New  Philip 
pines,  most  of  the  settlers  being  from  the 

1  History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Horatio  O.  Ladd, 
New  York,  1883,  p.  34. 


52  The  Mexican  War 

Philippine  Islands.1  These  were  failures, 
and  their  total  population  had  shrunk  to 
about  four  thousand.2  General  Grant  says 
that  in  Taylor's  march  to  the  Rio  Grande: 
"No  inhabitants  were  found  until  about 
thirty  miles  from  San  Antonio;  some  were 
living  under  ground  for  fear  of  the  Indians."  3 
At  San  Antonio,  in  1813,  out  of  two  thousand 
five  hundred  Americans  and  Texans  all  but 
about  one  hundred  were  slain  and  seven 
hundred  peaceable  inhabitants  murdered. 
Yoakum  places  a  thousand  pirates  on  Gal- 
veston  Island  as  early  as  1817.  There  seems 
to  be  no  denial  that  Lafitte  had  some  of 
his  men  in  Jackson's  lines  at  New  Orleans, 
whether  from  Galveston  or  Barataria. 

There  had  been  some  strength  added  to 
filibustering  expeditions  by  these  island 
pirates.  General  Mina,  son  of  the  distin 
guished  leader  General  Mina  of  the  Constitu 
tional  Cause  in  Spain,  was  joined  by  Aury 

1  Note,  Report  of  Com.  of  Investigation,  sent  by  Mexi 
can  Government,  New  York,  1875,  p.  318. 

2  The  total  population  of  Texas  in  1834  by  the  official 
report  of  Col.  Juan  Almonte  to  the  Mexican  Govern 
ment  was  21,000  whites   and  15,300  Indians,  although, 
according  to  Williams,   "this  estimate  of  the  Indian 
population  was  the  sheerest  guesswork." 

3  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,  vol.  i.,  p.  48. 


The  Wolf's  Cub  53 

and  reinforced  the  ''Independents"  in  the 
splendid  but  disastrous  attempt  to  displace 
the  Mexican  Dictator  Teran  in  1816.  This 
was  more  nearly  foundation  for  a  charge 
against  the  United  States  of  favoring  fili 
busters  than  any  later  event.  Mina  "ob 
tained  some  officers  and  additional  muskets 
and  some  pecuniary  aid  from  Baltimore 
and  New  Orleans,"  but  as  the  occurrence 
was  under  Madison,  President,  and  Monroe, 
Secretary,  it  has  not  been  made  prominent  in 
the  impeachment  of  Texas. 

There  had  been  similar  unsuccessful  little 
expeditions  into  Texas.  These  had  no  per 
manent  effect  on  Texas  any  more  than  did  the 
piratical  establishments  at  Barataria  upon 
Louisiana.  Nor  was  the  settlement  at  Nacog- 
doches  of  any  influence  in  the  eventual 
formation  of  Texan  character,  unless  in 
inspiring  the  Spanish  residents  with  love 
of  liberty. 

Early  boundary  disputes  had  given  to  a 
tract  of  land  east  of  the  Sabine  near  Natchi- 
toches,  in  Louisiana,  the  title  "the  neutral 
ground."  After  the  treaty  of  1819  (which 
made  the  Sabine  the  boundary)  this  tract  was 
subject  to  the  United  States.  Neither  the 
United  States,  Spain,  nor  Mexico  had  exer- 


54  The  Mexican  War 

cised  anything  like  a  decent  jurisdiction  over 
it ;  and  it  had  been  a  resort  of  ruined  despera 
does,  escaped  convicts  and  fugitives  from  jus 
tice — perhaps  most  of  them  from  the  United 
States,  as  Mexico  furnished  other  places  for 
such  riff-raff,  often  places  of  official  distinc 
tion.  After  1819  the  territory  was  soon  re 
duced  to  reasonable  order.  Localities  which 
are  not  subject  to  liberal  extradition  laws  and 
practice  are  very  liable  to  abuse  of  hospitality ; 
and  "Gone  to  Texas"  at  a  very  early  date 
acquired  as  uncomplimentary  construction 
as  was  afterward  coupled  with  "Gone  to 
Canada,"  a  phrase  which  has  never  been 
advanced  as  a  serious  impeachment  of 
Canadian  character. 

Disputes  over  land  titles,  always  rife  under 
Spanish  or  Mexican  grants — for  failure  of 
title  meant  reversion  to  the  crown,  or,  worse, 
to  the  crown's  vice-regents1 — culminated  in 
the  '  *  Fredonian  war, ' '  in  which  ' '  the  outlaws ' ' 
under  Hayden  Edwards  were  easily  sup 
pressed,  the  colonists  under  Austin  taking 
part  with  the  Mexican  authorities  such  as 
they  were.  The  only  important  event  was 
the  sparing  from  slaughter  of  prisoners  of 

1  Niles.  vol.  i.,  p.  65. 


The  Wolfs  Cub  55 

war — on  Austin's  insistence.  This  was  an 
innovation.1 

Refugees  from  justice  or  ''intrusive  Ameri 
cans"  had  no  association  with  Houston 
and  probably  furnished  no  greater  proportion 
of  population  to  Texas  than  convicts  to 
early  Virginia  or  Australia,  or  perhaps  even 
to  New  England;  and  they  had  no  share 
in  Texan  government  until  after  the  popu 
lation  of  Nacogdoches  had  been  greatly  modi 
fied  in  its  quality  by  later  settlements,  when 
that  locality  was  represented  in  Texan 
legislatures  and  conventions. 

There  was,  however,  a  later  and  unique 
class  of  adventurers  who  came  to  Texas 
not  as  settlers,  and  who  made  a  lasting 
impress  on  her  destinies,  although  their  lives 
there  were  mostly  short  and  their  descendants 
few. 

After  it  became  apparent  that  the  infant 
settlements  of  the  Brazos  were  to  be  set  in 
battle  against  pitiless  Mexican  and  Indian 
hordes,  there  joined  the  Texan  standards  a 
few  hundred  recruits  from  many  parts  of 

1  "At  the  instance  of  Austin  the  Mexicans  released 
the  few  prisoners  taken,  doing  them  no  harm — the  one 
case  of  such  clemency  on  record." — The  Conquest  of 
the  Southwest,  Cyrus  Townsend  Brady,  New  York, 
I9°5.  P-  35- 


5  6  The  Mexican  War 

the  United  States,  friends  and  relatives  of, 
or  sympathizers  with,  the  imperilled  colonists. 
The  larger  part  of  these  were  probably  of 
slaveholding  proclivities,  though  they  brought 
no  slaves  with  them.  The  eagerness  of  their 
muster  and  the  supreme  devotion  with  which 
they  laid  down  their  lives  mark  the  in 
spiration  of  a  noble  motive,  and  enforce  the 
belief  that  political  or  economic  impulses  were 
less  their  passion  than  love  of  kindred  and 
joy  of  battle  for  unpolluted  homes.  Joy  of 
battle  simply  may  have  been  the  motive 
of  some  of  them.  There  is  a  gaudium  cer- 
taminis.  Yet  the  rudest  of  these  recruits 
was  much  like  the  knight-errant  of  mediaeval 
guests.  The  coonskin  cap  had  replaced 
the  helmet ;  an  eagle  feather,  the  golden  dra 
gon  or  other  armorial  crest ;  lance  and  shield 
had  given  place  to  the  deadlier  armament  of 
hunting-knife  and  rifle. 

Others  were  in  the  uniform  of  hastily  im 
provised  military  companies.  They  had 
their  code  of  honor,  no  less  obligatory  than 
that  of  Malta  or  the  Temple,  and  no  less 
commendable.  Whatever  other  laxities  were 
permissible,  lying  and  cowardice  were  not. 
What  they  reported  is  true  as  they  saw  it. 

Their  skill  and  valor  made  them  as  formid- 


The  Wolfs  Cub  57 

able  opponents  as  the  world  had  seen.  They 
were  less  venal  than  many  of  the  earlier 
knights  and  soldiers  of  fortune.  Their  serv 
ices  were  not  sold  but  freely  given. 
.  Among  the  volunteers  from  the  United 
States  in  the  Texan  service,  the  names 
stand  conspicuous  of  Colonel  James  Bowie 
and  Colonel  David  Crockett,  author,  hunter, 
Congressman,  whose  diatribes  against  Jack 
son  were  more  violent  and  wittier  than  any 
modern  historian's.  Few  novels  of  frontier 
life  at  that  period  went  to  a  second  edition 
which  were  not  virtually  based  on  their 
biographies;  and  the  boys  who  hid  Crockett 
or  Mayne  Reid  in  hayricks  for  unobserved 
reading,  got  truer  impressions  of  Texas  than 
those  now  brought  up  strictly  on  school 
histories.  All  truth  can  be  misrepresented 
or  distorted  in  the  telling,  but  some  truths 
it  is  not  within  the  power  of  human  speech 
to  exaggerate  or  even  to  adequately  portray. 

William  Barrett  Travis  gave  up  his  law 
practice  in  North  Carolina  (or  Alabama)  to 
win  eternal  fame  as  the  commander  in  the 
unparalleled  defence  of  the  Alamo. 

Samuel  Houston  from  an  Indian  wigwam 
had  risen  to  a  command  in  the  Florida  war, 
and  to  an  Indian  agency  honorably  and 


58  The  Mexican  War 

humanely  administered.  He  had  won  the 
confidence  of  settlers  and  Indians  alike;  and 
if  Jackson  influenced  at  all  Houston's  deter 
mination  to  join  the  Texan  settlers,  it  was 
greatly  to  his  credit  to  have  induced  the 
presence  on  a  doubly*  imperilled  frontier 
of  that  man  who  in  his  day  stood  first  in 
ability  to  conciliate  the  elements  of  border 
discord.  It  was  from  the  great  unsurveyed 
wilderness  beyond  the  Red  River  that  raids 
on  our  own  settlers  were  to  be  anticipated. 

After  war  between  Texas  and  Mexico  broke 
out  Houston  was  made  commander  of  the 
eastern  army  of  Texas,  next  commander-in- 
chief,  then  first  president  of  Texas,  and 
later  United  States  senator.1 

One  ''volunteer"  resigned  his  rank  in 
the  United  States  army  to  cast  in  his  lot 
with  the  Texans,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  of 
Connecticut  ancestry,  of  whom  General 
John  B.  Gordon  says:  "In  him  more  than  in 
.any  other  man  at  that  period  when  he  was 
killed  at  Shiloh  were  centred  the  hopes  of 
the  Southern  people."2  General  Grant,  who 

1  Sam  Houston  and  the  War  of  Independence  in  Texas, 
Alfred  M.  Williams,  Boston,  1893. 

2  Reminiscences  of  the  Civil  War,  General  John  B. 
Gordon,  C.S.A.,  New  York,  1895,  p.  125. 


The  Wolf's  Cub  59 

was  his  adversary  at  Shiloh,  says  of  him: 
"His  contemporaries  at  West  Point  and 
officers  generally  who  came  to  know  him 
later  .  .  .  expected  him  to  prove  the  most 
formidable  man  to  meet  the  Confederacy 
would  produce." 

He  proved  to  be  "undecided  and  vacil 
lating,"  in  chief  command  .  .  .  but  "was 
a  man  who  would  not  abandon  what  he 
deemed  an  important  trust  in  the  face  of 
danger,  and  continued  in  the  saddle  com 
manding  until  so  exhausted  by  the  loss  of 
blood  that  he  had  to  be  taken  from  his  horse 
and  soon  after  died.  .  .  .  He  was  a  man 
of  high  character  and  ability."  1 

Other  volunteers  capable  for  council  no 
less  than  war  were  the  Virginia  Whartons, 
one  President  of  the  Council,  the  other  Secre 
tary  of  the  Navy;  Thomas  J.  Rusk  of  South 
Carolina,  Secretary  of  War,  Commander  of 
the  Texan  army,  Chief  Justice  and  United 
States  Senator;  David  G.  Burnet  of  New 
Jersey,  Provisional  President;  Doctor  Branch 
T.  Archer  of  Virginia,  President  of  the 
Committee  of  Public  Safety;  Thomas  J. 
Chambers,  first  Chief  Justice  of  the  mis- 

1  Personal  Memoirs,  U.  S.  Grant,  New  York,  1895, 
vol.  i.,  p.  297. 


60  The  Mexican  War 

joined  provinces  of  Coahuila  and  Texas; 
Henry  Smith  of  Kentucky,  first  Provisional 
Governor  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
under  Houston  when  the  wonderful  restora 
tion  was  made  of  Texan  finance. 

These  volunteers  gave  much  to  Texan 
tradition.  They  ' '  had  nobly  come  to  the  aid 
of  their  brethren  in  this  unequal  contest,"  1 
and  had  helped  them  in  civic  formation  as 
well  as  in  line  of  battle.  But  there  were 
few  of  them  who  survived  the  first  onset  of 
the  thousands  of  Mexico. 

If  the  impression  they  made  on  Texan 
character  was  mainly  ideal,  it  was  because 
their  remnant  was  of  very  few,  and  because 
the  character  of  the  Texas  people  had  a 
fixed  and  durable  existence  before  the 
volunteers  came  to  save  it  from  destruc 
tion. 

'  The  real  root  and  foundation  of  the 
prosperity  and  growth  of  Texas  was  in  the 
colony  of  Stephen  F.  Austin  on  the  Brazos.2 
The  character  of  the  Austins,  for  whom 
the  capital  of  the  State  of  Texas  was 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  John  M.  Niles, 
Hartford,  1837,  vol.  i.,  p.  209. 

2  Sam  Houston  and  the  War  of  Independence  in  Texas, 
Alfred  M.  Williams,  Boston,  1893,  p.  58. 


The  Wolfs  Cub  61 

named,    gave  much    to     the    character   of 
Texas.1 

Moses  Austin  was  the  founder  of  this 
colony,  which  was  brought  to  a  state  of 
prosperity  by  his  son.  Moses  Austin  was 
born  in  Durham,  Connecticut,  in  1764. 
He  married  Maria  Brown  of  Philadelphia, 
established  a  commercial  business  in  Rich 
mond,  Virginia,  and  with  his  brother  Stephen, 
who  was  at  the  head  of  a  large  export  house  in 
Philadelphia,  set  up  smelting  works  on  New 
River,  Wythe  County,  Virginia,  opening  lead 
mines  and  manufacturing  shot  and  sheet 
lead.  Meeting  with  reverses  from  adven 
turous  speculation  (this  was  the  first  venture 
of  the  sort  in  the  United  States),  he  took  a 
grant  from  the  Governor  General  of  Louisiana 
of  a  league  of  land  at  Potosi,  moved  there  with 
his  family  and  founded  Washington  County, 
Missouri.  He  became  a  large  stockholder 
in  the  Bank  of  St.  Louis,  and  on  its  ruin  in 
1818  surrendered  the  whole  of  his  property 
to  the  bank's  creditors.  In  his  55th  year 
he  attempted  a  large  colony  in  Texas. 
He  went  to  Antonio  de  Bexar  with  his 

i  "  It  was  the  Austins  who  gave  character  to  the  Texan 
settlements." — History  of  South  America  and  Mexico , 
John  M.  Niles,  Hartford,  1838,  vol.  i.,  pp.  254-93, 


62  The  Mexican  War 

petition  and  was  referred  to  the  Commandant 
General.  He  went  to  Mexico  for  an  answer, 
and  on  his  return  journey  through  1200 
miles  of  wilderness  died  of  privation,  June 
10,  1821,  leaving  to  his  son  who  was  already 
with  him,  an  injunction  to  continue  his  work. 
Such  was  the  pioneer  in  the  founding  of  Texas. 
The  son,  Stephen  Fuller  Austin,  whom 
Houston  called  "the  father  of  Texas,"  and 
Pease,  "the  father  of  the  colony,"1  also,  as 
Brady  says,2  "literally  gave  his  life  for 
his  country."  ...  "A  pure  and  un 
selfish  patriot,  a  devoted  and  disinterested 
public  servant,  a  prudent  and  far-seeing 
statesman,  a  cultivated,  high-minded  gentle 
man  and  a  kindly  and  generous  philanthro 
pist";  to  which  it  may  be  added  that  he  was 
a  capable  general  of  a  Texan  army,  from  the 
command  of  which  he  was  relieved  to  act 
as  special  commissioner  to  the  United  States, 
and  as  such  exhibited  the  highest  qualifica 
tions  as  a  diplomat  and  an  orator.3  He 

1  History  of  South  America  and   Mexico,  John    M. 
Niles,  with  account  of  Texan  Revolution  and  War  by 
L.  T.  Pease,  Hartford,  1837,  p.  361. 

2  Conquest  of  the  Southwest,  Cyrus  Townsend  Brady, 
New  York,  1908,  p.  138. 

3  Speech  at  Louisville,  March  7,  1836,  Niles,  pp.  269 
and  279. 

"  He  may  have  been  at  times  too  sensible  of  colonial 


The  Wolfs  Cub  63 

was  born  in  Austinville,  Wythe  County, 
Virginia,  in  1793.  In  1804  he  was  a  pupil  in 
the  academy  of  Colchester,  Connecticut,  in 
1805  in  the  near-by  academy  in  New  London. 
At  the  age  of  fifteen  he  was  in  the  Transyl 
vania  University,  Kentucky,  and  at  twenty 
was  a  member  of  the  Kentucky  Legislature. 
In  1819  he  went  to  Little  Rock,  Arkansas, 
where  he  was  made  Circuit  Judge.  Upon 
his  father's  death  in  1821,  observant  of  a 
dying  wish,  he  took  up  the  task  of  pressing 
the  petition  to  the  Spanish  government  for 
a  land  grant.  This  he  obtained  from  the 
Supreme  Government  of  the  East  Internal 
Province.  He  was  to  settle  three  hundred 
families,  each  settler  to  be  entitled  to  640 
acres,  plus  320  acres  if  he  had  a  wife,  plus 
100  acres  for  each  child,  and  80  acres  for 
each  slave.1 

With  a  special  commissioner  of  the  province 


obligations  to  Mexico,  but  to  him  belongs  the  great 
honor  of  giving  the  revolution  clear  moral  defensi- 
bility." — Texas,  a  Contest  of  Civilizations,  George  Pierce 
Garrison,  Boston,  1905,  p.  183. 

i  History  of  the  Pacific  States  of  North  America, 
Hubert  Howe  Bancroft,  34  vols.,  San  Francisco,  1882- 
1890,  vol.  xvi.,  p.  61,  citing  White's  Colonial  Laws,  i., 
586-7. 


64  The  Mexican  War 

and  seventeen  companions  he  proceeded  to 
Antonio  de  Bexar,  then  to  Bahia,  and  ex 
plored  up  the  rivers  Brazos  and  Colorado 
(of  Texas),  where  was  an  uninhabited  wil 
derness.  Then  he  went  to  Louisiana  and 
advertised  for  land -purchasers.  Meantime 
Mexico  started  on  its  series  of  revolutions; 
Austin  was  compelled  to  obtain  renewal 
of  his  grant  from  the  dictator  Iturbide,  then 
from  the  republic,  then  from  another  dictator. 
He  paused  from  his  colonizing  work  long 
enough  to  make  an  apparently  successful 
attempt  to  give  solidity  to  the  Mexican 
government. 

In  1823  he  delivered  a  "pro jet  of  a  con 
stitution  for  the  Republic  of  Mexico  to  his 
friend  Ramos  Arizpe  who,  as  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Constitution,  reported 
the  Constitution  of  1824,  as  adopted  .  .  . 
which  seems  to  have  been  but  the  elaboration 
of  Austin's."1  This  was  the  constitution 
which  gave  to  Niles  his  generous  hopes  for 
the  future  of  the  Mexican  republic,2  and  but 
for  the  criminal  perversity  of  her  leaders 
Stephen  Fuller  Austin  might  have  been  the 

1  Bibliography  of  Texas,  C.  W.  Raines,  of  Texas  His 
torical  Society,  1896,  p.  14. 

2  Supra,  p.  26. 


The  Wolfs  Cub  65 

father  of  Mexico  in  only  a  more  limited 
sense  than  he  was  the  father  of  Texas. 

With  apparently  stronger  guaranties  of 
constitutional  government,  Austin  got  a  great 
increase  of  promised  privileges.1 

Under  the  revised  grants,  to  each  settler 
with  his  family  was  to  be  allotted  about  4605 
acres.  An  excellent  agricultural  and  graz 
ing  colony  was  soon  established.  That  the 
colonists  held  a  few  slaves  was  a  blemish 
on  their  institutions,  but  it  was  not  an  in 
delible  stain  on  their  lives  and  characters. 
The  ownership  of  man  is  revolting  to  humane 
ideals.  Practically  there  was  much  to  excuse 
the  settlers.  No  family  in  whatever  need 
could  obtain  a  cook  or  a  stable  boy  or  a 
nurse  except  by  purchase.  The  home  mis 
sionaries  of  our  southwestern  borders,  as  late 
as  in  the  fifties,  considered  themselves 
compelled  ''to  take  their  slaves  with  them"; 
and  were  well  rated  for  it  by  Rev.  Dr.  Leon 
ard  Bacon.2 

Practically    too,    and    except    in    name, 

1  For  special  guaranties  see  speech  at   Louisville, 
March  7,  1836,  Niles,  i.,  p.  271. 

2  Records  of  convention  of  society  at   Hartford.     I 
remember  no  reference,  but  have  a  distinct  personal 
recollection  of  the  debate. — C.  H.  O. 


66  The  Mexican  War 

such  slavery  as  ever  subsisted  in  the  Brazos 
colony  was  for  the  slaves  an  enviable  lot 
compared  with  the  peonage  system  which 
subsisted  in  Mexico.  The  ownership  which 
shocks  our  ideals  has  as  one  effect  a  strong 
incentive  to  humane  treatment  to  the  chattel. 
Brutality  to  slave,  or  horse,  carries  penalty 
to  an  owner  in  loss  of  service.  Something 
akin  to  old  age  service  pension  was  also 
an  almost  invariable  adjunct  of  slavery. 
Hardly  a  plantation  was  without  its  decrepit 
old  "mammies  and  uncles,"  who  by  the 
unwritten  law  of  "the  families"  were  entitled 
to  draw  rations  and  equipments.  It  is 
shame  enough  that  under  the  law  there 
could  be  exceptions — or  that  there  could  be 
slavery  at  all — but  there  never  was  under 
slavery  so  bad  a  condition  of  the  poor  as 
under  the  peonage  of  Mexico.1 

David  A.  Wells  quotes  from  the  report  of 
Consul  General  Strother  to  the  State  De 
partment,  December,  1885,  "  The  scale  of 
living  of  the  laboring  classes  is  decidedly 
inferior  in  comfort  and  neatness  to  that  of 
the  negroes  of  the  Southern  States  where  is 

1  Niles,  pp.  73,  74,  75.  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa 
Fe  Expedition,  George  Wilkins  Kendall,  New  York,  1844, 
vol.  ii.,  pp.,  112,  113,  122. 


The  Wolfs  Cub  67 

slavery"1;  and  adds  that  "  land-owners  will 
not  employ  a  laborer  unless  sold  with  a 
debt  which  he  never  can  pay,"  and  which 
he  is  compelled  to  work  out  hopelessly  so 
long  as  capable — cast  loose  and  left  to  starve 
or  steal  when  decrepitude  comes  upon  him.2 

At  this  age  of  the  world  no  defence  of 
slavery  is  possible  or  could  be  desired.  Its 
warmest  apologists  have  long  since  come  to 
rejoice  at  its  elimination  from  our  problems. 
But  when  it  is  sought  to  cast  shame  upon 
the  nation  because  it  waged  a  war  or  furnished 
colonists  whereby,  as  a  collateral  effect,  the 
slavery  it  soon  abolished  seemed  likely  to  be 
extended,  it  is  well  to  remember  that  even 
slavery  extension  would  have  stood  to  the 
credit  side  of  accounts  with  progress  of 
humanity  in  that  it  went  pari  passu  with 
the  displacement  of  peonage.3 

The  laborers  on  the  haciendas 

are  many  of  them  slaves — slaves  to  all  intents 
and  purposes,  although  they  may  enjoy  a  nom 
inal  liberty.  A  large  proportion  of  them,  prob- 

» A  Study  of  Mexico,  David  A.  Wells,  New  York,  1 887 , 

P-  95- 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  27,  28-29. 

3 "  If  any  individual  in  Texas  owes  but  twenty -five 
cents,  the  creditor,  by  application  to  the  alcade.can 


68  The  Mexican  War 

ably,  are  in  some  way  indebted  to  the  proprietor, 
the  law  giving  him  a  lien  upon  their  services 
until  such  debts  are  paid;  but  most  especial 
good  care  does  he  take  that  they  never  pay  him 
so  long  as  their  services  are  in  any  way  pro 
fitable.  They  are  in  his  debt  and  are  kept  so 
until  age  or  infirmity  renders  their  labor  unpro 
ductive;  then  the  obligation  is  cancelled,  and 
they  are  cast  upon  the  world  to  beg,  steal,  or 
starve  as  best  they  may. 

Should  some  one  of  the  peons,  more  active, 
ambitious  or  enterprising  than  his  fellows,  chance 
to  accumulate  enough  money  to  pay  his  debt 
and  regain  his  liberty,  how  then?  He  offers  his 
master  the  price  of  his  redemption,  but  the 
latter,  upon  some  flimsy  pretext,  refuses  to  take 
it — he  has  not  yet  done  with  the  services  of  the 
vigorous  servant.  He  bribes  his  creature  the 
alcade,  who  "shuts  his  eyes  to  justice,  opens  his 
hand  to  the  longer  purse  of  the  proprietor,  and 
the  unfortunate  serf  is  once  more  driven  to 
bondage.1 

The  rude  adobe  hovels  of  the  common  laborers 

have  him,  with  his  family,  decreed  to  his  service,  and  re 
main  in  that  state  of  slavery  until  he  is  able  to  pay  the 
debt  from  the  wages  accruing  from  his  labor  after  being 
compelled  to  subsist  his  dependent  family." — Houston 
to  Santa  Anna,  March  21,  1842.  History  of  Texas,  H. 
Yoakum,  New  York,  1856,  vol.  ii.,  p.  556. 

i  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  George 
William  Kendall,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1844,  vol.  ii.,p.  113. 


The  Wolfs  Cub  69 

built  of  dried  mud],  frequently  have  but  one 
room,  in  which  the  whole  family,  father  and 
mother,  brothers  and  sisters,  sons-in-law  and 
daughters-in-law,  huddle  together  upon  one 
common  earthen  floor.1 

The  two  or  three  hundred  inhabitants  of  San 
Sebastian  do  not  more  than  half  live.  Their 
little  huts  are  built  of  small  stones  and  mud, 
without  doors  or  windows;  they  have  neither 
chairs  nor  beds,  nor  in  fact  furniture  of  any 
kind — in  fine,  are  infinitely  worse  off  than  Choc- 
taw  or  Cherokee  Indians,  not  only  as  regards 
clothing  and  food,  but  habitations  and  all  the 
necessaries  of  life.2 

A  mortgage  on  a  man  may  be  worse  for 
him  than  ownership  in  fee. 

But  slavery  had  little  influence  on  the 
Texan  colony;  there  was  little  of  it.  It  was 
on  their  own  hands  and  heads  that  the 
settlers  must  rely.  To  the  south  and  west 
of  them  was  the  "  lamb"  of  which  more  in 
another  chapter.  Along  the  gulf  were  the 
Carancachua  Indians,  whose  attacks  were 
repulsed  only  by  early  and  desperate  war; 
the  pirates  of  Aury  and  Lafitte,  and  later 
the  Spanish  ships.  To  the  west  and  north 

1  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  F6  Expedition,  vol.  ii., 
112-113. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  122. 


?o  The  Mexican  War 

and  all  about  them  the  Apaches,  the 
Comanches,  the  Pawnees,  the  Caddos  and  the 
Lipans. 

They  formed  an  orderly,  industrious  agri 
cultural  community,  almost  altogether  self- 
governing  ;  for  the  nearest  Mexican  authority 
was  five  hundred  miles  away  across  the  great 
river  and  an  intervening  wilderness,  at  Sal- 
tillo  in  Coahuila,  where  they  were  allowed 
two  representatives;  and  their  local  self- 
government  was  guaranteed  to  them  under 
a  republican  constitution  which  was  a 
condition  precedent  and  a  part  of  their 
contract  of  settlement.  Convicts  and  ref 
ugees  from  justice  were  excluded  from  the 
colony.  Doors  were  without  locks.  A  few 
English,  Irish,  and  Germans,  descendants  of 
Pilgrim  fathers,  Hollanders,  Virginia  cava 
liers,  South  Carolina  Huguenots,  hunters 
from  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  met  in  friend 
ship  in  Texas. 

Contrary  to  her  plighted  faith,  Mexico  gave 
them  no  protection.1  They  defended  their 

1  What  were  Mexico's  guaranties  to  the  colonists  and 
what  her  failure  absolute,  see  speech  of  Stephen  F. 
Austin,  Louisville,  March  7,  1836,  Niles,  pp.  269-279. 
"A  country  we  have  redeemed  from  the  wilderness 
and  conquered  without  any  aid  or  protection  from, 
the  Mexican  government." 


The  Wolf's  Cub  71 

lives  and  property  by  their  own  valor  against 
the  wild  beasts  and  the  wilder  savages. 
They  supplied  their  larders  from  their  own 
acres  and  from  the  spoils  of  the  hunt.  The 
necessities  of  their  lives  were  the  plough 
and  the  rifle.  The  one  gave  them  their 
bread,  the  other  their  meat  and  the  safety 
of  their  habitations.  Two  essentials  of 
existence, — the  plough  and  the  rifle;  but 
especially  the  rifle.  How  and  why  it  was 
attempted  to  take  away  from  them  the 
rifle,  and  what  was  the  result,  is  part  of 
a  later  record. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  LAMB 

WHEN  a  papal  bull  divided  the  spoil 
of  the  heathen  between  Spain  and 
Portugal,  by  an  imaginary  line  about  one 
hundred  miles  west  of  the  Azores,  it  fur 
nished  some  data  for  the  solution  of  such 
an  enigma  as  is  the  contrast  between  the 
many  grave,  witty,  chivalrous  gentlemen  of 
Spain  (or  the  devoted  padres  of  occasional 
Mexican  missions),  and  the  unrivalled  Span 
ish  oppressors  and  ravishers  of  feebler  races. 
It  is  a  startling  anomaly  that  the  native 
land  of  Murillo  and  Cervantes  and  Velasquez, 
which  gave  to  the  world  the  Cid  and  the 
caravels  of  Columbus,  should  have  exceeded 
all  others  in  the  terrors  of  the  Inquisition, 
and  made  her  colonies  the  crucibles  of  her 
gold.1  The  anomaly  is  less  startling  when 

*  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico.,  John  M. 
Niles,  Hartford,  1838,  vol.  i.,  p.  70. 
72 


The  Lamb  73 

it  is  realized  that  all  beyond  that  meridian 
came  to  be  looked  upon  as  but  a  mine  to  be 
worked  for  the  wealth  of  the  owners;  and 
that  all  means  were  justified  for  subduing 
whoever  doubted  that  a  chosen  people  had 
been  given  "the  heathen  for  an  inheritance." 

The  cruel  conquests  of  Cortez  and  his 
mailed  cohorts  have  been  made  familiar 
by  the  vivid  pages  of  Prescott  and  General 
Lew  Wallace. 

For  the  sequel,  the  development  of  mixed 
races  in  Mexico,  the  tyrannies  of  command 
ants  and  governors,  there  is  testimony 
enough  from  Niles  and  Abbot. 

The  comparatively  civilized  race  of  the 
Montezumas  was  virtually  annihilated. l  Ab 
bot  estimates  that  three  millions  of  them 
were  massacred  by  the  Spaniards.  Worse 
followed  worse  for  generations  after  Cortez. 
As  late  as  1775  the  condition  of  the  country 
was  estimated  as  worse  than  under  Cortez. 

While,  for  Spanish  American  possessions, 
loot  was  law,  and  robbery  of  Aztecs  and  Incas 
constituted  the  fabulous  wealth  which  the 
galleons  or  the  flota  bore  into  Seville  or 
Cadiz,  civilized  nations  applauded  and  long 

1  Essai  Politique,  Von  Humboldt,  vol.,  i.,  p.  117.  Mex 
ico  in  Transition,  William  Butler,  New  York,  1892,  p.  36. 


74  The  Mexican  War 

continued  to  abet  the  policy.  Lamartine 
cynically  half  approved  the  doctrine,  "Amer 
ica  belongs  to  Europe." 

There  was  little  difference  in  the  policy  of 
the  two  nations  (Spain  and  Britain)  relative 
to  their  colonial  possessions  in  America. 

Both  regarded  their  colonies  as  subordi 
nate  to  the  parent  state,  and  attempted  to 
render  them  contributory  to  its  interest  and 
prosperity. 

This  policy  seems  to  grow  out  of  the  relations 
which  subsist  between  colonies  and  their 
mother  country;  as  the  original  object  in 
planting  them,  since  the  sixteenth  century,  has 
been  to  benefit  the  colonizing  country,  to  drain 
off  a  surplus  or  dangerous  population,  to  draw 
a  direct  tribute  from  them,  under  some  form 
of  taxation,  or  for  the  interests  of  commerce.1 

The  British  colonial  system  was  vague 
and  tended  to  either  the  establishment  of 
absolute  power  in  the  home  administration 
in  all  cases  whatsoever,  or  independence  of 
the  colony.  Happily  for  the  world  the 
Americans  secured  the  latter.2  But  in  the 
Spanish  colonies,  the  governors  or  deputy 

1  History  of   South  America  and   Mexico,  John   M. 
Niles,  Hartford,  1838,  p.  70. 
2 Ibid.,  p.  69. 


The  Lamb  75 

sovereigns  being  responsible  only  to  the 
crown  (neither  the  Spanish  nation  nor  the 
colony  having  any  voice  in  affairs),  the 
colonial  governments  became  worse  despot 
isms  than  Russia  or  Turkey  and  more 
dangerous,  the  deputies  being  held  to  no 
responsibility  save  for  ample  and  immedi 
ate  revenue  to  the  king,  and  his  favorites- 
including  themselves.1 

"In  the  grants  of  the  country,  made  to 
the  first  adventurers,  the  Spanish  monarchs 
reserved  one  fifth  of  the  gold  and  silver  that 
might  be  obtained."2 

Indians  were  distributed  with  the  lands 
as  serfs  and  slaves;  "under  accumulated 
burdens  and  hardships,  to  which  they  were 
subjected  by  unfeeling  and  rapacious  masters, 
their  native  spirit  was  broken,  they  became 
humbled  and  degraded,  and  the  race  was 
rapidly  wasting  away." 

The  decree  of  Charles  V.,  1542,  abolishing 
the  repartimientos  and  all  rights  to  hold 
slaves  only  changed  the  Indians'  condi 
tion  to  that  of  vassals  to  the  crown,  under 
hopeless  conditions  of  tax  debts  payable 
in  personal  service,  which,  with  fees  of  the 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  p.  66. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  70. 


7 6  The  Mexican  War 

clergy,  made  the  measure  intended  for  the 
protection  of  the  natives  a  fertile  cause  of 
increasing  their  miseries. 1 

Later  measures,  especially  under  the  min 
istry  of  Count  Galvez,  relieved  much  of  their 
oppression  in  the  eighteenth  century,  but 
"no  other  situations  were  open  to  them 
but  those  of  common  laborers  or  artisans."  2 

The  average  Mexican  official  came  to  be  a 
mixture  of  the  cruellest  Spanish  blood  and 
the  worst  Indian.  The  character  of  the 
race  was  reflected  in,  as  well  as  moulded 
by,  a  religion  in  which  Jesuitry  had  been 
embellished  by  the  rites  of  the  savage,  and 
the  Inquisition  by  the  blood  sacrifices  of  the 
Aztec. 

The  population  was  brutal  and  priest- 
ridden.  Poor  as  were  the  national  fi 
nances,  the  churches  at  one  time  held  about 
$300,000,000  exempt.  The  annual  income 
of  the  archbishop  of  Mexico  was  $121,875. 

During  centuries  of  oppression  and  misrule 
the  Mexican  people  were  harried  by  taxation 
and  confiscation,  bled  by  greed  and  cruelty. 
There  were  revolts  and  suppressions  of 
revolts,  raids  and  reprisals.  The  one  rule 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  p.  74. 

2  Ibid. ,  p.  75. 


The  Lamb  77 

of  war  was  Vae  victis.  The  red  flag  floated 
over  conquered  cities  or  provinces,  in  streets 
or  chaparal.  The  battle  hymn  was  ' '  Deguilo ! ' ' 
(Cut  throat!).  "No  quarter!"  was  the  cus 
tom  of  the  country,  unless  an  unwary  foe 
could  be  deceived  by  false  promises  of  parole. 

A  few  and  comparatively  recent  examples 
only  need  be  cited  of  what  cannot  be  made 
other  than  hideous  reading. 

After  the  battle  of  January  17,  1814,  at 
Pascuaro, 

Matamoros,  Morelos'  lieutenant,  a  very  active 
and  brave  officer,  and  seven  hundred  men 
were  made  prisoners.  Morelos  [the  general  of 
the  independents]  made  every  effort  to  save 
Matamoros,  and  offered  to  exchange  for  him 
and  his  staff  five  hundred  Spaniards  which 
Matamoros  had  himself  taken  a  short  time 
before.  But  the  bloodthirsty  royalist  general, 
Llano,  declined  this  offer  and  immediately 
ordered  Matamoros  and  the  seven  hundred 
prisoners  shot;  which  he  must  have  known 
would  expose  the  lives  of  the  Spanish  prisoners, 
.  .  .  whom  Morelos  by  way  of  retaliation  put 
to  death.1 

This  same  General  Morelos  was  captured 
by  the  royalists  in  1815.  It  is  to  the  credit 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  pp.  148—9. 


78  The  Mexican  War 

of  the  Congress  at  Tehuacan  that  it  sent  a 
despatch  imploring  Calleja  "to  save  this 
valuable  life,  which  he  did  not  condescend 
to  answer";  and  "Morelos  was  shot  in  the 
back  as  a  traitor."  1 

General  Mina,  the  filibuster  (?)  (see  page 
52,  supra),  was  defeated  in  his  expedition 
after  effecting  a  junction  with  the  independ 
ent  forces  at  Sombrero,  and  captured  at 
Venadito,  September  27,  1817,  conducted  to 
the  head-quarters  of  Linan  commanding  the 
royal  forces  before  Remedios,  where  he  was 
condemned  and  shot  November  u,  1817; 
for  which  the  Spanish  government  conferred 
titles  and  distinctions.2 

The  royalists  prosecuted  the  siege  of  Reme 
dios.  Torres,  the  independent  leader  after 
the  loss  of  Mina, 

finding  his  ammunition  failing,  evacuated  the 
place  on  the  night  of  Jan.  i,  1818.  The  evacu 
ation  was  so  unskilfully  conducted  that  nearly  all 
of  the  garrison  were  killed  or  made  prisoners ;  and 
the  inhabitants  of  the  town,  of  all  ages  and  both 
sexes,  unarmed  and  unprotected,  were  involved 
in  one  common  ruin,  and  nearly  all  massacred.3 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  150-2, 

2  Ibid.,  152-3. 

3  Ibid.,  153. 


The  Lamb  79 

Nearly  the  same  had  been  done  at  Quautla, 
with  what  malice  prepense  may  be  judged 
by  the  written  words  of  the  royalist  captor 
Calleja,  seventy- five  days  before  the  sur 
render,  "We  will  precipitate  this  town  and 
its  inhabitants  into  the  centre  of  hell."1 

No  country  is  without  its  men  and  women 
of  courage  and  devotion,  though  Mexico  by 
reprisals  and  butchery  came  to  be  well-nigh 
depopulated  of  them.  After  long  defeat 
and  disappointment  the  independents  suc 
ceeded  in  throwing  off  the  yoke  of  foreign 
domination,  and  by  the  treaty  of  Cordova, 
August  20,  1821,  between  Iturbide  and 
Sefior  O'Donoju,  lieutenant-general  of  the 
armies  of  Spain,  the  independence  of  New 
Spain  was  recognized  and  a  constitutional 
monarchy  was  to  be  established ;  but  supreme 
authority  was  seized  by  Iturbide.2  He  dis 
solved  Congress,  declared  himself  emperor  and 
ordered  a  new  junta  of  "two  members  from 
each  of  the  larger  provinces  and  one  from 
the  smaller,  'all  of  whom  I  will  nominate.'  ' 

In  1822,  Iturbide's  army,  raised  to  support 
"the  plan  of  Iguala,"  was  called  "the  army 
of  the  three  guarantees" — to  preserve  the 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  146. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  162-173. 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


8o  The  Mexican  War 

holy,  apostolic  Catholic  religion,  the  inde 
pendence  of  Mexico,  and  the  union  of  Span 
iards  and  Mexicans,  to  wit,  the  abolition  of 
caste.1 

After  the  overthrow  of  the  royal  govern 
ment  by  Iturbide,  and  the  treaty  with 
O'Donoju  on  the  basis  of  the  plan  of  Iguala, 
Spain,  although  obstinately  refusing  to  ac 
knowledge  the  independence  of  Mexico,  made 
no  effort  to  regain  her  authority  over  it  until 
the  expedition  from  Havana,  July  5,  1829, 
of  General  Barradas  with  4500  men,  one 
seventy-four-gun  ship,  two  frigates  and  sev 
eral  corvettes,  brigs,  and  transports.2  All 
the  important  acts  passed  by  the  General 
Congress  during  their  session  of  1826 — and 
among  them  was  one  abolishing  forever  all 
titles  of  nobility  in  Mexico — had  been 
peaceably  carried  into  execution. 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States,  in 
spite  of  the  protests  of  Spain,  formally 
recognized  the  independence  of  Mexico 
and  commissioned  Mr.  Poinsett  minister 
resident. 

The  prompt  recognition  of  the  indepen 
dence  of  Mexico,  when  peace  had  been  signed 

»  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  p.  160. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  198. 


The  Lamb  81 

on  the  part  of  Spain  only  by  General 
O'Donoju  in  the  field,  became  afterwards  a 
precedent  against  Mexico  in  the  longer 
delayed,  and  far  more  logical,  recognition  of 
Texas. 

Iturbide,  usurper  and  tyrant,  was  suc 
ceeded  by  Victoria,  president  under  the 
Constitution  of  1824,  and  the  Congress  prom 
ised  for  a  while  much  progress  in  liberal 
government.  The  Spanish  residents  were 
banished  unlawfully,  though  many  evaded 
the  order.  There  were  two  or  three  revolts 
and  executions;  but  Victoria  held  his  office 
until  the  expiration  of  his  term,  when  Pedraza 
was  elected  his  successor. 

General  Antonio  Lopez  de  Santa  Anna, 
however,  with  his  and  other  regiments 
which  joined  him  under  pretence  of  driving 
out  the  Spaniards,  supported  the  claim  of 
General  Guerrero  and,  after  brutal  war  in 
the  streets  of  the  capitol,  established  him 
in  the  presidency.  Guerrero,  notwithstand 
ing  the  violence  of  his  accession,  gave  himself 
to  securing  the  peace  of  the  country,  and 
received  extraordinary  powers  from  the 
Congress  to  forward  the  forcible  expulsion 
of  the  army  of  4500  Spaniards  under  Bar- 
radas. 


82  The  Mexican  War 

After  compelling  the  capitulation  of  the 
Spaniards,  although  Santa  Anna  was  in 
command  as  Secretary  of  War,  humane 
terms  of  surrender  were  given  and  observed. 
Slavery  was  abolished,  or  rather  an  order 
to  that  effect  was  proclaimed.  Then  Guer 
rero  surrendered  his  temporary  powers  as 
dictator  —  it  was  at  first  supposed  vol 
untarily,  but  later  proved  to  have  been  to 
avoid  compulsion  from  the  Vice-President, 
Bustamente,  who  was  now  in  his  turn 
supported  by  Santa  Anna,  became  dic 
tator,  issued  a  decree  declaring  Guerrero  an 
outlaw,  organized  a  military  tribunal  to 
try  him,  had  him  tried,  sentenced,  and  shot. 

Sustained  by  the  aristocracy  and  clergy, 
who  from  the  first  had  been  alarmed  at  the 
probable  influence  of  republican  institutions 
upon  their  own  privileges,  and  supported  by  a 
military  force  ...  he  proceeded  to  establish 
a  perfect  despotism  in  the  country,  disregard 
ing  every  constitutional  or  legal  restraint.  .  .  . 
The  national  Congress  .  .  .  became  the  passive 
instrument  of  his  will.  His  order  alone  was 
sufficient  warrant  for  any  act  of  oppression  or 
cruelty;  his  military  satraps  soon  learned  to 
imitate  the  example  of  their  chief,  and  com 
pleted  the  resemblance  between  the  gov- 


The  Lamb  83 

ernment  of   Mexico  and   that   of    a    band    of 
robbers.  * 

Santa  Anna  now  played  the  r61e  of  de 
fender  of  the  constitution,  and  headed  an 
insurrection  of  the  army,  which  deposed 
his  late  fellow-conspirator,  Bustamente;  "re 
called  Pedraza,  whom  he  had  deposed  four 
years  before,  and  whose  time  was  now  about 
to  expire;  withdrew  to  his  hacienda,  and 
waited  the  movement  of  the  people  in  his 
favor."2 

His  pose  of  Cincinnatus  was  as  effective  as 
he  could  have  hoped,  and  he  was  unani 
mously  chosen  President  in  1833.  His 
treachery  to  every  ally  had  assumed  the 
guise  of  fidelity  to  constitutional  liberty. 
To  that  he  was  to  prove  himself  to  be  a  yet 
more  arrant  traitor. 

He  dissolved  the  council,  overawed  the 
suffrages  of  the  people,  and  in  his  first 
message,  January,  1835,  very  plainly  inti 
mated  his  opinion  that  the  people  of  Mexico 
were  "  unworthy  of  a  free  government;  and, 
as  the  Congress  had  been  chosen  for  no  other 

»  History  of  South  America  and   Mexico,  John   M. 
Niles,  Hartford,  1838,  p.  201. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  206. 


84  The  Mexican  War 

purpose  than  to  reflect  his  opinions,  it  pro 
ceeded  to  abolish  the  constitution  of  1824, 
abolishing  at  the  same  time  all  the  state 
constitutions  and  state  authorities."  The 
states  all  submitted — with  a  single  exception. 
Zacatecas  had  furnished  Mexico's  best  troops. 
No  part  of  Mexico  had  made  equal  sacri 
fices  for  the  common  cause  against  Spain. 
Santa  Anna  was  principally  indebted  to  the 
Zacatecans  (and  the  Texans)  for  his  own 
success  against  Bustamente.  He  knew  well 
the  people  he  had  to  encounter,  and  the 
spirit  which  would  animate  the  five  thou 
sand  state  militia,  which  near  the  city  of 
Zacatecas  prepared  to  resist  his  tyranny. 
He  was  to  surpass  Bustamente  in  barbarity 
and  treachery.  * '  He  was  utterly  unscrupulous 
and  treacherous  and  betrayed  every  party 
and  every  ally  that  put  trust  in  him ;  vindic 
tive  and  cruel  even  beyond  the  barbarous 
habits  of  Mexican  warfare,  and  never  spared 
a  defeated  enemy."  *  The  only  exceptions 
were  when  he  was  under  restraint  of  Guerrero, 
of  Austin,  or,  as  at  Meir,  of  the  American  and 
the  British  consuls.  At  Zacatecas  "  he  pre 
pared  to  accomplish  by  the  basest  treachery 
what  he  feared  to  attempt  in  a  fair  contest." 

1  Sam  Houston  and  the  War  of  Independence  in  Texas, 
Alfred  M.  Williams,  Boston,  1893,  p.  85. 


The  Lamb  85 

He  sent  there  several  of  his  officers  "who 
affected  to  join  the  people  in  supporting  the 
authority  of  the  state  and  offered  their  serv 
ices  to  command  the  militia,  which  were  ac 
cepted."  These  treacherous  officers  allowed 
the  Zacatecans  to  be  surrounded  by  superior 
force,  half  of  them  cut  to  pieces  before  they  had 
an  opportunity  for  resistance ;  the  rest  of  them 
were  ' '  driven  into  the  city,  where  the  victors 
for  several  days  indulged  themselves  in  ex 
cesses  too  shocking  and  barbarous  for  recital." 

Foreigners,  as  well  as  natives  who  had  taken 
no  part  in  public  affairs  .  .  .  were  butchered 
without  ceremony  and  their  property  given  up 
to  the  pillage  of  the  soldiery  or  confiscated  to 
the  use  of  the  officers  [until]  the  tyrant  had 
sufficiently  glutted  his  vengeance. 

Military  despotism  was  fully  established  ex 
cept  in  Texas,  whose  population  was  composed 
almost  wholly  of  emigrants  from  the  United 
States  .  .  .  drawn  by  liberal  colonization  laws 
and  expectation  of  free  government.  It  was 
in  the  population  of  Texas  and  in  them  alone 
that  Santa  Anna  foresaw  any  serious  obstacle 
to  his  designs.  His  resolution  was  therefore 
taken,  which  was  to  exterminate  or  drive  them 
from  the  country.1 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  John  M.  Niles, 
Hartford,  1838,  pp.  207-8. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ANTICIPATIONS  OF  TROUBLE  IN  TEXAS. 

WRITERS  who  attribute  the  Mexican 
War  to   the  conspiracies   of   slave 
holders  put  little  stress  on  complications  of 
an  early  date. 

March  15,  1827,  Henry  Clay,  Secretary  of 
State,  instructed  Joel  R.  Poinsett,  Envoy 
Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary 
to  Mexico,  to  offer  one  million  of  dollars 
for  Texas,  or  one  half  million  for  a  boun 
dary  on  the  Colorado  River  in  Texas;  and 
added : 

Large  grants  to  citizens  of  the  United  States 
indicate  that  Mexico  places  little  value  on  that 
province;  and  the  emigrants  will  carry  with 
them  our  principles  of  law,  liberty,  and  religion. 
.  .  .  Some  collisions  have  occurred  and  others 
may  be  anticipated  with  confidence.  These 
86 


Anticipations  of  Trouble  in  Texas  87 

collisions  may  insensibly  enlist  the  sympathies 
and  feelings  of  the  two  republics,  and  lead  to 
misunderstandings.  * 

It  had  been  supposed  that  Texas  belonged 
to  the  United  States  as  a  part  of  the  Louisi 
ana  purchase.  John  Quincy  Adams  has 
been  very  unjustly  blamed  for  not  retaining 
its  possession.  He  was  the  only  American 
signer  of  the  treaty  of  1819  who  had  held 
out  for  maintaining  our  title  to  Texas.  But 
by  that  treaty  with  Spain  the  Sabine  had 
been  made  the  boundary  of  Louisiana  to  the 
southwest;  and  Mr.  Adams  was  too  honest 
to  continue  to  claim  what  his  own  hand  had 
signed  away — if  indeed  he  had  been  right  as 
to  the  former  title.  He  remained  of  course 
quite  appreciative  of  the  value  of  Texas; 
and,  before  its  unfortunate  involvement  in 
the  slavery  controversies,  was  most  anxious 
to  obtain  or  re-possess  it. 

Later,  a  prefix  of  two  letters  became  a 
subject  of  heated  diatribes  of  politicians  and 
historians,  when  re-annexation  was  urged; 
though  in  view  of  the  earlier  claims  of  Adams 
the  word  would  seem  natural  enough.  Even 
Mr.  Carl  Schurz  quotes  without  objection 

i  25th  Congress,  ist  session  House  of  Reps., Ex.  Doc. 
No.  42. 


88  The  Mexican  War 

Clay's    letter  to  the  National    Intelligencer, 
known  as  his  Raleigh  letter,  of  April  17,  1844: 

He  [Henry  Clay]  had  believed  and  contended 
that  the  United  States  had  acquired  a  title 
to  Texas  by  the  Louisiana  purchase.  But  that 
title  had  been  relinquished  to  Spain  by  the 
treaty  of  1819,  and  it  was  idle  and  dishonor 
able  to  talk  of  resuming  our  title.  Under  the 
administration  of  John  Quincy  Adams  he  had 
attempted  to  re-purchase  Texas  from  Mexico, 
but  without  success.1 

After  having  learned  to  speak  of  repur 
chase,  the  word  r^-annexation  would  find 
place  easily  in  the  talk  of  common  men,  or 
Congressmen. 

The  praiseworthy  attempt  of  the  Adams 
administration  to  get  Texas  for  a  price  was 
unfortunately  a  failure.  Poinsett  reported 
that  ''the  purchase  was  impracticable,  that 
the  proud  temper  of  the  Mexicans  was  such 
that  an  official  offer  would  only  inflame  their 
jealousy."  It  was  a  far-sighted  and  benevo 
lent  attempt  of  Adams  and  Clay,  and,  had 
it  succeeded,  would  have  been  a  service  to 
their  countrymen  and  their  neighbors  second 
to  none  of  the  services  which  made  their 

»  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1887, 
vol.,  i.,  p.  244. 


Anticipations  of  Trouble  in  Texas   89 

lives  illustrious.  Even  in  failure  there  is  room 
for  gratitude  for  their  wise  and  good  intent. 

The  great  area  from  the  Sabine  to  the  Rio 
Grande  (389,795  square  miles)  was  to  become 
of  inestimable  value ;  but  Mexican  utilization 
of  it  had  long  been  proved  to  be  impracticable. 

The  Spanish  settlements  east  of  the  Rio 
Grande  were  forced  plants,  or  transplanta 
tions  from  the  Philippines  and  the  Carolines, 
made  in  order  to  give  color  to  claims  under 
the  discoveries  of  De  Soto,  and  to  resist  the 
wedge  of  French  outposts  which  La  Salle 
planned  driving  down,  from  the  Canadian 
great  lakes  and  portages,  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi. l  The  struggle  for  the  control 
of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  which  President  Tyler 
saw  engaging  the  powers  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States,2  had  its  prototype 
in  the  contest  made  by  Spain  and  France  for 
the  possession  of  Cuba  and  the  shores  of  the 
gulf  from  Floridk  to  the  Rio  Grande. 

Neither  Spanish*  nor  Mexican  occupation 
had  reduced  Texas  to  anything  resembling 
what  it  has  become  the  fashion  to  ca41  ef 
fective  occupancy. 

1  The  Journeys  of  Rene  Robert  Cavalier,  Sieur  De  la 
Salle,  New  York,  1906,  vol.,  i    p.  7. 

2  Letters   and   Times   of  the   Tylers,  Lyon   Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  pp.  333-4. 


90  The  Mexican  War 

The  United  States  had  been  prompt  to 
recognize  the  independence  of  Mexico.  Any 
change  was  hopeful.  But  there  was  no 
betterment  in  Texan  conditions.  The  con 
stitution  drafted  by  Austin  induced  the  hope 
that  legislatures  of  the  provinces  and  local 
self-government  would  solve  great  difficulties. 
But  local  self-government  got  no  chance. 

The  constitution  of  Mexico  [says  Kendall] 
guarantees  to  all  classess  and  colors  the 
greatest  liberty  and  equality.  .  .  The  practice 
is  an  entirely  different  matter.  [And  he  adds 
a  humorous  note] :  Such  was  the  case  when  I 
was  in  Mexico;  as  the  Constitution  is  changed 
on  an  average  every  six  months,  a  different 
state  of  thing  may  exist  now.1 

Ladd  says: 

In  fact  there  was  no  true  constitutional  gov 
ernment.  These  military  usurpers  seized  public 
and  private  property  to  maintain  the  army, 
till  superseded  by  others.  It  was  difficult  to 
unite  the  different  sections  of  the  Mexican 
confederation  upon  laws  for  the  national 
welfare.  The  territory  held  by  this  distracted 
nation  was  immense  ...  to  a  great  extent 
uninhabited  ...  no  railroads,  canals,  or  tele- 

1  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  George 
Wilkins  Kendall,  New  York,  1844,  vol.,  ii.,  p.  112. 


Anticipations  of  Trouble  in  Texas  91 

graphs,  and  but  few  post-roads  and  highways 
of  travel  to  foster  common  interests  and  opinions 
among  the  people,  who  had  been  alienated 
from  all  respect  for  governments  by  centuries 
of  the  misrule  and  selfish  exactions  of  Spain.1 

The  character  of  many  of  the  Mexican 
officials  was  inconceivably  brutal ;  "they  were 
men  who  possessed  all  the  vices  of  savage  life 
without  one  of  the  virtues  that  civilization 
teaches."  After  capture  of  the  Santa  Fe  expe 
dition,  Armijo,  the  Governor  of  New  Mexico, 
murdered  prisoners,  and  cut  off  the  ears  of  the 
dead ;  to  keep  his  tally  right  with  the  central 
dictatorship,  he  had  the  ears  to  show  for 
vouchers.2  Recruits  for  the  regular  army  were 
literally  roped  in ;  ' '  convicts  and  criminals  tied 
together  in  strings,"  ragged  and  wretched, 
the  majority  of  their  officers  taken  from  the 
higher  classes  and  placed  at  once  at  the  head 
of  companies  and  regiments  without  either 
theoretical  or  practical  knowledge  of  arms."3 

The  intolerable  character  of  Mexican  gov- 

1  History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Horatio  O.  Ladd, 
New  York,  1883,  p.  19. 

2  Narrative    of    the    Texan    Santa    Fe    Expedition, 
George   Wilkins  Kendall,  New  York,  1844,  vol.  i.,  p. 
292. 

3  Ibid.,  vol.,  ii.,  pp.  135  and  394-5. 


92  The  Mexican  War 

ernment  has  been  exhibited  in  a  previous 
chapter,  but  has  so  important  a  bearing  on 
questions  of  the  causes  of  the  campaigns 
fought  on  Texan  soil  and  in  American  politics 
and  history  that,  at  the  risk  of  some  reiter 
ation,  it  is  well  to  keep  informed  how  far 
such  character  came  down  unmitigated  to 
the  period  of  contest  between  the  two  races, 
and  to  have  in  mind  the  testimony  of  an 
eye-witness  and  keen  observer  like  Kendall, 
from  whose  pages  it  is  a  pleasure  to  transcribe 
his  distinction  between  a  kindly  people  and 
their  barbarous  oppressors.  It  will  explain 
much  of  the  later  forbearance  of  the  Ameri 
can  nation  with  the  Mexican  rulers. 

The  Mexican  people  as  a  body  are  kind  and 
benevolent.  ...  I  am  speaking  of  the  lower 
orders  and  consequently  of  the  mass.1  .  .  . 
With  deep  respect  and  reverence  the  moral 
excellence  of  the  pious  cura  of  El  Paso  inspired 
more  than  one  Protestant  American.2 

It  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  that  in  the 
regions  about  to  become  the  theatre  of  war 

i  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  vol., 
ii.,  p.  131. 

2Ibid.,  vol.,  ii.,  p.  41.  Whittier's  "  Angels  of  Buena 
Vista." 


Anticipations  of  Trouble  in  Texas  93 

there  was  an  Indian  population  more  numer 
ous  and,  if  possible,  more  treacherous  and 
hostile,  than  elsewhere  on  the  continent. 
The  fact  serves  in  some  measure  as  an  insuf 
ficient  apology  for  the  treacherous  and  futile 
attempts  to  make  Mexican  sovereignty  ap 
pear  anything  more  respectable  than  a  by 
word  for  exaction  and  cruelty.  It  also  serves 
to  show  some  reason  for  the  liberal  terms 
offered  by  Mexico  to  the  Austin  colonists ;  and 
again,  when  correctly  understood,  to  lessen 
the  doubt  whether  the  Austins,  in  trusting 
to  Mexican  promises,  displayed  a  lack  of 
sagacity  not  to  be  expected  in  a  business 
enterprise  however  bold. 

By  Mexican  authority  we  know  that  the  na 
tive  tribes  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Rio 
Grande  were  a  bar  to  the  advance  of  Spanish 
dominion,  from  the  earliest  occupations. 

The  conquests  beyond  Saltillo  and  Chihuahua 
were  suspended  in  1670  on  account  of  the 
immense  number  of  Indians. 1 

In  1719,  after  the  civil  and  military  admin 
istration  of  the  Marquis  de  Aguayo  [which 
marked  the  high  tide  of  Spanish  or  Mexican 

i  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Investigation  sent  in 
18 73  by  the  Mexican  Government  to  the  frontier  of 
Texas,  New  York,  1875,  pp.  318,  319. 


94  The  Mexican  War 

rule]  had  placed  troops,  missionaries,  and 
new  colonists  from  the  Canary  Islands  as  far 
as  the  boundaries  of  the  Red  River,  there  was 
general  tranquillity  along  the  immense  line  of 
defence.  The  position  of  the  province  called 
Coahuila  and  Texas,  being  the  farthest  advanced, 
engaged  it  more  deeply  than  its  neighbors  in  the 
ensuing  wars  of  conquest.  .  .  .Security  was  fully 
established  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande.1 

That  the  Indian  problem  remained  a 
serious  one,  especially  when  the  tribes  were 
incited  to  violence  by  Mexican  emissaries, 
is  apparent  from  the  existence  of  some  thirty 
United  States  forts  which  an  ordinary  map 
locates  between  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  Nueces . 
Garrison  mentions  the  danger  from  Indians 
in  1836  to  the  inhabitants  of  Nacogdoches. 

M.  M.  Kenney  recites  a  dozen  Indian 
raids  and  atrocities  from  1836  to  1839. 2 

The  Spanish  and  Mexican  colonists  had 
failed  to  protect  themselves  or  hold  their  own 
against  the  Indians.  The  supports  from  the 
Carolines  and  the  Philippines  had  proved 
insufficient,  and  the  military  posts  of  the 
Marquis  de  Aguayo  fell  into  disuse.  The 

1  Italics  mine. — C.  H.  O. 

2  History  of  Texas,  edited  by  William  G.  Wosten, 
Dallas,  Tex.,  1898. 


Anticipations  of  Trouble  in  Texas  95 

white  population  shrunk  into  insignificance, 
and  the  red  men  crowded  them  out. 

The  chief  authority  always  in  regard  to 
Texan  affairs,  on  whatever  subject  he  speaks — 
an  almost,  or  quite,  unquestioned  though  gen 
erally  ignored  authority — is  Stephen  F.  Austin. 
He  says:  ''The  Comanches  and  other  tribes 
waged  a  constant  and  ruinous  war  against  the 
Spanish  settlements.  .  .  .  The  incursions  of 
the  Indians  extended  beyond  [i.e.  to  the  west 
ward  of]  the  Rio  Bravo  del  Norte  [upper  Rio 
Grande]  and  desolated  that  part  of  the  country.1 

It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that  a  Spanish 
nation,  which  for  two  centuries  had  failed — 
mainly,  it  is  true,  by  reason  of  the  unfaithful 
ness  of  its  officials — to  make  any  noticeable 
or  permanent  advance  against  a  red  race,  in 
spite  of  using  means  not  in  the  arsenals  of 
other  civilized  nations,  and  notwithstanding 
its  expensive  importations  of  settlers  from 
the  antipodes,  should  have  looked  with  envy 
on  another  and  nearer  class  of  settlers  who, 
meantime,  had  swept  that  same  red  race 
half  across  the  continent.  JSori-was  it  strange 
that  it  had  given  liberal  land  holdings  to 
the  new  colonists  in  the  hope  and  expecta- 

1  Speech  of  Stephen  F .  Austin ,  at  Louis  ville ,  Ky. ,  on  March 
7, 1 83 6;  reported  in  full  in  Niles,  vol.,  i.,  pp.  269-279. 


96  The  Mexican  War 

tion  that  they  would  establish  a  civilized 
barrier  against  Indian  invasions  of  nearer 
Mexican  territory,  and  that  they  would 
eventually  assist  in  enlarging  the  habitable 
borders  of  Mexico.  "In  order  to  restrain 
these  savages ' ' — Austin  continues — '  *  and 
bring  them  into  subjection,  the  government 
[of  Mexico]  opened  Texas  for  settlement."1 

Nor  is  it  surprising  that  men  of  the  quality 
of  the  Texan  settlers  should  have  expected 
to  hold  their  own  against  savages,  assisted 
by  the  self-interest  of  a  nominally  civilized 
nation  in  the  rear  and  flank  of  their  foes. 
Mexico  guaranteed  the  safety  of  the  Texan 
settlers  manifestly  in  her  own  interest — 
an  interest  amounting  to  a  necessity.  She 
guaranteed  it  by  the  general  guarantee  of  the 

object  of  government,  the  well-being,  security, 
and  happiness  of  the  governed.  Allegiance 
ceases  whenever  it  is  clear,  evident,  and  palpable 
that  this  object  is  in  no  respect  effected. 

Beside  this  general  guarantee  [all  this  is  in 
the  unanswerable  words  of  Austin]  we  had  others 
of  a  special,  definite,  and  positive  character — 
the  colonization  laws  of  182^24  and  '25  .  .  . 

1  Speech  of  Stephen  F.  Austin  at  Louisville,  Ky.t 
March  7,  1836,  reported  in  full  in  Niles,  vol.  i.,  p.  270. 


Anticipations  of  Trouble  in  Texas  97 

especially    guaranteed    protection    for    persons 
and  property,  and  the  right  of  citizenship.1 

By  the  organic  act  of  the  7th  of  May,  1824, 
Texas  was  joined  with  Coahuila  until  Texas 
possessed  the  necessary  elements  to  form  a 
separate  state  by  herself. 

Texas  had  suffered  long  enough  from  the  im 
possible  joinder  with  Coahuila  and  govern 
ment  from  its  capital  hundreds  of  miles  away 
across  an  Indian-harried  wilderness.  She  had 
loyally  kept  her  faith,  and  now  sought  for  an 
independent  local  government  only  by  respect 
ful  petition  and  within  her  constitutional  rights . 

How  the  guarantees  of  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  to  the  Texan  settlers  were  broken  is  told 
in  the  same  statesmanlike  speech  of  Austin,  and 
the  official  presentment  of  the  Texan  appeal, 
presented  by  the  first  Texan  minister  to  the 
United  States,  Memucan  Hunt ;  but  the  events 
connected  therewith  are  of  so  great  consequence 
in  themselves,  and  so  greatly  affected  the  sym 
pathies  of  the  already  great  American  people, 
as  to  have  incited  their  leaders  to  action; 
and,  thereby  becoming  one  of  the  principal  in 
centives  of  the  Mexican  War,  and  one  full  justi 
fication  of  it,  must  be  presented  in  their  order. 

*  Speech  of  Stephen  F.  Austin  at  Louisville,  Ky. 
March  7,  1836,  Niles,  vol.,  i.,  pp.  269-279. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  LAMB  ASSAULTS  THE  CUB 

IN  the  necessarily  crowded  recital  of  the 
happenings  in  what  has  unjustly  been 
called  the  Texan  revolt,  and  which  was  as 
clearly  a  defence  of  vested  rights  as  was  the 
equally  miscalled  American  Revolution,  noth 
ing  can  be  properly  understood,  whether  of 
civic  action  or  military  strategy,  without  a 
constant  appreciation  that  the  flanks  of  the 
settlement  were  incessantly  attacked  by  sav 
age  Indians  roused  to  even  more  than  their 
usual  ferocity  by  the  emissaries  of  those 
whose  protests  of  friendship  and  solemn 
treaty  of  democratic  government  had  proved 
to  be  only  a  snare  and  a  delusion,  and  who 
now  attacked  the  front  with  overwhelming 
numbers,  undisguised  hatred,  and  a  savagery 
surpassing  even  that  of  their  Indian  allies. 
The  first  Mexican  open  attack  on  Texas  was 
made  with  all  the  advantage  of  being  led 
98 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub    99 

by  the  recognized,  de  facto  governors  of  both 
parties  to  the  issue,  and  with  Mexican  regu 
lars  entrenched  already  in  Texan  strongholds. 

In  1830  Bustamente,  having  obtained  the 
dictatorship  of  Mexico  by  treason  and  fraud, 
assisted,  as  has  been  related  in  a  previous 
chapter,  by  the  treason  and  fraud  of  Santa 
Anna  and  his  army,  set  at  defiance  every 
guarantee  of  the  Mexican  constitution,  and 
the  grants  to  Austin.  He  prohibited  immi 
gration  from  the  United  States  to  take  up 
the  lands  already  granted.  He  established 
customs  duties  in  violation  of  vested  privi 
leges.  He  prepared  to  make  Texas  a  penal 
colony,  and  sent  a  thousand  soldiers  there, 
mostly  criminals  and  convicts.  He  closed 
all  the  Texan  ports,  except  Anahuac,  which 
was  outside  the  settlements  and  whose 
harbor  was  inaccessible  to  vessels  drawing 
over  six  feet  of  water.  He  arrested  citizens 
and,  when  the  colony  protested,  arrested  the 
envoys  who  bore  the  protest. 

It  was  at  this  stage  of  Mexican  history 
that  Santa  Anna  saw  his  opportunity  to  take 
advantage  of  the  indignation  in  the  prov 
inces  whose  legislatures  had  been  dissolved, 
and  whose  officers  had  been  discharged  or 
slaughtered.  He  selected  Texas  as  the  most 


ioo  The  Mexican  War 

promising  field  for  a  revolution,  or  resistance 
to  the  revolution  of  Bustamente,  posing  as 
the  leader  of  liberty  and  constitutional 
rights  under  the  Austin  Constitution. 

John  Austin  with  a  force  of  125  Texans 
had  captured  Velasco. 

In  a  skirmish  at  Nacogdoches  the  Mex 
ican  troops  were  defeated  by,  and  declared 
for,  Santa  Anna.  They  were  allowed  to 
depart  for  Mexico  to  reinforce  his  war  against 
Bustamente  beyond  the  Rio  Grande;  and  the 
Texans  gave  their  adhesion  to  the  *  'restored 
liberal  government  and  the  Constitution  of 
1824." 

There  followed  an  interval  of  relief  from 
Mexican  oppression.  The  war  between  Santa 
Anna  and  Bustamente  kept  the  Mexicans 
busy.  Whether  the  Texans  had  any  confi 
dence  in  Santa  Anna  or  not,  they  had  reason 
to  believe  themselves  a  recognized  necessity 
to  the  Mexican  Government,  constitutional 
or  despotic.  To  their  arms  was  due  its 
re-establishment  and  the  power  of  Santa 
Anna.  It  was  apparently  a  good  opportunity 
for  getting  into  more  practical  and  concrete 
form  the  constitutional  rights  granted  in  the 
charter  of  settlement  and  in  the  Mexican 
constitution.  They  sent  a  memorial  to  the 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  101 

Mexican  Congress,  petitioning  for  the 
promised  separation  from  Coahuila  and  for 
a  state  constitution;  and  Austin  took  the 
memorial  to  Mexico.  Baffled  by  delays,  and 
finally  despairing  of  action,  he  wrote  back 
to  Bexar  advising  the  Texans  to  fall  back 
on  their  original  charter  rights,  unite,  and 
organize  a  state  government  in  accordance 
with  the  Constitution  of  1824,  without  wait 
ing  for  superfluous  sanction.1 

His  letter  was  intercepted;  he  was  taken 
at  Saltillo  and  kept  in  custody,  a  part  of  the 
time  in  the  dungeons  of  the  Inquisition. 

Coahuila  was  in  a  state  of  anarchy,  worse 
than  that  prevailing  in  the  rest  of  Mexico. 
After  the  battle  of  Guadalupe  and  the  bar 
barous  sack  of  Zacatecas,  Santa  Anna  had 
left  his  brother-in-law,  General  Cos,  "to 
regulate  matters  in  Coahuila."  Cos  dis 
persed  the  Legislature,  thus  leaving  Texas 
without  even  the  nominal  government  of 
the  joint  provinces.2 

1  History  of  South  America  and   Mexico,  John   M. 
Niles,    Hartford,    1838,    p.    272.      Austin's    Louisville 
speech. 

2  "By  midsummer   of    1832    Texas   was    free   from 
military  rule." — A  History  of  the  People  of  the  United 
States,  John  Bach    MacMaster,  New  York,  1906,  vol., 
vii.,  p.  252. 


102  The  Mexican  War 

Whether  with  or  without  Mexican  incita- 
tion,  the  Indians  became  particularly  trou 
blesome.  They  had  murdered  a  party  of 
traders  at  Gonzales. 

The  Texans  were  forbidden  to  maintain  a 
militia  in  excess  of  one  soldier  to  each  500 
inhabitants, 1  which  would  permit  a  total  of 
about  420  men  scattered  over  an  enormous 
area;  and  would  be  in  about  the  propor 
tion  of  one  soldier  to  thirty  Indians.  The 
Texans  were  also  commanded  to  give  up 
their  rifles,  which  were  the  prime  neces 
sity  of  border  life,  necessary  for  repulsing 
enemies  and  necessary  for  providing  food. 

Like  all  civilized  men — indeed  like  all 
men,  when  left  solely  to  their  own  devices 
for  any  government  whatever — they  made  a 
government  for  themselves.  Still  loyal  to 
their  word  and  to  the  forms  of  government 
to  which  they  had  once  subscribed,  they 
formed  only  temporary  or  provisional  gov 
ernments.  Their  civic  action  took  the  form 
ordinarily  adopted  by  civilized  peoples  left 
to  the  dangers  of  unrestrained  rioting  and 
murderous  invasion.  They  formed  com 
mittees  of  safety. 

»  A  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  vol. 
vi.,p.  253. 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  103 

Many  of  the  colonists,  seeing  their  oppor 
tunity,  favored,  of  course,  an  immediate 
movement  for  independence,  temporary 
independence  having  been  thrust  upon 
them.  There  had  been  a  few  Mexican 
troops  left  at  Anahuac  to  collect  customs.  l 
Colonel  Travis,  without  orders  from  the 
provisional  government,  drove  them  out 
of  their  quarters,  and  sent  them  to 
Bexar. 

Commissioners  were  sent  to  arrange  terms 
of  conciliation  with  General  Cos.  His  an 
swer  was  an  abortive  attempt  to  arrest  the 
leaders  of  the  party  of  independence. 

Meantime,  after  two  years'  detention  in 
Mexico,  Austin  had  been  released  by  Santa 
Anna  with  strong  protestations  of  friendship 
cor  himself  and  the  Texans.  Austin  seems 
to  have  known  his  man  by  this  time,  and 
was  too  wise  to  take  any  more  chances  on  his 
word.  He  reported  the  hopeless  overthrow 
of  liberal  government.  He,  who  had  himself 
given  form  to  a  democratic  constitution 
for  Mexico,  despaired  of  successful  adminis 
tration  under  it.  The  leaders  were  too 

»  Quarterly,  Tex.  Historical  Association,  vol.,  iv.,  pp. 

100-202. 


1 04  The  Mexican  War 

foul.  The  Mexican  Republic  was  over 
thrown. 

The  moderation  and  strength  of  Austin's 
character  united  the  people;  and,  September 
J3»  T835,  he  issued  a  circular  declaring  that 
peace  negotiations  were  useless;  he  recom 
mended  the  election  of  delegates  to  a  general 
convention,  and  added,  "We  must  defend 
ourselves  by  force  of  arms." 

Before  news  of  this  could  probably  have 
reached  him,  at  all  events  about  the  middle 
of  the  same  month,  General  Cos  started  on 
the  march  to  Bexar  with  five  hundred  Mex 
ican  troops. 

October  2,  1835,  was  the  date  of  the  first 
act  of  war  between  Texas  and  Mexico.  It 
was  an  attempt  to  enforce  the  decree  of  dis 
armament  of  the  Texans  by  taking  away 
from  the  little  town  of  Gonzales  a  six- 
pounder  cannon. 

It  cannot  be  appreciated  at  this  day 
how  near  to  a  matter  of  life  or  death  it  was 
to  a  little  settlement  like  Gonzales  to  have 
a  single  six-pounder,  probably  a  not  very 
effective  one  at  that.  They  were  face  to  face 
every  day  and  night  with  the  Comanches 
and  Pawnees,  stirred  to  hostility  and  ravage 
by  Mexican  officials  who  shared  their  plunder 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  105 

and    gave    in    barter    for    it    powder   and 
lead.1 

A  war  party  of  Comanches  had  once  made 
an  attack  on  an  expedition  which  had 
with  it  a  small  cannon,  and  were  repulsed 
at  such  an  unexpected  distance,  and  with 
slaughter  so  little  comprehended,  that  they 
were  thereafter  very  shy  of  such  armament. 
Since  then  "no  party  of  the  tribe  has  ever 
dared  attack  openly  any  company  fortunate 
enough  to  possess  a  field-piece."2  It  may 
have  been  enough  for  the  brave  citizens  of 
Gonzales  to  know  that  their  honor  was  at 
stake  and  their  liberties  invaded  by  the  pre 
cedent  of  taking  their  cannon;  that  their 
rifles,  already  demanded,  would  go  next, 
and  with  their  rifles  their  meat,  their 
property,  and  probably  their  lives  and  the 
lives  of  their  wives  and  children.  But  the 
one  cannon  was  of  itself  a  treasure  inesti 
mable;  it  was  the  safety  of  their  city.  The 
cannon  answered  the  attack  with  grape,  and 
its  supports  with  rifle  fire;  and  the  Mexicans 
under  Colonel  Ugartchea  were  driven  back 
to  Bexar. 

*  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  George 
Wilkins  Kendall,  New  York,  1844,  vol.  i.,  pp.  400-401. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  144. 


io6  The  Mexican  War 

Texas  appreciated  that  the  war  was  be 
gun.  Sam  Houston  was  made  command- 
er-in-chief  in  eastern  Texas;  Stephen  F. 
Austin  was  made  commander-in-chief  at  Gon- 
zales.  October  13,  1835,  Austin  moved  on 
San  Antonio  with  350  men.  General  Cos  with 
five  hundred  Mexican  regulars  was  in  the 
city  since  the  gth.  Both  waited  for  rein 
forcements.  A  small  party  of  Texans  under 
Captain  Smith  had  meantime  taken  Victoria, 
and  Goliad,  capturing  two  or  three  pieces 
of  artillery,  $10,000  in  supplies  and  ammu 
nition,  and  five  hundred  stand  of  arms. 

October  27,  1835,  Austin  sent  Colonels 
Bowie  and  James  W.  Fannin  with  ninety 
men  to  reconnoiter.  They  disobeyed  instruc 
tions  to  return  before  night,  and  encamped 
at  the  Mission  Concepcion,  where  they  re 
pulsed  an  attack,  defeating  about  four 
hundred  Mexicans,  killing  sixty-seven  and 
capturing  a  cannon  with  the  loss  of  one  man, 
before  reinforcements  which  Austin  promptly 
sent  could  arrive. 

November  25,  1835,  Austin,  having  been 
chosen  a  commissioner  to  solicit  aid  in  the 
United  States — in  which  capacity  he  deliv 
ered  the  Nashville  speech  already  quoted, 
and  others — resigned  his  commission  and 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  107 

was  succeeded  by  General  Edward  Burleson, 
a  distinguished  Indian  fighter,  with  whom 
was  the  scout  "Deaf  Smith,"  among  daring 
men,  skilful  in  wood-craft  and  prairie 
righting,  celebrated  for  his  pre-eminence. 

Smith  discovered  a  party  of  one  hundred 
mounted  Mexicans  driving  some  mules  laden 
with  grass  for  foddering  Cos'  horses.  He 
mistook  them  for  expected  reinforcements 
under  Ugartchea,  and  thought  the  mules' 
panniers  contained  silver  for  paying  Cos' 
troops.  Bowie  dashed  out  with  one  hundred 
mounted  Texans,  defeated  the  hostile  horse 
men,  and  a  sortie  from  the  garrison  supported 
by  artillery;  captured  the  mules;  killed  fifty 
Mexicans,  losing  one  man  killed  and  one 
missing.  The  affair  was  known  as  "the  grass 
fight." 

These  successes  seem  to  have  increased 
the  discontent  of  the  Texan  volunteers  at 
the  failure  to  immediately  carry  San  Antonio 
by  assault,  and,  there  being  no  regular  time 
of  enlistment  and  but  lax  discipline,  many  of 
Burleson's  army  of  about  eight  hundred 
went  home,  those  having  families  being 
especially  anxious  for  the  safety  of  their 
homes.  Two  companies  of  "Grays,"  fifty 
men  each,  arrived  from  New  Orleans,  a 


io8  The  Mexican  War 

company  from  Mississippi,  and  one  from 
eastern  Texas.  A  scout  was  missing,  and 
it  was  suspected  that  he  had  deserted  to  the 
Mexican  garrison,  and  would  put  it  on  the 
alert  for  an  attack;  so  it  was  decided  to 
raise  the  seige.  But  the  scout  returned 
bringing  in  a  deserter,  a  Mexican  lieutenant, 
and  both  reported  the  weakness  of  the 
defences.  Colonel  Milam,  who  had  just  es 
caped  from  Mexico  in  an  exhausted  condi 
tion,  urged  Burleson  to  attack,  and  was 
allowed  to  call  for  volunteers.  He  shouted 
along  the  lines,  "Who  will  go  with  old  Ben 
Milam  into  Antonio?"  He  was  joined  by 
101  men,  who  after  four  days'  fighting  drove 
the  Mexicans  out  of  the  city  into  the  mission 
building  known  as  the  Alamo.  In  this 
battle  the  Texans  pursued  the  tactics  which 
were  afterward  successfully  adopted  by  the 
American  infantry  at  Monterey,  as  related 
by  General  Grant  in  his  Memoirs.  They  kept 
in  the  shelter  of  houses,  screened  from 
the  enemy's  bullets,  and  made  their  advance 
from  house  to  house,  digging  their  way 
through  the  walls.  Some  of  the  Mexicans 
deserted  and  fled  across  the  Rio  Grande. 
On  the  fifth  day  General  Cos  surrendered  to 
General  Burleson;  his  troops  were  paroled, 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  109 

and,  December  i4th,  he  set  out  on  his  retreat 
with  1105  men,  two  cannon,  and  sufficient 
ammunition  for  protection  of  his  army 
against  the  Indians. 

Such  were  the  generous  terms  the  Texans 
actually  gave  to  a  conquered  enemy,  only  to 
be  libelled  by  modern  historians  as  rough 
border-men  who  probably  treated  their 
foes  in  a  manner  not  far  different  from  that 
of  the  Mexicans. 

The  Texan  losses  in  their  capture  of  the 
Alamo  were  two  killed  and  twenty-six 
wounded;  but  one  of  the  killed  was  Colonel 
Milam. 

The  Mexican  loss  was  not  reported ;  but  was 
estimated  at  from  one  hundred  to  three 
hundred  men,  twenty-one  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  a  large  quantity  of  small  arms  and 
ammunition. 

December  15,  1835,  there  was  an  engage 
ment  near  Goliad.  The  post  was  attacked 
by  the  Mexican  garrison  of  Lipanititlan. 
The  Mexicans  were  defeated,  compelled  to 
surrender,  and  paroled,  on  condition  that 
they  leave  the  country  and  bear  arms  no 
more  against  Texas. 

After  these  had  crossed  the  Rio  Grande 
there  was  not  an  armed  Mexican  soldier  left 


no  The  Mexican  War 

in  the  territory  of  Texas.  The  Rio  Grande 
was  the  boundary  of  Texas  by  conquest.1 
Had  the  United  States  and  the  Texan  pro 
visional  government,  in  that  state  of  affairs, 
agreed  upon  terms  of  annexation,  and  United 
States  regulars  been  sent  to  the  Rio  Grande 
with  orders  to  resist  any  Mexican  advance 
across  that  river,  not  a  nation  in  Europe 
could  have  objected  that  such  proceedings 
were  not  in  accordance  with  its  own  best 
approved  action  in  similar  case.  There  would 
have  been  abundant  precedent  to  cite  from 
the  record  of  every  nation  in  Europe  at 
that  date;  and  there  has  been  abundant 
precedent  for  exactly  such  action,  with 
few  exceptions,  in  the  subsequent  record  of 
all  civilized  nations.  It  would  have  been  a 
humane  and  just  act,  protecting  an  infant 
colony  from  ravage  of  treacherous  tribes. 

But  those  whom  Schouler  politely  terms 
"the  greater  harpies  of  the  United  States" 
forbore  to  take  advantage  of  this  oppor 
tunity  for  expansion,  although  eloquently 

1  The  surrender  of  San  Antonio  left  the  Mexican  chief 
without  a  single  post  in  Texas,  and  consequently 
terminated  the  campaign  of  1835. — Niles,  vol.  i.,  p. 
297. 

A  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  John 
Bach  MacMaster,  New  York,  1906,  vol.  vi.,  252. 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  in 

urged.    Austin's  argument  was  in  their  ears : 

That  nation  of  our  continent  will  be  regen 
erated  ;  freedom  of  conscience  and  rational  liberty 
will  take  root  in  that  distant,  and  by  nature 
much  favored,  land  where  for  ages  past  the  upas 
banner  of  the  Inquisition,  of  intolerance  and  of 
despotism,  has  paralyzed,  and  sickened,  and 
deadened  every  effort  in  favor  of  civil  and  re 
ligious  liberty.  By  Americanizing  Texas,  Texas 
will  become  a  great  outwork  on  the  West,  to 
protect  the  outlet  of  this  Western  world,  the 
mouths  of  the  Mississippi.1 

In  would  be  difficult  to  cite  any  pre 
cedent  of  international  action  or  any  prin 
ciple  of  international  law  or  ethics,  which 
would  have  been  violated  had  the  United 
States  yielded  in  1835  to  Austin's  eloquent 
petition,  annexed  Texas,  and  defended  her 
territory  by  force  of  arms. 

It  would  not  have  been  necessary  to  plead 
the  modern  doctrines  of  "effective  occu 
pancy"  or  "International  Eminent  Domain." 
It  would  have  been  ample  justification  to 
plead  Mexico's  absolute  abandonment  of 
the  territory,  by  having  ceased  to  exercise 
any  jurisdiction  over  it,  and  by  having 

»  Louisville  Speech,  Niles,  i.,  p.  279. 


H2  The  Mexican  War 

failed  to  provide  any  defence  or  any  govern 
ment  for  it.  It  would  have  been  ample 
justification  to  plead  the  need  to  defend  the 
vested  rights  of  American  citizens,  traders, 
merchants,  buyers  of  land  grants.  It  would 
have  been  more  than  justification,  and  a 
righteous  appeal  to  "the  higher  law"  that 
was  being  appealed  to  for  less  cause,  to 
plead  the  determination  to  defend  innocent 
non-combatants,  women,  children,  the  aged, 
from  the  fate  of  Zacatecas. 

The  United  States  as  a  nation  denied 
Austin's  application  for  intervention.  It 
is  to  the  credit  of  her  people  that  enough  of 
them  heard  his  appeal  and  answered  it. 

Texas  was  to  win  her  independence  in 
fiercer  fashion  than  taking  shelter  under 
the  wing  of  the  great  republic.  She  was 
to  establish  her  boundaries  on  the  great 
westward  river  by  even  more  unmistakable 
evidence  than  her  preliminary  victories. 

She  was  a  State  that  was  to  begin  life  with 
a  brilliant  history. 

Their  early  successes  cost  Texans  dear. 
Goliad  and  San  Antonio  de  Bexar,  with  its 
old  mission,  almost  a  fortress,  were  testi 
monials  to  the  valor  of  their  captors,  too 
valued  to  be  cheerfully  abandoned.  They 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  113 

commanded  the  routes  to  the  settlements 
whose  peaceful  inhabitants,  women,  children, 
all  who  were  unfit  for  war,  were  hastening 
eastward,  pursued  by  a  proclamation  from 
Mexican  head-quarters  at  Matamoras  order 
ing  Mexican  troops  to  "treat  all  foreigners 
as  pirates.'* 

Goliad  and  San  Antonio  were  too  far  apart 
for  mutual  support,  notwithstanding  the 
superior  mobility  and  fighting  quality  of  the 
Texans.  On  the  face  of  it,  good  generalship 
and  strategy  should  have  concentrated  on 
Santa  Anna,  who  was  now  advancing  with 
6000  to  7000  veterans,  a  force  sufficient  to 
defeat  and  check  him;  lacking  such  a  force, 
should  have  evacuated  one  of  these  posts  and 
kept  open  the  communications  of  the  other 
with  a  base  of  supplies.  But  it  was  doubtful 
whether  the  Texans  could  defeat  such  an 
army  with  all  the  men  who  could  be  spared 
from  defending  against  Indians  and  flying 
columns  of  Mexicans  the  non-combatants 
and  their  necessary  burden  of  equipment.1 
All  the  available  force  for  war  which  Texas 

1  "  The  700  men  afterward  with  Houston  at  the  Bra 
zos  consisted  of  most  of  those  who  had  not  families  to 
remove." — History  of  South  America,  John  M.  Niles, 
Hartford,  1838,  vol.  i.,  p.  299. 


ii4  The  Mexican  War 

could  furnish  was  under  Houston,  who  had 
succeeded  Burleson  at  the  front.  If  his 
army  were  defeated  there  was  nothing  to 
look  forward  to  but  ruin  and  desolation  and 
the  horrors  of  Mexican  mercy.  Houston 
ordered  the  evacuation  of  both  posts.  His 
order  to  Fannin  probably  reached  Goliad  too 
late.  Colonel  Travis  and  the  devoted  band 
in  the  Alamo  (San  Antonio  de  Bexar)  are 
said  to  have  scorned  to  fall  back  from  a  foe 
they  hated  and  despised.  They  had  ample 
reason  to  do  both.  They  were  men  originally 
from  various  localities.  They  were,  many 
of  them,  already  noted  for  desperate  valor 
and  skill  in  battle.  There  was  doubtless 
too  much  emulation  for  any  one  of  them 
to  be  willing  to  be  the  first  to  go  back. 
Some  of  them  were  admirable  for  little 
else  than  a  disposition  to  take  long  odds. 
But  they  were  border-men;  they  were 
familiar  with  the  artifice  of  retreating  to 
better  position  for  ambuscade  or  flank 
attack. 

(  It  is  possible  that,  appreciating  that  it 
would  be  a  point  of  honor  with  Houston  to 
withdraw  them  from  an  extreme  front  he 
could  not  wisely  support,  they  regarded  his 
order  as  less  a  command  to  support  his  main 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  115 

body  than  as  a  release  to  themselves  from 
an  over-perilous  position.  The  most  likely 
conjecture  is  that  they  realized  fully  their 
position  and  its  consequences.  There  was, 
perhaps,  a  faint  hope  that  they  might  be 
able  to  hold  out  long  enough  to  enable 
volunteers  sufficient  for  their  relief  to  answer 
the  appeal  sent  out  by  Travis;  but,  in  full 
view  of  the  really  hopeless  odds,  it  is  difficult 
to  doubt  that  they  deliberately  sacrificed 
themselves  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  non- 
combatants.  They  gave  their  lives  for  a 
few  days'  priceless  delay. 1 

There  were  no  desertions.  On  the  con 
trary,  after  the  place  was  invested  a  few 
from  Gonzales  stole  or  fought  their  way  into 
it.  The  garrison  numbered  when  first  the 
Alamo  was  surrounded  145.  The  number 
killed  was  166,  probably  including  the  five 
prisoners  said  to  have  been  massacred. 
As  to  these  five  General  Castrillo — whose 
name  should  be  remembered  from  among 
the  many  it  is  a  charity  to  forget — "inter- 

i  "The  pause  at  San  Antonio  had  afforded  time  for 
most  of  the  non-combatants  to  flee  out  of  reach,  and 
thus  saved  Santa  Anna  from  the  consummation  of  his 
premeditated  crime  of  staining  his  hands  with  their 
blood." — Niles,  vol.  i.,  p.  209. 


n6  The  Mexican  War 

ceded  for  their  lives,  but  Santa  Anna  turned 
his  back  upon  him  and  they  were  bayo 
neted." 

It  is  doubtful  if  even  the  five  were,  strictly 
speaking,  massacred;  whether  Castrillo,  see 
ing  them  helpless  for  much  mischief,  did 
not  beg  to  have  them  overpowered  and 
taken  alive.  It  is  denied  on  good  authority 
that  any  surrendered. 

Schouler  says,  "  Santa  Anna  had  been 
cruel  at  the  Alamo,"  making  the  unfounded 
intimation  that  he  had  been  other  than 
cruel  elsewhere,  and  selecting  the  only  battle 
in  his  life  where  it  is  not  certain  that  he  was 
cruel,  or  tried  to  be. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  there  was  little  to 
complain  of,  comparatively,  at  the  taking 
of  the  Alamo — if  we  are  to  take  the  most 
probable  account. 1  At  the  worst  there  were 
only  five  victims  and  they  were  killed  before 
the  blood  of  the  charging  columns  had  time 
to  cool.  If  it  was  murder  it  was  not  murder 
in  the  first  degree;  it  was  in  chaud  medley. 
The  red  flag  of  no  quarter  was  flying  from 
the  nearest  church  tower,  and  a  Mexican 
band  was  playing  Deguello  (Cut  throat) 

i  "Only  one  was  left  alive  and  he  was  shot  by  order 
of  the  chief." — Niles,  vol.  i.,  p.  329. 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  117 

throughout  the  battle.  Bowie  was  killed 
in  his  bed,  disabled  by  wounds  and  attended 
by  Mexican  women  who,  with  their  colored 
servant  boy,  were  afterward  protected  by 
a  Mexican  officer;  but  Bowie  was  firing  his 
pistols  when  he  was  killed.  Crockett  was 
overpowered  by  numbers  and  killed;  but  he 
was  making  efficient  use  of  his  clubbed 
rifle  to  the  last.  Major  Evans,  the  ordnance 
officer,  was  killed;  but  he  was  attempting, 
in  accordance  with  previous  agreement,  to 
fire  the  magazine. 1  A  cannon  was  fired  into 
the  long  ward  of  the  hospital,  and  fourteen 
Texans  were  found  dead  in  that  ward;  but 
there  were  forty  dead  Mexicans  at  the  door 
of  it. 

"Remember  the  Alamo! "  was  not  so  much 
a  war-cry  of  revenge  at  San  Jacinto  a  few 
months  later  as  an  incentive  to  emulate  a 
valor  unsurpassed. 

To  give  any  description  of  the  details  of 
the  battle  would  be  to  draw  upon  imagination 
or  to  trust  to  the  confused  memories  of  two 
Mexican  women  and  a  negro  boy,  the  sole 
survivors,  who  were  fully  occupied  in  the  care 
of  the  wounded.  Why  no  authorized  report 

»  History  of  Texas,  H.  Yoakum,  New  York,  1856,  vol. 
ii.,  p.  81. 


ii 8  The  Mexican  War 

of  the  battle  can  be  given  is  plain  from 
the  "  haughty  epitaph"  graven  on  the 
monument  to  its  heroes :  ' '  Thermopylae  had 
its  messenger  of  defeat.  The  Alamo  had 
none." 

Goliad  was  a  far  more  shameful  affair  to 
Santa  Anna,  to  General  Urrea  and  to  the 
Mexican  arms  than  was  the  Alamo. 

After  two  or  three  skirmishes  in  which 
Fannin's  volunteers,  mostly  from  the  United 
States,  were  outnumbered  and  defeated,  the 
prisoners  and  wounded  had  been  butchered 
by  express  orders  from  General  Urrea— 
whose  name  must  be  remembered  for  future 
uses — and  from  Santa  Anna  in  person.  Gen 
eral  orders  also  of  Santa  Anna  and  his  crea 
ture,  the  Mexican  Congress,  were  to  treat 
all  foreigners  under  arms  as  pirates.  General 
Urrea  had  900  to  1000  troops,  reinforced  by 
sixty-six  paroled  Mexicans  who  broke  their 
parole  and  joined  him.  Colonel  Fannin,  a 
Georgia  volunteer,  had  evacuated  Goliad 
under  orders  to  join  Houston,  and  with  350 
men  and  nine  field-pieces  was  surrounded  in 
the  prairie. 

A  hundred  Campeachy  Indians  increased 
the  Mexican  force.  Their  skill  in  keeping 
cover  and  their  excellent  rifle  practice  did 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  119 

much  to  harass  the  Texans,  who,  however, 
repulsed  the  first  day's  attack,  and  would 
probably  have  made  good  their  march  to 
join  Houston  had  they  not  been  encumbered 
with  sixty  wounded,  whom  they  refused  to 
abandon  to  butchery.  Thus  much  his  bar 
barity  helped  Santa  Anna's  strategy. 

On  the  second  day  the  Mexicans  were  seen 
to  be  reinforced  by  300  to  400  troops,  two 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  100  pack  mules  with 
ammunition  and  supplies.  Without  food, 
water,  or  ammunition,  the  Texans  surrendered 
on  written  conditions,  signed  in  triplicate, 
of  being  treated  according  to  the  usages  of 
civilized  nations,  the  wounded  to  be  cared 
for,  the  rest  paroled  not  to  serve  during  the 
war.  By  express  orders  of  Urrea  and  Santa 
Anna  they  were  all  shot  or  bayoneted  with 
the  exception  of  twenty-seven  who  escaped 
to  the  woods.  Three  hundred  and  twenty 
men  died  in  this  massacre.  The  wounded 
were  butchered  in  their  beds  in  the  hos 
pital.  That  the  bodies  were  collected 
and  burned  was  no  harm  to  anybody  but 
those  who  did  it.  Williams  well  says  of 
the  whole  transaction,  "  It  was  a  blunder 
as  well  as  a  crime."  There  were  Mex 
icans  who  were  shocked  at  such  barbar- 


120  The  Mexican  War 

ity;  and  Santa  Anna  was  to  hear  at  San 
Jacinto  the  terrible  war-cry  "  Remember 
la  Bahia!" 

The  excitement  in  the  United  States  on 
the  receipt  of  news  of  this  slaughter  was, 
of  course,  intense.  Had  General  Gaines 
been  ordered  at  once  across  the  Sabine,  the 
relatives  of  the  slaughtered  men  would  have 
been  reconciled  to  the  invasion  of  Mexican 
prerogatives;  and  there  might  have  been 
justification  for  the  comment  of  the  his 
torian  that  "Jackson  helped  Houston's 
strategy." 

Houston  had  perhaps  distrusted  too  much 
the  quality  of  his  forces.  Justly  or  unjustly 
he  was  greatly  blamed  by  many  in  his  com 
mand;  and  by  his  personal  enemies,  who 
were  never  few,  he  was  accused  of  personal 
cowardice.  But  it  is  impossible  for  a  review 
to  blame  him  for  retreating  with  an  undis 
ciplined  body  of  recruits  before  a  fivefold- 
outnumbering  army  of  veterans.  He  was 
covering  the  flight  of  women  and  children, 
while  his  numbers  were  depleted  by  the 
going  home  of  men  who  had  families,  to 
help  them  toward  Nacogdoches.  His  sup 
ply  train  also  was  crippled  for  lack  of  the 
wagons  he  had  lent  the  fugitives. 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  121 

Moreover  he  was  outflanked  and  his  rear 
already  threatened.  Santa  Anna  crossed 
the  Brazos  with  1500  men  to  prevent  re 
inforcements  to  Houston  and  cut  off  his 
retreat.1 

Santa  Anna  was  now  proclaiming  him 
self  more  loudly  than  ever  "the  Napoleon  of 
the  West."  It  takes  time  and  long  marches 
to  overrun  a  country  like  Texas,  however; 
and  the  Mexican  army  was  making  quicker 
work  of  it  by  dividing  into  three  columns, 
to  carry  devastation  faster.  Houston  had 
by  the  superior  mobility  of  his  hungry  army 
got  across  the  Brazos  in  time  to  keep  Nacog- 
doches  covered,  and  now  he  was  accused  of 
trying  to  bring  the  Mexicans  into  collision 
with  Games' s  United  States  troops  at  the 
Sabine. 

There  would  seem  to  be  obvious  fatuity 
in  Santa  Anna's  pushing  with  his  column 
toward  Galveston  Bay.  He  had  no  fleet 
there  to  support  a  new  base.  He  seems  to 
have  become  infatuated  with  his  own  great 
ness  and  his  eagerness  to  destroy  the  Texan 
civil  authorities.  He  had  information  that 
they  were  in  session  at  Harrisburgh,  and 

1  Niles,  vol.  L,  p.  209. 


122  The  Mexican  War 

made  a  rapid  march  to  that  place.  They 
had  escaped  him;  but  he  burned  the  town 
and  turning  northward  advanced  to  the 
San  Jacinto  River — the  Holy  Hyacinth,  the 
water-flower. 

It  would  seem  that  Houston,  with  so 
mobile  a  force  as  Texan  volunteers,  should 
have  been  able  to  take  Cos  and  Sesma's 
columns  in  detail  before  a  junction  with 
Santa  Anna  could  be  effected.  Cos  had 
broken  his  parole — probably  his  men  with 
him — and  was  now  in  the  field.  Santa 
Anna  had  managed  to  be  heavily  reinforced, 
however,  and  had  1500  troops  with  him 
when  he  reached  Buffalo  Bayou. 

A  smaller  stream,  Vince's  Bayou,  with 
Buffalo  Bayou,  the  San  Jacinto,  and  their 
adjacent  swamps,  form  what  is  practically 
an  island,  approachable  only,  and  with 
difficulty,  by  boats  (of  which  there  were 
none)  or  by  the  bridge  over  Vince's  Bayou. 
After  taking  position  on  this  island,  Santa 
Anna  did  not  even  defend  the  bridge.  He 
must  have  had  confidence  enough  in  his 
double  numbers  of  veterans  to  be  desirous 
of  getting  the  Texans  where  they  could  not 
escape  him.  Had  the  Texans  taken  the 
defensive  at  the  bridge,  they  could  have 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  123 

starved  him  out  or  forced  him  to  attack  at 
insuperable  disadvantage;  only  that  would 
have  set  free  Cos  and  Filisola  to  plunder 
and  ravage  their  homes. 

Marches  and  counter-marches  had  con 
sumed  a  year.  It  was  now  April  21,  1836. 
Houston's  senior  officers  advised  waiting 
the  Mexican  assault.  His  army  numbered 
743.  Santa  Anna's  forces  were  1500  veterans 
behind  a  barricade.  The  impatience  of  the 
Texan  troops  to  finish  the  war  and  get 
home  was  what,  probably,  determined  the 
attack.  Deaf  Smith,  it  is  said,  was  sent 
back  to  cut  down  the  bridge  over  Vince's 
Bayou,  and  as  line  was  formed  for  the 
charge  word  was  passed,  "  The  bridge  is 
down;  you  must  fight  for  your  lives." 
No  incentive  was  needed;  but  it  was 
desirable  that  the  Mexicans  should  not 
escape. 

The  Texans  had  been  in  a  belt  of  timber. 
As  they  advanced  out  of  it — the  rifle  at 
trail,  the  bowie  knife  in  the  teeth  or  loose 
in  the  belt,  the  blood  of  the  border  at  fever 
heat — came  the  touch  of  comedy  which 
seems  to  relieve  all  tragedy — for  the  reader. 
The  Texan  band  consisted  of  one  drum 
and  one  fife;  it  struck  up: 


124 


The  Mexican  War 


Will  you  come  to  the  bow'r  I  have  shaded  for  you  ? 


Your  bed  shall  be   ros  -  es  be-span-gled  with  dew. 


Will  you,  will  you,  will  you,  will  you  come  to  the  bow'r? 


Will  you,  will  you,  will  you,  will  you  come  to  the  bow'r  ? 


The  "twin  sisters,"  two  howitzers,  a  pre 
sent  from  citizens  of  Cincinnati,  discharged 
a  volley  of  stones  and  iron  scrap  into  the 
barricade;  the  Texans  halted  at  close  range, 
fired  once,  the  band  played  ''Yankee  Doo 
dle,"  l  and  they  dashed  forward  with  cries 
of  "Remember  the  Alamo!"  "Remember  la 
Bahia!"  The  battle  of  San  Jacinto  had 
begun. 

Before  nightfall  the  Mexican  army  was 
annihilated.  With  the  loss  of  six  killed  and 
twenty-five  wounded,  the  Texans  had  killed 
630  of  their  foes,  wounded  208,  and  taken 


So  reported  to  Professor  Garrison. 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  125 

730  prisoners  (including  the  wounded),  with 
their  baggage,  camp  equipage,  900  English 
or  Spanish  muskets,  300  sabres,  200  pistols, 
300  mules,  and  $12,000  in  specie.  One  half 
of  the  money  was  promptly  contributed  to 
the  relief  of  suffering  non-combatants  or  the 
navy;  the  other  half  was  distributed  in  pay 
to  the  victorious  soldiers — about  $8.00  each 
for  a  year's  campaign. 

Santa  Anna  had  fled,  but  was  pursued  and 
captured  within  a  day  or  two. 

His  immediate  execution  for  murder  was, 
of  course,  strenuously  demanded;  but  for 
purposes  of  civil  and  diplomatic  advantage 
his  was  a  very  valuable  life. 

There  was  a  nominal  congress  in  Mexico, 
but  it  was  well  known  to  be  only  the  poorest 
creature  of  the  despot's  will,  and  Santa 
Anna  was  that  despot.  He  readily  entered 
into  treaty  to  save  his  life. 

"He  was  in  duress. "  But  the  conquered 
are  always  in  duress.  The  treaty  of  Ve- 
lasco  was  signed  May  14,  1836,  between 
the  Texan  government  and  the  government 
of  Mexico — to  wit  Santa  Anna.  Hostilities 
were  to  cease,  prisoners  to  be  exchanged, 
all  Mexican  troops  to  be  withdrawn  beyond 
the  Rio  Grande,  indemnity  to  be  paid  by 


i26  The  Mexican  War 

Mexico,  Texan  independence  acknowledged, 
with  the  boundary  not  beyond  the  Rio  Grande^1 
the  latter  clause  to  be  kept  secret  at  Santa 
Anna's  suggestion,  lest  it  be  repudiated  by 
the  Mexican  Government  before  he  could 
arrive  home. 

This  agreement  of  secrecy  enabled  Santa 
Anna  to  keep  up  a  show  of  his  life  being 
of  importance  to  his  captors,  who  sent  him 
back  to  Mexico,  where  he  promptly  resumed 
autocratic  power;  and  the  treaty  was  as 
promptly  abrogated,  so  far  as  one  party  to 
a  treaty  can  ignore  it.  Of  its  binding  the 
Mexican  Government,  Senator  Rusk  after 
ward  summed  up  the  situation  perfectly 
when  he  said,  "All  the  Mexican  Government 
which  was  in  existence  at  the  time  [of  the 
treaty  of  Velasco]  was  in  Burleson's  baggage 
train,  prisoner  of  war." 

General  Filisola,  the  Mexican  second  in 
command  in  the  field,  accepted  the  terms 
of  the  treaty,  and  marched  4000  troops 
across  the  Rio  Grande  to  Matamoras  in 
wretched  condition.  The  conditions  were 
precisely  the  same  as  those  under  which 
the  United  States  had  recognized  the 

1  South-westward  Extension,  George  Pierce  Garrison, 
New  York,  1906,  p.  206, 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  127 

independence  of  Mexico,  only  that  General 
O'Donoju  was  not  the  Spanish  Govern 
ment. 

There  was  never  thereafter  a  serious 
attempt  of  Mexico  to  renew  the  invasion  of 
Texas  or  of  any  of  the  territory  on  the 
Texan  side  of  the  Rio  Grande. l 

Her  internal  feuds  were  alone  sufficient 
to  account  for  Mexico  being  in  too  reduced 
a  condition  to  defend  even  her  nearer 
provinces  from  Indian  raids.  The  few  Indian 
and  Mexican  raids  afterward  made  into  the 
territory  on  the  Texan  side  of  the  Rio 
Grande  were  promptly  repulsed;  every  mil 
itary  post  in  that  territory  remained  in 
Texan  possession,  and  the  boundary  claimed 
and  conceded,  at  least  by  implication,  in  the 
treaty  of  Velasco  was  successfully  defended, 
although  the  raids  by  Indians  incited  by 
Mexicans  were  a  constant  drain  on  the 
resources  of  the  young  republic.  After  the 

>"  As  to  the  possibility  of  its  [Texas']  reconquest  and 
loss  of  the  national  status  it  had  gained,  that  was  too 
slight  to  be  taken  seriously  into  consideration  at  all." 
— Texas,  A  Contest  of  Civilizations,  George  Pierce 
Garrison,  Boston,  1903,  p.  262. 

"  It  was  evident  that  Mexico  would  never  recover 
this  territory." — History  of  the  War  with  Mexico, 
Horatio  O.  Ladd,  New  York,  1883,  p.  24. 


128  The  Mexican  War 

battle  of  San  Jacinto  there  was  but  a  single 
engagement  to  complete  the  victorious  cam 
paign  which  drove  the  Mexicans  to  Mata- 
moras.  Captain  Isaac  W.  Burton,  who 
appears  to  have  been  the  only  Texan  com 
mander  not  a  colonel  or  a  general,  captured 
three  vessels  at  Capano  with  supplies  valued 
at  $25,000.  His  force  consisted  of  twenty 
mounted  rangers  who  for  their  success  re 
ceived  the  title  of  "Horse  Marines,"  a  term 
very  frequent  in  the  slang  of  the  period  for  a 
while  after. 

Houston  was  installed  President  of  Texas 
October  226..  He  made  Austin  Secretary 
of  State.  Smith,  his  other  competitor  for 
the  presidency,  he  appointed  to  the  Treas 
ury;  Colonel  William  H.  Wharton  Minis 
ter,  and  Memucan  Hunt  Commissioner, 
to  the  United  States;  who  at  once  urged 
recognition.  This  was  violently  opposed 
by  Mexico  and  by  many  anti-slavery  poli 
tician^.  Williams  says,  "The  majority 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  were  in 
favor  of  it."  Judging  from  later  events, 
from  the  sympathy  which  had  naturally 
been  elicited  by  the  battles  in  Texas,  in 
which  their  own  kin  had  participated,  and 
from  the  ownership  throughout  the  country 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  129 

of  many  shares  of  "land-scrip" — issued  by 
corporations  holding,  or  claiming  to  hold, 
lands  in  Texas,  and  from  the  election  of 
Polk  eight  years  later,  Williams'  opinion 
would  seem  to  be  justified. 

Shipping  interests,  too,  particularly  of 
New  Orleans  and  the  gulf  ports,  would  be 
served  by  bringing  under  United  States 
laws,  and  power  to  enforce  laws,  the  pirate- 
haunted  islands  of  the  Texan  coast. 

Jackson  has  been  blamed  for  haste  in 
Texan  recognition.  He  did  not  at  first 
display  any  undue  ardor  in  that  direction. 
In  his  message  to  Congress  December  2ist 
he  said : 

Prudence  would  dictate  that  the  United  States 
should  stand  aloof  until  the  independence  of 
Texas  had  been  recognized  by  Mexico  or  one 
of  the  great  foreign  powers,  or  until  events 
should  have  proved  beyond  dispute  the  abil 
ity  of  the  people  to  maintain  their  independent 
sovereignty.1 

He  expressed,  however,  his  willingness  to 
trust  the  discretion  of  Congress.  This  was 
for  Jackson  a  very  tame  treatment  of  an 
exciting  subject.  Sumner,  and  others  with 


1  Message  to  Congress,  Dec.  21,  1836. 

9 


130  The  Mexican  War 

him,  have  harbored  the  suspicion  that 
delays  were  ingeniously  fostered  for  the 
purpose  of  letting  affairs  with  Mexico  get 
into  such  a  tangle  as  would  result  in 
the  United  States  having  a  pretext  for 
the  acquisition  of  both  Texas  and  Cali 
fornia. 

It  is  easy  to  prophesy  after  the  event. 
Results  may  have  given  an  air  of  probability 
to  the  theory;  but  it  does  not  follow  that, 
whatever  the  shrewdness  of  the  Southern 
politicians,  the  United  States  as  a  nation 
disgraced  herself  by  her  formal  forbearance. 
It  is  not  necessary  for  even  the  most  vin 
dictive  of  biographers  to  impeach  "Old 
Hickory's  "  motives.  He  was  not  incapable 
of  generosity  to  a  fallen  enemy — at  least 
if  it  happened  that  the  fallen  enemy  was 
the  enemy  of  somebody  other  than  himself ; 
and  for  a  while  after  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto, 
in  spite  of  protestation  and  bluster,  Mexico 
appeared  to  be  quite  prostrate  before  the 
Texan  prowess — an  object  of  pity,  unable, 
as  she  was,  to  establish  a  stable  government 
or  to  defend  her  towns  from  Indian  ravages. 
After  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  and  the 
peace  of  Velasco,  it  would  surely  have  been 
within  the  rights  of  the  United  States  as 


The  Lamb  Assaults  the  Cub  13 J 

defined  by  any  international  obligations  to 
have  annexed  Texas  at  her  request  with 
the  boundary  of  the  Rio  Grande.  But  the 
wolf  forbore. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

RECOGNITION 

IT  may  be  doubted  that  conjecture  is  a 
profitable  occupation  for  historians.  But 
if  amusement  is  to  be  afforded  by  guessing 
at  Jackson's  motives  for  advising  delay  of 
recognition  of  the  independent  republic  of 
Texas,  in  his  message  December  21,  1836, 
it  is  not  needful  to  confine  the  imagination  to 
the  theory  that  it  was  to  serve  the  purposes 
of  slave-holding  or  other  territorial  aggrand 
izement.  Now  that  the  heat  of  war  had  sub 
sided,  and  calmer  deliberations  as  to  what 
were  their  practical  interests  were  occupying 
Texan  councils,  doubts  may  have  come  to  the 
surface  of  their  ability  to  hold,  or  their 
profit  in  holding,  dominion  over  the  "  herds 
of  wild  horses"  beyond  the  Nueces,  or 
undertaking  the  policing  of  the  few  Mexicans 
who  remained  in  the  settlements  northeast 
of  the  Rio  Grande. 

132 


Recognition  133 

It  was  like  Jackson  to  be  impetuous,  and  to 
be  intolerant  of  delay;  but  it  was  also  like 
Jackson  to  be  shrewd,  and  to  wait  behind 
his  breastworks  for  his  Pakenhams.  He  had 
had  his  experiences  with  Calhoun  as  friend 
and  foe;  Martin  Van  Buren  had  been  his 
associate  as  Vice- President  and  as  Secretary 
of  State ;  Edward  Livingston,  Louis  McLane, 
and  John  Forsyth  had  advised  him  in 
foreign  relations.  He  was  planning,  and 
effecting,  the  unique  political  success  of 
naming  the  President  who  was  to  follow  him 
into  power. 1  It  was  uncertain,  too,  how 
many  votes  could  be  secured  for  recognition. 
There  may  have  been  a  better  chance  of 
securing  reluctant  votes  by  coyness  and 
deliberation. 

Then  there  was  a  claim  for  a  Texan 
boundary  far  into  the  water-shed  of  the  upper 
Rio  del  Norte,  which  included  much  of  what 
is  now  New  Mexico,  and  to  secure  which  the 
United  States  eventually  paid  Texas's  nat 
ional  debt.  There  could  hardly  have  failed 
to  be  some  hesitating  Senators  who  hoped 
to  narrow  the  demands  of  Texas  for  property 

1  "  His  last  political  victory — the  election  of  Van 
Buren — was  his  greatest." — Jacksonian  Democracy, 
William  MacDonald,  New  York,  1906,  p.  300. 


134  The  Mexican  War 

so  far  encroaching  the  supposed  limits  of 
the  Louisiana  purchase — or  of  Mexico.  The 
embarrassments  of  such  questions  and  the 
difficulties  attendant  on  attempting,  even, 
such  surveys  as  might  tend  to  their  solu 
tion,  became  at  a  later  date  quite  apparent. 

If  Texas,  on  the  whole,  were  satisfied  with 
a  boundary  on  the  Nueces,  votes  were  likely 
to  be  gained,  and  questions  of  property  about 
Santa  Fe  postponed  or  settled. 

Whatever  the  motives  or  plans,  the  Texas 
Legislature,  December  19,  1836,  passed  a  res 
olution  declaring  the  Rio  Grande  to  be  the 
western  boundary  of  Texas.  As  this  was  two 
days  earlier  than  Jackson's  message  recom 
mending  delay  it  is  not  likely,  when  the  slow 
mails  of  the  day  are  considered,  that  either 
of  the  two  influenced  the  other  very  much. 

Texas  stood  by  the  rights  she  claimed 
under  the  treaty  of  Velasco,  and  the  bound 
ary  she  had  established  by  battle. 

Jackson  may  have  had  undisclosed  opinions 
and  been  privy  to  any  number  of  conspira 
cies  to  breed  wars  and  obtain  Californias, 
for  all  the  possibility  of  proving  a  general 
negative;  but  what  he  did  was  sufficiently 
straightforward . 

He  reported  the  Texas  resolution  Decem- 


Recognition  135 

ber  226,  and  "pointed  out  distinctly  that  in 
taking  Texas  the  United  States  would  take 
her  with  her  new  [!]  boundary  claims."1 
Of  this  Sumner  says: 

That  is  as  if  Maine  were  to  secede  .  .  .  claim 
ing  for  her  boundaries  the  Alleghenies  and  the 
Potomac,  join  Canada,  and  then  England  claim 
the  New  England  and  Middle  States.  .  .  .  The 
policy  was  to  keep  the  Texas  question  open  until 
California  could  be  obtained."  2 

Sumner  anticipates  at  this  point  the 
whole  question  of  annexation;  but  it  is  as 
well  to  meet  his  imagination  here  as  later. 
If  Maine  were  supposed  to  have  driven  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  across  the 
Alleghenies  and  the  Potomac,  and  com 
pelled  a  treaty  to  stay  there,  and  enforced 
compliance  with  that  provision  of  the  treaty, 
the  comparison  would  not  be  without  a 
show  of  semblance — as  it  now  is. 

Professor  Theodore  Salisbury  Woolsey, 
Yale  University,  while  recognizing  that  the 
territory  acquired  was  ''essential  to  our 
symmetrical  development,"  stigmatizes  the 
Mexican  war  as  unjust  and  the  recognition  of 

1  Andrew  Jackson,  William  Graham  Sumner,  Boston, 
1882,  p.  357. 

'  Ibid. 


136  The  Mexican  War 

Texan  independence  as  " premature "*;  but, 
when  he  gets  down  to  the  fund  of  learning  he 
unquestionably  possesses  in  his  own  specialty 
of  international  law,  he  gives  three  justifying 
reasons  for  the  intervention  of  the  United 
States  in  liberating  Cuba: 

The  burden  of  neutrality;  the  dictates  of  our 
commercial  interests ;  the  call  of  humanity.  Any 
one  of  these  is  strong;  together  they  are  very 
nearly  convincing.2 

Connecticut  was  not  of  Professor  Woolsey's 
opinion  as  to  the  prematurity  of  the  recog 
nition  of  Texas.  March  27,  1836,  at  its  first 
session  after  the  slaughter  at  Goliad  and  the 
Alamo,  and  while  the  Texans  were  falling 
back  toward  San  Jacinto,  the  Connecticut 
Legislature  passed  a  resolution  instructing  the 
Senators  and  Representatives  from  the  State 
to  use  their  best  endeavors  to  procure  the  ac 
knowledgment  of  the  independence  of  Texas. 
Many  other  States  passed  similar  resolutions.3 

1  American     Foreign     Policy,    Theodore     Salisbury 
Woolsey,  New  York,  1898,  pp.  11-16  and  120. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  64-65. 

3  The   Connecticut    resolutions    were    presented   by 
Senator   Niles,  June    13,  1836.     The   Ohio   and    Penn 
sylvania  resolutions,  to  the  same  effect,  were  referred  to 

the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. — Senate  Journal. 


Recognition  137 

No  Senators  in  1837  took  Professor  Wool- 
sey's  view.  Mr.  Schurz  seems  to  differ  with 
him. 

March  i,  1837,  the  resolution  recognizing 
Texas  as  an  independent  nation  was  passed 
by  Congress  and  Jackson  signed  it.1 

At  the  last  hour  of  the  session  a  clause  was 
inserted  in  the  civil  appropriation  bill,  and 
passed  both  houses,  providing  for  the  pay 
ment  of  a  diplomatic  agent  to  the  Republic 
of  Texas  whenever  the  President  should 
receive  satisfactory  evidence  that  Texas  was 
an  independent  power,  and  deemed  it  ex 
pedient  to  appoint  such  a  minister.  "Jack 
son  immediately  signed  the  bill."  Certainly 
the  civil  appropriation  bill  must  be  signed 
if  a  new  administration  was  to  be  comfort 
able.  Jackson  appointed  the  new  minister, 
and  the  appointment  was  confirmed  by  the 
Senate.2 

There  is  of  course  a  surface  appearance  of 
haste  in  such  disposition  of  a  matter  of  inter- 

1  "Clay  was  in  no  haste  in  reporting  from  the  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations  the  resolution  for  recogni 
tion,  and  it  passed  the  Senate  by  a  unanimous  vote." 
— Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz  (Boston,  1887),  vol.  ii.,  pp. 
91-92. 

2  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Schouler,  Bos 
ton,  1889,  vol.  iv.,  p.  256. 


138  The  Mexican  War 

national  importance.  But  there  was  no  haste 
at  all  differing  from  what  is  usual,  or  even 
without  exception,  at  the  end  of  a  Con 
gressional  session.  It  did  not  hurry  official 
business  in  the  closing  hours  of  an  admin 
istration  as  had  Adams'  long  list  of  ap 
pointments  in  anticipation  of  party  change. 
Prematurity  is  to  be  inferred  less  from  rapid 
action  at  the  end  of  a  period  than  from  giv 
ing  too  little  time  and  thought  to  the  consid 
eration  of  the  action. 

If  a  new  administration  and  a  new  con 
gress  were  not  to  be  saddled  with  a  vexatious 
question  which  had  already  been  well  threshed 
out,  certainly  the  last  hour  of  the  session 
was  not  too  early  for  deciding  it. 

Without  comparison  of  dates,  but  in  view 
of  the  progress  of  events,  the  recognition  of 
Texas,  in  consideration  of  her  relations  to 
Mexico,  had  been  delayed  longer  than  the 
recognition  of  Mexico  in  consideration  of 
her  relations  to  Spain.  Spain  held  impor 
tant  military  posts,  and  ports  where  her 
formidable  navy  could  cover  the  disembarka 
tion  of  comparatively  great  military  forces — 
of  which  she  later  availed  herself — when  the 
United  States,  in  spite  of  Spain's  protests, 
recognized  the  independence  of  Mexico.  In 


Recognition  139 


1837  every  military  post  and  every  port  in 
Texas  was  in  the  hands  or  power  of  the 
Texans. 

The  Republic  of  Cuba  was  recognized 
when  the  Spaniards  held  possession  of 
everything  on  the  island  but  the  thickets, 
and  surrounded  its  coast  with  their  fleets. 

The  treaty  between  Mexico  and  Spain,  on 
the  faith  of  which  the  United  States  had 
recognized  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  had  been 
signed  on  the  part  of  Spain  by  General 
O'Donaju  only,  her  commander  in  the  field, 
without  the  approval  of  his  government. 
The  treaty  of  Velasco  had  been  consented 
to  and  acted  upon  by  all  of  Mexico's  gen 
erals  in  the  different  departments  in  Texas 
and  by  the  only  government  she  actually 
possessed. 

The  terms  agreed  upon  between  Grant  and 
Lee  at  Appomatox  were  respected  as  re 
ligiously  as  if  a  formal  treaty. 

Other  republics  have  been  from  time  to 
time  recognized  in  which  the  suzerain  had  a 
better  fighting  chance  than  the  Mexican 
outlook  in  Texas  at  the  time  of  her 
recognition. 

Judged  as  a  mere  question  of  difference  in 
dates,  too,  many  a  new  de  facto  government 


140  The  Mexican  War 

has  been  received  into  the  brotherhood  of 
nations  after  a  coup  d'etat,  or  a  removal  of  a 
head — or  two — or  more — with  more  speed 
than  Texas. 

Hawaii  was  not  kept  waiting  so  long — nor 
Panama. 

The  date  of  the  treaty  of  Velasco  (by 
which  the  only  government  of  Mexico — 
that  "in  Burleson's  baggage  train" — had 
recognized  Texan  independence)  was  May  14, 
1836.  To  March  i,  1837, tne  date  of  recogni 
tion  of  Texas  by  the  United  States,  the 
interval  was  nine  months  and  eighteen  days ; 
and  it  is  difficult  to  perceive  why  the  pro 
fessors  should  regard  that  as  an  abnormally 
brief  period  of  incubation. 

There  was  no  great  reason  for  waiting  to 
learn  the  boundaries  of  Texas. 

The  acquisition  of  California  had  not  yet 
become  a  pressing  political  question.  It  is 
hardly  credible  that  Jackson  was  in  a  con 
spiracy  to  force  a  war  to  obtain  a  footing  on 
the  Pacific  coast. 

The  boundary  of  Texas  was  made  the  Rio 
Grande  in  the  treaty  of  Velasco  by  implication, 
if  not  in  terms. l  Treaty  or  no  treaty,  that 

1  "  A  condition  of  the  treaty  of  Velasco  was  the  es 
tablishment  of  the  Rio  Grande  as  a  boundary." — Sam 


Recognition  141 

boundary  had  been  enforced:  the  Texan 
Congress  had  insisted  on  it;  Jackson  had 
advised  the  United  State  Congress  of  the 
insistence;  and  after  the  resolution  of  recog 
nition  had  passed  there  was  no  reason 
for  any  official  of  the  United  States,  in  the 
observance  of  neutral  relations,  to  question 
that  boundary.  Texan  independence  was 
recognized  by  other  powers.  And  the  recog 
nition  of  Texas  by  the  United  States,  was 
timely,  definite  as  to  the  Rio  Grande  bound 
ary,  and  conclusive. 


Houston    and    the     War    of    Independence    in    Texas, 
Alfred  M.  Williams  (Boston,  1893),  pp.  209-211. 

Henry  M.  Morfitt,  American  agent  in  Texas,  to  Sec 
retary  of  State,  Aug.  27,  1836:  "The  Rio  Grande  was 
made  the  boundary  by  implication,  as  Article  III.  of 
the  agreement  stipulates  that  the  Mexican  troops 
should  evacuate  the  territory  cf  Texas,  passing  to 
the  other  side  of  the  Rio  Grande  del  Norte." — British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  London,  1853,  vol.  25,  p. 
1365- 


CHAPTER  IX 

MIXED  MOTIVES 

'HPHE  opinion  expressed  as  to  the  causes 
1       of  the  Mexican  War  by  the  mass  of 
historians    is    given    more    definite     shape,  [ 
perhaps,  than  by  any  other,  by  Mr.  Ladd,  * 
who  says  in  italics:    "  The  potent  cause  and 
ruling  motive  of  the  war  with  Mexico  was  the 
purpose  to   extend  human  slavery   into   free 
territory.''1     But  he  admires  "the  forbearance 
which  citizens  of  the  United  States  had  long 
extended  to  the  Mexicans."  1 

Carl  Schurz  gives  four  "ostensible  grounds 
for  war":  "annexation,  claims,  the  boundary 
line,  the  rejection  of  a  minister,"  but  says 
that  "the  course  of  the  administration  in 
its  dealings  with  Mexico  was  such  as  can 
scarcely  be  explained  on  any  other  theory 
than  that  it  desired  to  bring  on  a  war." 

1  History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Horatio  O.  Ladd, 
New  York,  1883,  p.  29. 

142 


Mixed  Motives  143 

The  motives  and  reasons  for  annexation 
of  Texas  and  for  war  with  Mexico  because 
of  it,  or  independently  of  it,  are  not  so 
simple  and  uninvolved  as  from  this  brief 
generalization  would  be  inferred.  TJiey_are 
numerous,  and  so  interlaced,  interdependent, 
and  yet  contradictory  of  each  other,  as  to 
form  a  chapter  in  history  than  which  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  imagine  one  fuller  of 
intricacy  and  difficulty.  It  is  not  improb 


able  lliU  TS"!!!  avoidance  of  this  difficulty, 
along  the  line  of  least  resistance,  that  his 
torians  have  with  so  great  an  approach  to 
unanimity  attributed  it  all  to  a  slavery 
cabal.  Brief  histories  and  biographies  nat 
urally  accept  a  short  cut.  Philosophical 
historians  in  love  with  a  priori  reasoning 
seem  to  be  almost  irresistibly  drawn  into 
attributing  effects  to  a  single  dominant 
cause. 

That  there  was  a  large  slave-holding  inter 
est,  under  the  leadership  of  Calhoun,  which  1 
favored    extension    toward     the    southwest  \ 
has  never  been  and  cannot  be  questioned;  j 
its  methods  were  shrewd  but  direct,  earnest, 
and  so  obvious  as  to  have  been  deservedly 
denounced  as  domineering.     The  jslave-hold- 
ers  undoubtedly  took  advantage,  with  great 


144  The  Mexican  War 

political  skill,  of  everything  which  tended 
to  elicit  popular  favor  for  their  projects. 

But,  whatever  their  justly  famed  political 
ability  in  taking  advantage  of  circumstances, 
their  power  had  limitations.  They  did  not 
and  could  not  create  the  conditions;  they 
found  them  existing,  and  only  controlled 
results  as  far  as  possible.  And,  since  many 
of  their  official  acts  have  been  damned  with 
opprobrium  for  their  alleged  disregard  of 
formal  good  manners  and  diplomatic  decen 
cies,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  the 
political  skill  and  experience  which  were  jeal 
ously  recognized  and  bitterly  regretted  by 
their  opponents  constituted  in  themselves  al 
most  a  guarantee  that  no  mistakes  in  the  for 
mality  of  the  official  acts  for  which  they  were 
responsible  would  be  allowed  to  endanger 
their  popular  standing.  And  it  would  be 
unjust  not  to  credit  the  pro-slavery  faction 
with  much  patriotic  and  personal  pride. 

A  faction  did  not  control  events.  The 
remark  of  John  Quincy  Adams  that  ''The 
question  of  the  right  of  search,  Oregon  occu 
pation,  the  Jones  landing  in  California,  and 
the  movement  for  the  annexation  of  Texas 
were  a  part  of  one  great  system,  looking 
for  a  war  of  conquest  and  plunder,"  was 


Mixed  Motives  145 

answered  by  Webster:  "He  was  wrong  in 
sall  this." 

Upshur  lost  his  own  temper  in  repelling 
Adams'  charges  against  the  Department  of 
State,  in  which  he  had  succeeded  Webster, 
saying:  '  The  old  man  has  nothing  of  his 
former  strength  left  but  his  passions;  his 
whole  letter  [November  5,  1842]  is  a  tissue 
of  malignant  misrepresentations."  J 

President  Tyler's  Texas  message  declares, 
"No  intrigue  has  been  set  on  foot  to  accom 
plish  annexation."  2 

"  In  Von  Hoist  everything  is  twisted  and 
distorted  in  the  worst  possible  degree."3 

The  faction  of  slavery  extensionists  found 
allies  and  weapons  in  the  reactions  from  the 
infatuation  of  their  most  radical  opponents. 
The  American  Anti-Slavery  Society,  after 
years  of  vague  threats,  passed  a  resolution 
in  May,  1844,  that  "the  abolitionists  make  it 
one  of  the  primary  objects  of  their  agitation 
to  dissolve  the  American  Union."  4 

There  was  a  plot  disclosed,  to  induce  the 

^Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  268. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  323. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  268. 

*Ibid.,  p.  274,  quoting  Niles  Register,  Ixvi.,  p.  192. 


146  The  Mexican  War 

interference  of  Great  Britain  to  effect  the 
emancipation  of  slaves  in  Texas  and  guar 
antee  Texan  independence;  to  which  Adams 
bade  Godspeed.1 

Many  a  hater  of  slavery  would  refuse  to 
ally  himself  with  a  party  of  disunion,  or 
with  one  which  would  be  willing  to  see 
British  influences  predominate  in  a  new  and 
near  quarter  of  the  continent. 

The  gradual  emancipationists  of  the  South 
were  advocates  of  slavery  extension.  Their 
reasoning  was  precisely  the  opposite  of  that 
of  the  Freesoilers  who,  in  later  days,  would 
strangle  the  institution  by  constriction ;  they 
proposed  to  modify  it,  and  eventually  dispose 
of  it,  by  a  process  of  dilution. 

The  birth-rate  among  slaves  does  not 
seem  to  have  entered  as  a  factor  into  their 
calculations;  but  there  is  no  reason  for  im 
peaching  their  honesty. 

If  the  purest  patriots,  like  Jefferson  and 
Madison,  could  believe  in  the  doctrine  of  a  diffu 
sion  of  slaves  as  the  open  sesame  of  emancipa 
tion,  it  was  not  impossible  for  an  abolitionist 
to  suppose  that  President  Tyler  really  believed 
that  the  addition  of  Texas,  with  its  fine  cotton 

1  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  p.  275,  quoting 
Adams'  Memoirs,  xi.,  p.  380. 


Mixed  Motives  147 

fields  inviting  slave-labor  from   the  old   States,  \ 
would   hasten  the   period  of  emancipation  in 
Virginia.1 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  processes  of 
reasoning  of  the  gradual  emancipationists, 
they  and  most  Southern  statesmen  and 
influential  men  were  for  annexation. 
yXwith  the  exception  of  the  contest  of 
Jackson  with  the  United  States  Bank,  no 
issue  had  probably  brought  a  more  formidable 
lobby_  to  Washington  than  that  which  urged 
Texan  annexation,  nor  one  more  deeply 
interested  by  reason  of  money  considerations. 
"During  the  debates  in  the  Senate  as  late  as 
1844  the  lobbies  were  crowded  with  _sgec- 
ulators  in  Texan  scrip  and  lands." 2  Among 
the  speculators  were  land  companies  in  New 
York,  and  the  Rio  Grande  Company.3 

The  lobby  was  not  a  rich  nor  a  talented 
one,  and  is  not  likely  to  have  greatly  influ 
enced  results  at  Washington,  however  much 
the  distribution  of  the  land-scrip  among 

1  Letters  and   Times   of  the   Tylers,  Lyon   Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  255. 

2  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Ford  Rhodes, 
New  York,  1900,  vol.  i.,  p.  81. 

3  Thirty  Years  View,  Thomas  H,  Benton,  New  York. 
1854,  vol.  ii.,  p.  623. 


148  The  Mexican  War 

many  holders  may  have  influenced  a  pop 
ular  election.  The  chief  importance  of  the 
scripholders  is  to  be  looked  for  in  having 
gained  some  votes  for  Polk. 

Several  writers  have  laid  much  stress  on 
the  readiness  of  a  large  class  of  the  American 
people  to  be  enthusiastic  about  "manifest 
dssiifiyj."  and  a  readiness  to  encroach  on  the 
rights  of  others  in  "following  the  star  of  the 
nation's  destiny."  If  anything  of  such  im 
pulse  is  discoverable  in  concrete  results,  it  is 
not  to  be  found  often  or  easily  in  diplomatic 
action.  If  traceable  in  affairs  with  Mexico  it 
must  be  found  in  election  excitements  and 
declamations.  It  may  have  served  to  gather 
a  few  votes,  but  it  is  not  a  ponderable  force. 

A  summary  of  the  considerations  moving 
for  the  annexation  of  Texas  was  presented 
to  the  United  States  Senate,  ApriJ  22,  1844,  in 
executive  session,  in  a  secret  message  from 
President  Tyler,1  couched  in  his  usual  delib 
erate  and  moderate  language  and  preserving 
a  friendly  tone  toward  Mexico. 

Texas,  for  reasons  deemed  sufficient  by  herself, 
threw  off  her  dependence  on  Mexico  as  far  back 
as  1836,  and  consummated  her  independence 

1  2  8th  Congress,  ist  session,  "Documents  from  which 
the  seal  of  secrecy  has  been  removed."  Doc.  2 7  6,  p.  9. 


Mixed  Motives  149 

by  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  in  the  same  year, 
since  which  period  Mexico  has  attempted  no 
serious  invasion  of  her  territory;  but  the 
contest  has  assumed  features  of  a  mere 
border  war,  characterized  by  acts  revolting  to 
humanity. 

In    1836    Texas    adopted    her  constitution,  - 
under   which   she   has   existed   as   a   sovereign 
power  since  having  been  recognized  as  such  by 
many  of  the  principal  powers  of  the  world;  and,  > 
contemporaneously    with    its    adoption    by    a  : 
solemn  vote  of  her  people,  embracing  all  her 
population  but  ninety-three   persons,   declared 
her  anxious  desire  to  be  admitted  into  associa 
tion  with  the   United   States.  .  .  .  This  course 
has  been  adopted  by  her  without  the  employ 
ment  of  any  sinister  measures  on  the  part  of 
this  government.     No  intrigue  has  been  set  on 
foot  to  accomplish  it. 

The  message  sets  forth  certain  dangers  in  re 
fusal,  such  as  smuggling,  hostility  of  Texans, 
raids  of  Indians  from  a  territory  not  accessible 
to  our  arms  or  policing,  loss  of  trade,  the 
.submission  of  Texas  to  some  other  Power. 

It  is  not  to  be  believed  that  a  man  of 
Tyler's  unquestionable  integrity,  and  an 
independence  of  character  such  that  he  had 
not  hesitated  to  vote  in  a  minority  of  one  in  a 


150  The  Mexican  War 

case  of  conscience,1  should  have  misstated 
the  position  willingly  to  the  Senate,  his 
colleague  in  the  treaty-making  power.  And 
it  is  not  probable  that  a  statesman  of  his 
experience  made  any  serious  error  in  his 
presentation  of  facts. 

He  viewed  the  matter  as  "an  American 
and  not  a  Southern  question."  2 

If  any  speculators  in  Texas  stocks  have 
counselled,  much  less  impelled,  me  to  action  upon 
that  subject,  I  declare  myself  to  be  wholly 
ignorant  of  that  fact.  The  plain  truth  is  that 
I  saw  nothing  but  the  country,  and  the  whole 
country ;  not  this  or  that  section,  this  or  that  local 
interest,  but  the  whole — the  good,  the  strength, 
the  glory  of  the  whole  country  in  the  measure.3 

Or,  as  Professor  Woolsey  says,  "  something, 
essential  to  our  symmetrical  development." 
Webster,  Clay,  and  Tyler  endeavored   to 
keep  the  solution  of  the  Texan  question  out; 
of  politics.4 

1  "  The  Force  Bill,"  Jacksonian  Democracy,  William 
MacDonald,  New  York,  1906,  p.  164. 

2  Letters  and   Times   of  the   Tylers,  Lyon   Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  422-423. 

3  Ibid.  p.  425,  Letter  to  Richmond  Enquirer. 

4  "It  was  necessary  for  the  success  of  the  scheme 
that  the  question,  above  all,  should  not  become  a  party 
one." — Ibid.,  p.  278. 


Mixed  Motives  151 

Clay  considered  slavery  to  be  a  strictly 
temporary  institution,  which  would  soon  be 
overthrown  by  the  laws  of  population.1 

The  advantage  to  trade  in  controlling 
Texan  ports  is  obvious  from  the  cotton 
monopoly,  from  the  conformation  of  her 
coast — the  shelter  offered  to  pirates  and 
smugglers  by  her  sounds  and  inlets. 

The  complication  of  the  question  of 
Texas  with  that  of  Oregon,  and  general 
access  to  the  Pacific,  cannot  be  either  over 
estimated  or  altogether  unravelled. 

At  another  period  annexationists  would 
naturally  have  pulled  together  to  land  a 
double  prize.  The  Democrats  did  join  the 
political  war-cry  of  "jce-annexation,"  with 
"fifty-four,  forty,  or  fight,"  and  won  out; 
but  whether  by  virtue  of  the  combination, 
the  alliteration — cited  longer  and  wider  than 
the  Reverend  Burchard's  "Rum,  Romanism, 
and  Rebellion  " — or  the  division  among  their 
opponents,  cannot  be  computed  with  any 
thing  approaching  to  exactness. 

How  many  votes  were  lost  to  the  Demo 
cracy  in  the  South  by  the  prospect  of  a  great 

«  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  Boston,  1887, 
vol.  ii.,  p.  260-1,  Letter  of  Clay  to  Stephen  F.  Miller, 
Tuscaloosa,  July  27,  1844. 


1 52  The  Mexican  War 

increase  in  Northern  territory?  How  many 
everywhere  by  the  danger  of  two  wars  at  a 
time? 

How  many  votes  were  captured  by  an  out 
look  for  cotton  monopoly  and  cheap  lands  in 
Texas?  How  many  by  the  vision  of  ports 
on  the  Pacific?  Daniel  Webster  had  said, 
''The  port  of  San  Francisco  is  twenty  times 
as  valuable  to  us  as  all  Texas."  1 

How  many  American  whalers  and  ship 
owners,  how  many  of  the  settlers  pushing 
out  over  the  trails  of  Lewis  and  Clark,  how 
many  owning  lands  or  whose  brothers  and 
sons  were  among  the  pioneers  in  Oregon, 
were  supporting  a  policy  of  expansion  ?  Such 
questions  cannot  be  answered  with  exactness. 
No  census  t>r  election  returns  can  be  relied 
on  for  figures.  A  close  analysis  of  the  votes 
in  some  State  elections  and  in  the  election 
of  President  might  give  reasonably  close 
approximations;  but  these  influences  on  the 
solution  of ''questions  with  Mexico  are  not 
quite  ascertainable  and  are  at  best  remote. 

Nearer  and  more  powerful  impulses  for 
curt  dealing  with  Mexico,  but,  nevertheless, 
influences  incapable  of  measurement,  were 

1  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  264. 


Mixed  Motives  153 

kinship  with  the  Texan  population,  or  a  great 
and  controlling  part  of  it,  and  intense  sym 
pathy  for  their  wrongs,  coincident  with  no  less 
intense  indignation  at  Mexican  barbarities. 

From  1836  until  1845  " Remember  the 
Alamo"  —which  more  reasonably  should 
have  read  "Remember  Goliad"  (la  Bahia)  — 
meant  as  much  to  a  vast  number  of  American 
citizens  as,  within  a  decade,  "Remember 
the  Maine"  meant  to  their  descendants,  and 
with  much  more  certainty  that  the  ven 
geance  invoked  was  not  misplaced. 

It  would  seem  to  be  highly  probable  that, 
instead  of  slavery  extension  having  been  the 
prime  factor  in  inducing  annexation  and 
war  with  Mexico,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
slavery  question  Texas  would  have  been 
annexed,  the  pirates  of  her  coast  sunk  or 
hung,  her  grand  agricultural  wealth  ex 
ploited,  and  Mexican  and  Indian  atrocities 
suppressed  by  the  power  of  the  great  republic, 
immediately  after  the  slaughter  at  Goliad.1 

One  of  the  series  of  incidents  which  un- 

1 "  The  wonder  is  not  that  there  were  occasional 
emigrations  and  subscription  of  funds,  but  that  there 
was  not  an  open  and  direct  intervention  by  our  people. 
The  ludicrous  part  of  the  business  was  that  the  greatest 
complaints  came  from  the  very  men  who  proclaimed 
the  higher  law  against  slavery." — Letters  and  Times  of 


i$4  The  Mexican  War 

doubtedly  tended  to  delay  annexation  was 
the  contention  between  the  two  houses 
of  Congress  as  to  their  constitutional  pre 
rogatives.  Niles,  as  we  have  already  noticed, 
had  been  reluctant  on  account  of  constitu 
tional  scruples.  Benton  objected  to  the 
acquisition  of  Texas  by  treaty,  instead  of  a 
treaty  based  on  legislative  action,  as  in  the 
case  of  Louisiana  and  Florida;  "  by  treaty 
covertly  conceived  and  carried  on  with  all  the 
features  of  an  intrigue,  and  in  flagrant  violation 
of  the  principles  and  usages  of  government."1 
He  insisted  that  immediate  annexation  was 
made  to  serve  a  political  scheme  to  weaken 
Van  Buren  and  make  Calhoun  President  by 
throwing  the  election  into  the  House.2 
February  14,  1845,  annexation  was  effected 

the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner  Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol. 
ii.,  p.  257. 

Since  editing  The  American  Nation,  Professor  Hart 
has  materially  changed  his  views  as  to  the  slavery- 
extension  cause  of  the  war,  and  now  says:  "The 
annexation  of  Texas  was  logical  and  delayed  only 
by  the  accidental  connection  with  slavery." — National 
Ideas  Historically  Traced,  Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  New 
York,  1907,  p.  26. 

»  Thirty  Years  View,  Thomas  H.  Benton,  New  York, 
1854,  p.  600. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  581-599. 

"The  power  of  annexation  by  treaty  had  been  car- 


Mixed  Motives  155 

by  joint  resolution.  No  one  can  fail  to 
surmise  that  jealousy  for  the  prerogative 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  was  not  the 
sole  motive  for  preference  of  that  method. 
A  party  having  a  majority  in  each  house, 
and  lacking  the  requisite  two  thirds  for 
making  a  treaty  in  the  Senate,  would  be 
very  apt  to  have  its  views  of  constitutional 
obligations  lean  toward  the  method  of 
annexation  by  joint  resolution — a  method 
originally  proposed  by  Stephen  F.  Austin 
and  definitely  described  in  the  instructions 
of  J.  P.  Henderson,  Texan  Secretary  of  State, 
to  Memucan  Hunt,  Minister  to  the  United 
States,  December  31,  I836.1 

It  does  not  follow  that  because  of  preju 
dices  the  method  is  not  constitutional,  nor 
that  it  is  not  the  best  method.  Since  the  an 
nexation  of  Hawaii,  it  will  probably  stand  as 
the  generally  accepted  procedure. 

The  fact  for  history  to  concern  itself  about 
is  that  the  debates  and  scruples  as  to  methods 
of  procedure  were  an  obstacle  to  annexation, 

ried  to  annexation  even  without  treaty." — American 
Political  History,  Alexander  Johnson,  New  York,  1906, 
pp.  71-72. 

1  Southwestward  Extension,  George  Pierce  Garrison, 
New  York,  1906,  pp.  92,  93,  94. 


156  The  Mexican  War 

and  probably  delayed  it  until  the  people  of 
the  United  States  had  been  heard  from  in 
the  election  of  Polk. 

"The  Texan  question  was,  after  all,  the 
real  issue  of  the  campaign.  In  this  respect 
Folk's  position  was  perfectly  clear. "  1 

The  question  of  the  annexation  of  Texas 
was  the  principal  issue  in  the  campaign  of  1844. 
And  yet  the  Whig  platform  was  silent  upon  it. 
It  is  probable  that  they  feared  openly  to  oppose 
a  measure  which  had  aroused  the  national 
pride  and  enthusiasm.2 

There  is  an  amusing  discrepancy  in  the 
ideas  of  political  inheritances  of  adminis 
trations,  as  discovered  by  historians.  The 
evils  of  Jacksonianism  were  entailed  by  his 
biographer  on  three  subsequent  administra 
tions.  In  concurrence  with  Von  Hoist,  Sum- 
ner  says,  "  The  Mexican  War  was  forced  on 
by  a  Cabinet  intrigue,  and  Tyler  forced  it  on 
Polk. " 3  But  Garrison  accuses  Tyler  of  antici 
pating  Polk  in  the  fruit  of  his  victory;  and 

»  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  Boston,  1887,  vol. 
ii.,  p.  258. 

2  History  of  Political  Parties  in  the   United  States. 
James  H.  Hopkins,  New  York,  1900,  p.  70. 

3  Andrew  Jackson,  William  Graham  Sumner,  Boston, 
1882,  p.  358. 


Mixed  Motives  15  7 

Johnson  says:  "  Tyler  forestalled  Polk,  and 
leaped  at  the  chance  of  ending  his  presidency 
with  the  eclat  and  the  honor  of  annexation."  l 
Tyler  gives  the  inside  facts.  The  action 
of  the  British  envoy  was  so  full  of  mach 
inations  to  defeat  annexation  that  delay 
seemed  to  President  Tyler  to  be  inadmissible. 

He  directed  Mr.  Calhoun  to  wait  upon  Mr. 
Polk  and  submit  to  him  the  instructions  to  our 
agent  in  Texas.  Mr.  Calhoun  did  as  he  was 
directed,  but  Mr.  Polk  declined  any  inter 
ference  in  the  matter,  and  was  understood  by 
his  silence  as  concurring,  or  at  least  acquiescing, 
in  Mr.  Tyler's  course —  2 

which  was  to  hasten  Texan  acceptance  of 
the  terms  offered  by  the  United  States. 

This  was  characteristic  courtesy,  on  the 
part  of  an  exceptionally  mannerly  gentle 
man,  even  in  the  presidential  office. 

John  Tyler  will  always  stand  charged  by 
the  larger  section  of  an  intelligent  people 
with  the  gravest  political  error  in  standing 
to  States'  rights  and  the  pro-slavery  cause, 
although  himself  an  emancipationist. 

>  A  Century  of  Expansion,  William  Fletcher  Johnson, 
New  York,  1903,  vol.  ii.,  p.  71. 

2  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  363. 


i58  The  Mexican  War 

The  charges  brought  against  him  by 
modern  historians  and  ancient  fire-eaters 
(who  could,  as  he  said,  be  found  in  every 
section)  of  allowing  rude  and  unmannerly 
correspondence  with  Mexico,  through  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  the  diplomatic 
representatives  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  and  so  conspiring  with  other 
Southern  leaders  to  force  a  war  of  aggran 
dizement,  must  provoke  a  smile  of  deris 
ion,  which  perforce  widens  to  a  grin  when  it 
is  remembered  that  the  accusation  implies 
that  he  made  Daniel  Webster  his  Secretary 
of  State,  and  employed  him  as  his  first 
choice  for  his  chief  instrument  in  so  indeco 
rous  a  purpose. 

Nor  will  Mr.  Tyler  find  himself  in  especially 
crude  and  ill-mannered  company  when,  in  a 
later  chapter,  he  is  brought  into  association 
for  answering  the  same  charges  with  other 
Secretaries  of  State — Martin  Van  Buren, 
Edward  Livingston,  Louis  McLane,  John 
Forsyth,  Hugh  S.  Legare,  Abel  P.  Upshur, 
John  C.  Calhoun,  and  James  Buchanan. 
Whatever  other  charges  may  be  harbored 
or  sustained  against  these  gentlemen,  it  will 
require  proofs  of  a  quite  unmistakable  nature 
to  induce  the  belief  that  they  were  oblivious 


Mixed  Motives  159 

of  the  duties  or  the  advantages  of  decorum, 
of  parliamentary  skill  and  diplomatic  eti 
quette,  or  wished  to  write  themselves  down 
as  incapables. 

The  direct  and  finally  prevailing  causes 
for  war  with  Mexico — the  concrete  and  meas 
urable  causes — have  not  been  touched  upon 
in  this  chapter.  Those  yet  to  be  consid 
ered  are  more  important  in  their  results 
and  in  the  insufferable  nature  of  their  mani 
festation.  They  were  more  hopelessly  un 
avoidable,  and  involved  more  enduring 
interests — interests  continued  from  a  previ 
ous  generation  and  embracing  centuries  of 
outlook,  yet  neglected  by  philosophical  his 
torians  because  not  falling  into  line  with 
the  prescribed  logic  of  charging  a  wrong 
to  slavery  extension,  which  has  enough  un 
doubted  sins  to  answer  for. 

It  must  be  noted,  however,  before  losing 
sight  of  the  imponderable,  and  perhaps 
sentimental,  impulses  or  motives  to  war 
with  Mexico,  that,  according  to  Professor 
Woolsey's  schedule  of  justifying  causes  for 
war  as  applied  to  the  war  for  Cuban  inde 
pendence,  they  were  ample.  To  go  to  the 
official  record,  and  to  an  example  which, 
involving  no  constitutional  questions  and  no 


160  The  Mexican  War 

internal  dissensions  or  struggle  for  sectional 
political  supremacy,  received  the  enthusi 
astic  support  of  the  whole  people  of  the 
United  States,  and  its  underlying  principle 
the  consent  of  the  peoples  of  the  world,  re 
hearsing  in  a  preamble 

the  abhorrent  conditions  in  Cuba,  so  near  our 
own  borders  .  .  .  which  have  shocked  the  moral 
sense  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and 
have  been  a  disgrace  to  Christian  civilization — 
culminating  in  the  destruction  of  a  United 
States  battle-ship  with  two  hundred  and  sixty- 
six  of  its  officers  and  crew,  while  on  a  friendly 
visit  in  the  harbor  of  Havana — and  cannot 
longer  be  endured,  the  Senate  and  House  of 
Representatives  resolved:  I.  That  the  people  of 
Cuba  are  and  of  right  ought  to  be  free  and 
independent.  II.  That  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  demands  that  the  Government 
of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and 
government  in  the  island  of  Cuba  and  withdraw 
its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban 
waters.  III.  That  the  President  be  directed  to 
use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  to  carry 
this  resolution  into  effect.1 

The    case    of    Mexico    in   Texas   differed 
from  that  of  Spain  in  Cuba  in  that: 

i  Joint  Resolution   No.    21,  April  20,  1898,  30  Stats, 
at  Large,  p.  738. 


Mixed  Motives  161 

i  st.  Spain  had  large  districts  under 
control  in  Cuba;  Mexico  had  not  so  much 
as  a  fighting  chance  to  establish  control 
over  any  part  of  Texas.  Texas  in  1845  had 
been  practically  independent  for  nearly  nine 
years.1 

2d.  The  cruelties  in  Cuba  had  been 
continued  "three  years";  those  in  Texas 
nine,  plus  the  long  period  prior  to  the  Texan 
revolution. 

3d.  The  abhorrent  conditions  in  Cuba 
had  been  without  the  avowed  sanction  of  the 
Spanish  Government,  but  under  the  orders 
of  a  commander  (Wehler)  who  had  been  with 
drawn.  Our  own  naval  board  of  inquiry  as 
to  the  blowing  up  of  the  Maine  had  reported 
that  the  explosion  was  from  the  outside, 
but  by  whose  agency  could  not  be  deter 
mined.  The  abhorrent  conditions  in  Texas 
were  by  the  direct  and  avowed  orders  of  the 
sole  government  of  Mexico,  the  dictator 
Santa  Anna,  and  of  preconceived  purpose, 
fully  authorized  by  his  creature,  the  Mexi 
can  Congress,  in  deliberate  record  of  his 
enactments. 

4th.     The   excesses    in   Cuba   had    been 

i  Westward  Extension,  George  Pierce  Garrison,  New 
York,  1906,  p.  149. 


1 62  The  Mexican  War 

committed  mainly  against  a  race  alien  to  us. 
Those  in  Texas  were  inflicted  on  our  own  kin, 
settled  in  Texas  by  Mexican  invitation  and 
land  grants. 

5th.  The  disorders  in  Cuba  "near  our  own 
border"  were  across  intervening  seas.  Those 
in  Texas  were  absolutely  adjacent  to  our 
territory,  divided  from  it  only  by  the  scanty 
waters  of  the  Sabine  and  a  long  imaginary 
line. 

6th.  The  blowing  up  of  the  Maine  was  a 
single  incident,  though  of  terrible  conse 
quence.  The  attacks  on  our  ships  and  flag 
by  Mexicans  had  been  many  and,  for  a  long 
time,  continuous. 

The  impulses  and  motives  thus  far  men 
tioned  did  not  bring  about  the  annexa 
tion  of  Texas  nor  the  sequent  war.  "In 
1837  the  Texan  Government  proposed  to 
Van  Buren  the  annexation  of  Texas  to 
the  United  States,  but  Van  Buren  declined." l 
All  these  motives  had  been  urged  by  Austin 
and  Memucan  Hunt,  authorized  agents  of 
Texas,  the  latter  her  Minister  in  1836.  They 
had  the  support  of  the  enthusiastic  propa 
ganda  which  has  already  been  summarized, 

1  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  Boston,  1887,  vol. 
ii-,  P-  235. 


Mixed  Motives  163 

and  which  has  been  magnified  by  historians 
into  the  great  and  only  cause  of  the  war — 
sufficient  unto  itself.  And  the  United  States 
for  nine  years  refused  to  break  the  peace 
with  her  malignant  and  insolent  but  feeble 
neighbor.  Twice  the  Senate  refused  to  ratify 
a  treaty  for  annexation;  as  late  as  April  22, 
1844,  by  a  more  than  two  thirds  vote  against 
ratification,  35  to  16,  while  two  thirds  was 
required  to  ratify.  The  patience  and  for 
bearance  of  a  nation  with  "a  manifest  des 
tiny,"  the  clemency  of  the  wolf,  had  not 
been,  exhausted. 


CHAPTER  X 

CLAIMS  AND  CORRESPONDENCE 

NO  article  of  the  impeachment  of  the 
United  States  for  her  conduct  toward 
Mexico  has  been  urged  with  bitterer  in 
dignation  than  the  alleged  impositions  in 
preferring  claims  for  Mexican  encroach 
ments  on  the  persons  and  property  of  Amer 
ican  citizens,  and  the  manner  of  their 
presentation.  The  unsettled  condition  of 
the  Spanish  and  Mexican  governments,  the 
inadequacy  of  their  navies  to  crush  the 
pirates  sheltered  in  the  gulfs  and  sounds  of 
their  coast,  and  the  want  of  character  in 
many  of  their  officials,  military  and  naval, 
had  naturally  resulted  in  many  offensive 
acts  for  which  compensation  had  been  de 
manded  by  the  United  States,  England,  and 
France.  That  these  claims  were  presented 
by  the  United  States  in  an  undiplomatic 
and  offensive  manner,  is,  of  course,  a  charge 
164 


Claims  and  Correspondence    165 

which  should  be  substantiated  by  proofs 
and  specifications  citing  the  obnoxious  papers. 
The  charge  is  maintainable,  if  at  all,  by 
record  evidence;  no  other  proof  or  opinion 
is  admissible;  and  in  a  matter  susceptible 
of  record  proof  by  citations,  out  of  a  vast 
mass  of  official  papers,  there  is  less  justifi 
cation  than  in  any  other  case  for  putting, 
or  attempting  to  put,  the  defence  to  the 
proof  of  a  general  negative.  It  is  quite 
enough  answer  to  Mr.  Schouler's  phrases 
"the  greater  harpies  of  the  United  States" 
and  "a  Pizarro,"  to  observe  that  the  manner 
of  the  nations  aggrieved  by  Mexican  breaches 
of  international  obligation,  in  enforcement  of 
demands  for  indemnity,  had  been  this: 
England  had  threatened  to  send  an  admiral 
and  his  squadron,  and  the  fugitive  rebel 
Mexican  General  Arista,  from  her  station 
in  Jamaica,  to  make  collection  of  her  claims ; 
and  got  her  payment.  France  sent  a  fleet, 
battered  down  the  castle  of  San  Juan 
d'Ulloa;  and  got  her  payment. 

The  United  States  agreed  to  arbitrate 
her  claims;  and  eventually  paid  most  of 
them  herself  to  such  citizens  as  proved 
claims,  reserving  the  amount  out  of  the  sum 
she  paid  Mexico  at  the  close  of  the  war. 


1 66  The  Mexican  War 

Dr.  Sparks  and  others  intimate  that  the 
claims  as  presented  were  excessive  because, 
while  $8,000,000  were  claimed,  only  $3,000,- 
ooo  were  eventually  allowed  by  the  commis 
sion.  1  The  claims  were  very  largely  for 
personal  injuries  and  detentions;  the  " thir 
teen  revolutions  "  Dr.  Sparks  mentions  as 
having  " taken  place  in  twenty  years,"  and 
the  neighborhood  of  pirates,  made  very 
great  the  difficulty  of  fixing  responsibility. 
Any  young  practising  lawyer  of  Chicago 
can  advise  the  historian  that  forty  per  cent, 
is  an  unusually  large  proportional  amount 
to  recover  of  damages  asked  in  complaints, 
even  in  complaints  sustained  by  judgments. 
Schouler  calls  the  spoliation  claim  a  "con 
venient  weapon ' '  for  Jackson.  Sumner  says  : 

A  correspondence  now  began  between  the 
representatives  of  the  governments  of  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  which  no  American  ought  to 
read  without  shame.2 

Again : 

In  1836  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
opened  a  new  battery  against  that  of  Mexico  in 

1  The  United  States,  Edwin  Earle  Sparks,  Part  II., 
New  York,  1904,  p.  139. 

2  Andrew  Jackson,  William  Graham  Sumner,  Boston, 
1882,  p.  356. 


Claims  and  Correspondence    167 

the  shape  of  a  series  of  claims  and  charges.  .  .  . 
Powhatan  Ellis  performed  his  duties  in  such  a 
rude  and  peremptory  manner  that  one  is  forced 
to  suspect  that  he  acted  by  orders  [i.e.  that  the 
indecorum  was  chargeable  to  John  Forsyth]; 
the  charges  were  at  first  fifteen  in  number,  then 
forty-six,  then  fifty-seven,  and  bear  the  charac 
ter  of  attempts  to  make  a  quarrel.  Ellis  ab 
ruptly  came  home.1 

Elson  goes  a  step  further ;  he  says : "  Jackson 
even  demanded  damages  from  Mexico  and 
threatened  reprisals,  when  the  damage  claims 
should  have  come  from  the  other  side." 
This  piece  of  history  in  the  face  of  the  award 
of  a  commission  of  arbitrators. 

Von  Hoist,  Sumner's  authority  for  im 
peaching  Powhatan  Ellis'  manner  in  cor 
respondence,  relying  on  the  authority  of 
Jay,2  declares:  "It  is  rare  indeed  that  diplo 
matic  history  exhibits  a  series  of  natural 
complaints,  so  trivial  in  themselves,  urged 
with  so  much  spleen  and  arrogance  on  the 
one  side,  or  met  with  so  much  fairness  and 
good  temper  on  the  other."  This  manner 
of  writing  history  shows  one  rather  passion- 

1  Andrew  Jackson,  p.  358. 

2  A   Review  of  the  Causes  and  Consequences   of  the 
Mexican  War,  William  Jay,  Boston,  1849,  ?•  45- 


i68  The  Mexican  War 

ate  writer  quoting  the  opinion  (no  state 
ments  of  facts)  of  another  more  impassioned  ; 
he  in  turn  quoting  the  opinion  of  one  of  the 
partisans  of  the  day  of  the  questioned  occur 
rences.  The  first  bare  fact  alleged  is,  how 
ever,  traced  to  Jay l  who  quotes  Pendleton  of 
Virginia  as  authority  for  the  statement  that 
there  was  among  the  claims  a  foolish  bill  for  56 
dozen  bottles  of  porter,  $1690,  with  6  years' 
interest,  $6570(1),  on  which  Mexico  was  obliged 
eventually  to  pay  a  total  of  $8260.  This  would 
look  very  much  like  evidence  of  one  swindle 
on  Mexico  if  it  had  not  been  thrown  out.2 

Schouler  continues  condemnation  of  the 
manners  exhibited  by  our  diplomatists  to 
the  last  effort  (to  be  considered  later)  which 
Slidell  was  supposed  to  make  for  averting 
the  war:  "Despatches  more  contemptuous 
of  a  country  to  whom  an  apology  was  owing 
were  never  penned."  3  Yet  James  Buchanan, 
a  peculiarly  formal  old  gentleman  (to  our 
sorrow  as  a  nation,  over-formal  in  an  emer- 

1  A   Review  of  the  Causes  and  Consequences  of  the 
Mexican  War,  p.  73. 

2  Constitutional  and  Political  History  of  the  United 
States,  H.  Von  Hoist,  Chicago,  1881,  vol.  ii.,  p.  606. 

3  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Schouler,  Bos 
ton,  1889,  vol.  iv.,  p.  525. 


Claims  and  Correspondence    169 

gency) ,  did  not  discover  anything  improper— 
though  Secretary  of  State  at  the  time;  nor 
does  George  Ticknor  Curtis  in  his  biography.1 
Carl  Schurz  is  so  impressed  with  the 
wickedness  of  the  United  States  diplomats 
that  he  denounces  it  twice — he  does  not 
make  any  specifications,  nor  offer  any  proof; 
but  he  does  quote  an  opinion,  tracing  the 
phrases  of  blame  and  shame  to  their  source: 

Claims  were  presented  to  the  Mexican  Govern 
ment  and  satisfaction  demanded  in  language  so 
insulting  that,  as  John  Quincy  Adams  said,  "No 
true-hearted  citizen  of  this  Union  could  witness 
the  proceeding  without  blushing  for  his  country. ' ' 2 

"John  Quincy  Adams  was  a  master  of 
sarcasm  and  invective,"  3  and  there  probably 
is  nothing  to  be  found  in  the  correspondence 
in  question  as  severe  as  the  language  he 
was  in  the  habit  of  addressing  to  his  fellow- 
congressmen.  He  called  them  skunks  once 
in  his  diary,  if  Tyler  does  not  misquote  him. 

>•  Popularity  in  any  deep  sense  was  denied  him. 

1  Life  of  James  Buchanan,  George  Ticknor  Curtis, 
vol.  ii.,  p.  449- 

2  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  vol.  ii.,  p.  93-1 78- 

3  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Ford  Rhodes, 
New  York,  1900,  pp.  71-77.     Note  2. 


1 70  The  Mexican  War 

This  deprivation  he  repaid  by  harsh,  vindictive, 
and  censorious  judgments  upon  his  contempo 
raries.1 

In  referring  to  such  evidence  at  all  as  Ad 
ams'  opinion,  quoted  by  Mr.  Schurz,  it  is  not 
intended  to  admit  it  as  authority  by  any 
means ;  nor  yet  to  speak  with  any  disrespect 
of  the  fiery  old  debater  and  cunning  parlia 
mentarian,  on  whose  voice  for  so  many 
days  and  years  rested  in  great  measure  the 
defence  of  the  right  of  petition  and  the 
freedom  of  speech.  But  it  is  intended  to 
rebuke,  so  far  as  it  is  in  the  power  of  the 
reviewer,  the  historians  who  will  take  a 
single  exasperated  statement  of  opinion  of  a 
passionate  old  man  and  unflinching  partisan, 
pass  it  off  for  historical  authority,  and  cite 
it,  as  if  a  fact,  in  evidence  of  grave  official 
misdemeanor.  When  a  session  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  had  resembled  too  much 
a  bear-bait,  and  the  bear  had  kept  within 
parliamentary  rules  in  cuffing  back  his  tor 
mentors,  and  had  come  home  tired  and  hot 
and  worn  of  temper  to  comfort  himself  with 
writing  in  his  diary,  or  his  memoirs,  what 
it  would  have  called  down  the  Speaker's 

i  Rise  of  the  New  West,  Frederick  Judson  Turner, 
New  York,  1906,  p.  179. 


Claims  and  Correspondence    171 

gavel  to  have  said  in  the  House,  is  it  good 
research  for  a  historian  to  dig  down  into 
such  papers,  or  his  talk,  or  some  other  ex 
pression  not  specified,  not  for  a  fact  (if  John 
Quincy  Adams  testifies  anywhere  that  any 
thing  is  a  fact,  it  is  evidence  enough  to  any 
body)  ,  but  for  a  bitter  phrase  to  describe  the 
action  of  an  adversary,  and  announce  that 
as  the  summary  of  a  mass  of  unquoted 
correspondence? 

So  far  as  is  disclosed  by  a  reasonably  ex 
tended  and  careful  search,  the  charge  by  the 
historians  that  the  correspondence  of  the 
United  States  with  Mexico  was  disgraceful, 
is  unsupported  by  the  citation  of  a  single 
piece  of  evidence ; *  and  it  would  be  sufficient 

i  Westward  Extension,  Professor  George  Pierce  Garri 
son,  New  York,  1907,  p.  190,  is  an  exception,  published 
since  this  review  was  written.  He  says  Ellis'  demands 
on  Mexico  were  made  in  a  letter  "more  forcible  than 
diplomatic  " ;  and  he  cites  the  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  24th  Congress,  2d  session,  No.  139,  pp.  60-67,  in 
which  I  find  nothing  which  strikes  me  as  more  "forc 
ible  "  than  the  letter  of  Powhatan  Ellis  to  Monasterio, 
Mexico,  Oct.  20,  1836,  which  calls  attention  to  note  of 
the  26th,  ult.,  and  says: 

"In  presenting  so  urgent  a  representation  as  he  did 
on  that  occasion  of  the  wrongs  of  which  his  Govern 
ment  has  such  just  cause  to  complain,  the  Undersigned 
indulged  the  hope  that  a  returning  sense  of  justice  on 
the  part  of  the  Supreme  Mexican  Government  would 


172  The  Mexican  War 

criticism  to  leave  the  subject  at  this  point. 
But  there  are  some  interesting,  disconnected 
bits  of  evidence  accessible  which,  while  not, 
perhaps,  sufficient  to  prove  a  general  nega 
tive,  exhibit  clearly  enough  that  a  veracious 
historian,  if  not  ignorant  of  them,  should 
have  stated  them,  as  indicating  some  ex 
ceptions  at  least  to  the  broad  general  state 
ments  above  quoted. 

It  is  necessary  to  the  understanding  and 
characterization  of  the  diplomatic  correspon 
dence  to  know  something  of  the  claims 
which  were  the  subject  of  the  correspondence. 
These  cannot  well  be  followed  in  their  order; 
nor  will  brevity  permit  separating  always 
the  claims  and  the  correspondence,  or  re 
viewing  more  than  a  few  examples. 

The  great,  salient,  and  undisputed  facts, 
which  are  the  main  evidence  as  to  the 
question  in  its  large  scope,  are  that  in  1837 

have  induced  it  to  enter  into  a  speedy  arrangement  of 
all  alleged  causes  of  complaint  against  it;  but  he  has 
seen  with  regret  that  his  expectations  thus  far  have 
not  been  realized.  Now  he  has  only  to  inform  Your 
Excellency  that,  unless  redress  is  offered  without  un 
necessary  delay  in  the  several  cases  heretofore  brought 
to  the  notice  of  this  Government,  the  longer  residence  of 
the  undersigned  as  the  representative  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  near  that  of  Mexico  will  be  useless." 


Claims  and  Correspondence   173 

claims  unadjusted  had  accumulated  against 
Mexico  such  and  so  many  that  Jackson  had 
declared  "they  would  justify  in  the  eyes 
of  all  nations  immediate  war,"1  and  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  had  re 
ported  a  resolution  to  Congress  requir 
ing  a  final  demand  to  be  made  for 
redress.2 

There  had  been  repeated  acts  of  violence, 
robbery,  and  insult  to  the  flag  of  the  Union. 
For  these  acts  the  United  States  Government 
with  great  forbearance  sought  reparation.  Not 
withstanding  the  most  earnest  remonstrances 
these  depredations  did  not  cease.  The  frequent 
changes  of  rulers  in  Mexico  gave  opportunity 
for  new  outrages  and  seemed  to  remit  the  respon 
sibility  of  the  Mexican  Government  for  old  ones. 
The  injuries  and  insults  after  the  treaty  of  1831 
increased  rather  than  diminished.  The  griev 
ances  of  American  citizens,  the  hot  debates 
in  the  Mexican  Congress,  and  the  arbitrary 
and  insulting  conduct  of  the  Mexican  officials 
toward  the  representatives  of  the  United  States 

1  History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Horatio  O.  Ladd, 
New  York,  1883,  pp.  31-35. 

2  "  If  the  mission  fails  of  a  speedy  and  definite  state 
ment  this   House   will   sustain  the  executive   in  any 
ulterior    measures    which  may  become  necessary." — 
March  2,  1839,  House  Journal. 


174  The  Mexican  War 

were  used  successfully  to  cover  the  aggressive 
designs  of  the  Administration.1 

Unfortunately  Mr.  Ladd  cites  no  authorities 
for  any  of  his  statements ;  and  how  Mexican 
insults  to  the  flag  and  other  injuries  could 
be  used  to  cover  aggressive  designs  by  the 
United  States,  it  is  difficult  to  understand, 
except  as  may  appear  from  undue  urgency 
in  collection,  or  orders  to  generals  in  the 
field — which  will  be  discussed  in  the  proper 
place. 

Some  of  the  dissensions  arose  on  the  Pa 
cific  coast.  Commodore  Jones,  U.  S.  N.,  with 
the  Pacific  squadron,  was  ordered  to  take  no 
hostile  steps,  though  directed  "to  explore 
the  coast  within  the  Gulf  of  California  and 
as  high  as  the  port  of  San  Francisco,  out  of 
regard  to  the  protection  necessary  to  the 
American  inhabitants  in  a  country  which 
owned  a  nominal  allegiance  to  Mexico."2 
Nominal  allegiance  was  not  attended  by  the 
protection  of  actual  government  or  policing. 

Sumner  is  over-mild  in  the  statement  of 
the  number  of  claims  presented;  or  the 

1  History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Horatio  O.  Ladd, 
New  York,  1883,  p.  33. 

2  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner  Tyler, 
Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  266. 


Claims  and  Correspondence   175 

offences  were  more  numerous  as  the  years 
progressed.  In  the  award  of  the  commission 
of  the  United  States  (after  the  war  and  the 
assumption  of  payment  of  claims  by  this 
government) — George  Evans,  Caleb  B.  Smith, 
and  Robert  T.  Paine,  commissioners,— 
transmitted  by  Daniel  Webster,  Secretary  of 
State,  February  n,  1852,  there  are  reported: 

Claims  presented . . : 292 

Claims  rejected  for  not  setting  forth  facts 
which  if  proved  would  constitute  valid 
claims  against  Mexico  (viz.  overruled 
on  demurrer) ........ ... . .;. ... ... 40 

252 
Allowed X82 

Rejected 70 

The  Arbitration  Treaty  was  concluded  in 
1839.  The  term  of  the  commission  expired 
in  1842,  with  many  claims  unadjusted.1 

The  date  of  final  adjustment  ought  to  be 
taken  as  indicating  great  patience  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  with  Mexico.  It 
has  been  construed  as  part  of  the  plot  to  keep 
up  and  protract  dissension  until  a  war  could 
be  forced,  and  California  included  in  the  spoils. 

i  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  Boston,  1887,  vol. 
»•>  P-  235- 


1 76  The  Mexican  War 

"  It  was  suspected  [sic]  that  they  [the 
claims]  were  purposely  kept  an  open  sore."1 

At  least  a  part  of  the  delay  was  by  reason  of 
Mexican  dilatoriness — or  worse.  The  United 
States  Commissioners  for  adjustment  of 
claims  against  Mexico — W.  L.  Marcy,  after 
ward  Secretary  of  State,  and  John  Rowan, 
ex-Senator  from  Kentucky — reported  May 
26,  1841  (Baron  Roeme  was  appointed  um 
pire  by  the  King  of  Prussia),2  that  they  had 
proceeded  to  Washington  July  23,  1840; 
the  Mexicans  had  not  arrived,  and  they  ad 
journed  to  August  lyth.  The  Mexicans  then 
insisted  that  the  claims  should  be  presented 
not  by  individual  claimants  but  by  the 
State  Department  of  the  United  States;  and 
they  were  then  so  presented.  Requisitions 
were  made  on  the  Mexican  Government  for 
official  documents  requisite  for  claimants' 
proofs.  At  date  of  the  report,  in  only  two 
cases  out  of  eleven  had  the  requisition  been 
complied  with.  Many  of  the  claims  depended 
for  a  legal  statement  on  judicial  and  other 
Mexican  documents.  These  documents  Mex- 

»  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  vol.  ii.,  p.  235. 

2  "The  King  of  Prussia  is  the  Umpire  and  is  repre 
sented  by  his  minister  here." — Niles'  Register,  1840, 
P-  274. 


Claims  and  Correspondence    177 

ico,  in  the  convention  for  arbitration,  Article 
IV,  had  promised  to  furnish  on  requisition. 
Requisition  was  made  in  due  form,  but  the 
American  Commissioners,  William  L.  Marcy 
and  H.  W.  Breckenridge,  report  April  23, 
1842: 

First — Mexico  has  wholly  omitted  to  send  even 
a  moiety  of  the  documents  .  .  .  and  no  reasons 
are  given  to  the  board.  Second — several  of  the 
documents  actually  sent  are  on  the  face  of  them 
not  full  records,  but  refer  to  other  acts  which 
ought  to  appear  in  the  same,  but  do  not.  Third 
— there  are  discrepancies  between  documents 
thus  transmitted  from  Mexico  to  the  board 
and  others  equally  authenticated  which,  with 
out  explanation,  mutually  destroy  each  other's 
credit. 

The  character  of  the  claims  against  Mexico 
may  be  gathered  in  part  from  the  list  pre 
sented  in  the  final  award,  and  in  other  part, 
perhaps,  by  diligent  research  among  the 
papers  filed  by  claimants,  which,  however, 
even  with  the  awards  for  check,  would  be 
biased  statements.  Many  of  the  claims 
were  for  the  seizure  of  American  vessels; 
others  for  murder,  robbery,  imprisonment, 
spoliation  of  American  citizens  by  Mexican 
officials.  Some  of  these  claims  had  been 


178  The  Mexican  War 

adjudicated  and  had  remained  for  a  long 
time  unpaid.  The  claim  founded  on  the 
seizure  of  the  American  vessel  the  Cossack, 
and  cargo,  rested  on  a  judgment  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Justice  in  Mexico. 

William  Hallett  and  Zalmon  Hull  had 
been  taken  from  the  house  of  the  American 
consul  at  Matamoras  and  held  under  arrest 
as  spies.1  In  the  sack  of  Zacatecas  the 
property  and  lives  of  peaceful  American 
merchants  had  been  taken.2 

A  trading  and  exploring  expedition  from 
Austin,  Texas,  to  Santa  Fe,  armed,  but  in 
sufficiently,  against  the  Indians,  who  nearly 
destroyed  them,  attempted  to  take  refuge 
in  Santa  Fe;  but  were  all  held  as  prisoners 
by  the  Mexican  governor,  and  barbarously 
treated.  There  is  no  doubt  that  if  the 
inhabitants  of  Santa  Fe  had  shown  a  coura 
geous  disposition  to  claim  Texan  citizenship, 
this  Texan  expedition  would  have  assisted 
them  in  throwing  off  the  Mexican  control  and 
asserting  the  Texan  jurisdiction — the  town 
being  within  the  territory  acknowledged  as 

1  Senate  Documents,  2d  session,  24th  Congress,  vol. 
2.,  Doc.  160,  pp.  134-8. 

2  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  George 
Wilkins  Kendall,  New  York,  1844,  vol.  ii.,  p.  143-4. 


Claims  and  Correspondence   179 

Texan  by  the  treaty  of  Velasco,  that  is,  being 
east  of  the  Rio  del  Norte. 

Some  of  the  members  of  the  party  claimed 
American  citizenship,  among  them  George 
Wilkins  Kendall,  who  was  a  traveller,  partly 
for  his  health,  and  who  had  passports  and 
letters  from  Mexican  authorities.'  He  wrote 
a  full  account  of  the  expedition  and  his  ex 
periences  as  a  prisoner  in  a  vivid  and  entirely 
convincing  style.  Among  the  Mexican  of 
fences  he  noted  are  these: 

Samuel  Rowland,  a  native  of  New  Bedford, 
Mass.,  in  a  daring  attempt  to  escape  and 
give  important  information  to  Colonel  Cook's 
party,  not  yet  captured,  was  wounded,  re 
captured,  bound,  and  shot  in  the  back  by 
orders  of  Amijo. 1 

"Golpin,  a  merchant  and  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  was  too  sick  and  weak  to  keep 
up."  (The  expedition  had  not  been  able 
to  distinguish  whether  they  were  on  the 
branches  of  the  Red  River  or  the  Arkansas; 
had  completely  lost  their  way,2  and  arrived 
in  Santa  Fe  in  a  condition  of  suffering  and 
exhaustion  which  elsewhere  would  have 

1  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  George 
Wilkins  Kendall,  New  York,  1844,  vol.  i.  p.  305. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  249. 


i8o  The  Mexican  War 

awakened  compassion.)  Salazar  the  Mexican 
commandant  started  them  at  once  on  foot 
for  the  City  of  Mexico.1  "  Golpin  had  made 
a  bargain  with  one  of  the  guard  to  ride  his 
mule  for  a  short  distance,  for  which  he  was 
to  give  him  his  only  shirt/*  While  in  the 
act  of  taking  it  off  Salazar  ordered  a  soldier 
to  shoot  him.  "  The  first  ball  only  wounded 
the  wretched  man,  but  the  second  killed 
him  instantly  with  the  shirt  still  over  his 
face."2 

"  Griffith  had  been  wounded  by  Indians. 
When,  too  weak  and  lame  to  travel,  he  sank 
to  the  ground,  he  was  told  by  a  soldier  to 
rise  or  he  would  obey  the  orders  of  Salazar 
to  put  to  death  all  who  could  not  keep  up. 
He  made  one  feeble  and  ineffectual  attempt. 
The  brutal  miscreant  knocked  his  brains 
out  with  a  musket.  His  blanket  was  then 
stripped  from  him  as  the  reward  of  his 
murderer,  his  ears  were  cut  off,  and  he  was 
thrown  to  the  buzzards  and  wolves."3 

While  Gates  was  dying  of  inflammation 
of  the  lungs,  a  Mexican  twice  snapped  a  gun 

1  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  vol.  i., 
p.  365,  and  vol.  ii.,  p.  14. 
2 Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  14. 
3  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  17. 


Claims  and  Correspondence    181 

in  his  face,  apparently  enjoying  the  torture 
he  was  inflicting.  His  ears  were  cut  off.1 

Major  Bennett,  the  quartermaster  (of  the 
expedition),  "was  a  native  of  Massachusetts, 
born  and  educated  among  the  descendants 
of  the  Puritans ;  he  knew  the  Bible  almost  by 
heart  and  was  always  ready  with  a  passage 
from  that  book  with  which  to  illustrate  or 
point  his  discourse ;  he  had  been  a  lieutenant 
in  the  United  States  service  at  Bridgewater 
and  Lundy's  Lane,  and  was  wounded  in 
several  places  at  the  battle  of  Victoria  in  the 
Texan  service.  He  had  the  small-pox  in  the 
prison  in  the  city  of  Mexico." 2  The  prison  was 
crowded  with  small-pox  patients  and  lepers. 

In  citing,  not  opinions  but  testimony  of  an 
eye-witness,  and  an  excellent  observer  and 
recorder,  it  is  a  relief  to  interpolate  one 
of  his  illustrations  of  the  kindness  of  many 
of  the  Mexican  people  to  which  he  gratefully 
and  amusingly  testifies,  contrasting  them 
with  the  infamous  brutality  of  their  rulers. 
Mr.  Kendall  says  he  was  himself  "raised  far 
enough  'down  east'  to  have  a  natural  fond 
ness  for  codfish  and  potatoes"  and  a  dish  of 

»  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  vol.  ii., 
p.  24. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  218. 


1 82  The  Mexican  War 

it  was  sent  to  him,  to  his  great  and  almost 
pitiful  delight,  by  a  talented  Mexican  lady, 
wife  of  a  native  of  the  sea-coast  of  Massachu 
setts  resident  in  the  city  of  Mexico.1 

It  did  not  seem  to  inmates  of  Mexican 
prisons  that  the  diplomatic  service  of  the 
United  States  was  criminally  impetuous 
about  securing  proper  treatment  and  speedy 
trial  for  such  of  them  as  had  claims  to  the 
protection  of  American  citizens. 

The  Texans  jeered  at  them  for  the  indiffer 
ence  of  their  government ;  and  Kendall  says : 

The  fact  is  notorious  that  a  fear  of  losing  po 
litical  influence  has  induced  those  in  power  [in 
the  United  States]  to  sacrifice  the  independence 
and  jeopard  the  honor  of  the  country  on  more 
occasions  than  one. 

Full  well  does  the  Mexican  Government 
understand  this  weak  point  in  our  foreign 
policy ;  else  we  never  should  hear  of  our  country 
men  being  arrested,  robbed  of  all  their  evidence, 
denied  a  hearing,  thrust  into  loathsome  pris 
ons  among  malefactors,  compelled  to  labor  in 
chains,  and  all  to  gratify  the  caprice  or  feed  the 
revenge  of  some  such  tyrant  as  Santa  Anna.2 

Imprisoned    unjustly   in    one    of    the   vilest 

1  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  vol.  ii., 
p.  246. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  212. 


Claims  and  Correspondence    183 

holes  in  Christendom,  surrounded  by  loathsome 
wretches  whose  very  aspect  was  enough  to 
drive  one  to  desperation  [lepers  and  small-pox 
patients],  shut  out  completely  from  the  world, 
taunted  almost  daily  by  my  Texan  comrades 
with  invidious  comparisons  between  my  own 
government  and  that  of  Great  Britain  in  looking 
after  the  rights  of  their  subjects.1 

Kendall  was  not  kept  informed  of  what  was 
being  attempted,  and  what  probably  was 
being  hindered  by  factious  opposition. 

As  to  Santa  Fe  prisoners  Mr.  Webster 
warmly  interposed,  and  sent  special  instruc 
tions  to  Mr.  Ellis.2 

It  may  seem  to  be  a  weak  conclusion  to 
pass  from  official  protests,  and  the  words  of 
an  eye-witness  who  had  in  person  suffered 
from  Mexican  outrages,  to  citations  of  opin 
ion;  but  it  would  not  be  justifiable  to  omit 
the  summary  of  evidences  by  two  men  who 
had  exceptional  means  of  information  and 
were  generally  careful  or  even  reticent  in 
their  manner  of  speech. 

11  The  claims  against  Mexico,"  in  Tyler's 

1  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  vol.  ii., 
p.  266. 

2  Letters  and   Times   of  the   Tylers,  Lyon   Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  257. 


1 84  The  Mexican  War 

opinion,  * '  had  their  origin  in  the  most  abom 
inable  spoliations  on  the  property  of  our 
citizens."  1 

General  Cadmus  M.  Wilcox  believed  that 
' '  The  ill  feeling  caused  by  the  wanton  attacks 
on  the  rights,  persons,  and  property  of 
American  citizens  for  over  forty  years  must 
have  culminated  in  war,  even  had  the  Texan 
question  not  been  agitated."  2 

>  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  283. 

2  The  History  of  the  Mexican  War,  Cadmus  M.  Wilcox, 
Washington,  1892,  p.  2. 


CHAPTER  XI 

CORRESPONDENCE 

HP  HE  character  of  the  claims  against  Mex- 
1  ico  was  not  such  as  to  render  agree 
able  any  interchange  of  communications  in 
regard  to  them ;  and  the  motives  which  have 
already  been  considered  tended  to  any 
thing  but  facilitating  diplomatic  interchanges. 
Diplomacy  has  its  troubles. 

On  the  one  side  was  a  nation  accused  of 
piracy,  larceny,  and  murder;  on  the  other  a 
government  accused  of  breach  of  neutrality 
and  land-grabbing  intentions — a  formidable 
party  in  the  latter  leading  in  the  vehemence 
of  the  accusation.  Mexican  diplomatists  en 
dowed  with  brains  enough  to  be  intrusted 
with  the  care  of  Mexican  relations  with  the 
United  States  must  have  been  aware  that 
the  conditions  in  Texas  were  not  creditable 
to  Mexico  either  in  the  failure  of  Mexican 
administration  before  the  Texan  war,  in 
185 


1 86  The  Mexican  War 

the  manner  in  which  that  war  had  been 
conducted,  in  the  immediate  repudiation  of 
the  treaty  of  Velasco,  or  in  the  ridiculously 
futile  attempts  of  Mexico  to  make  any  one 
believe,  since  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto,  that 
there  was  still  a  war.  For  there  was  until 
the  annexation  of  Texas  a  terrible  war  on 
paper  waged  between  those  eloquent  bellig 
erents  Santa  Anna  and  Sam  Houston;  the 
former  threatening  to  "drive  the  Texans 
across  the  Sabine,"  1  and  the  latter  to  "plant 
the  lone  star  flag  on  the  isthmus  of  Darien." 
But  other  than  brave  words  there  was  noth 
ing  doing.  There  was  nothing  like  it  until 
professional  pugilists  contested  the  cham 
pionship  belt  in  the  newspapers. 

A  few  raids  of  Indians  and  Mexicans  into 
Texas  at  San  Antonio,  Goliad,  and  Salado 
Creek  had  been  promptly  repulsed,  and  one 
or  two  Texan  attacks  on  Mexican  posts  to 
the  south  of  the  Rio  Grande  had  met  defeat. 
At  Salado  some  Texan  prisoners  were  taken, 
and  while  being  marched  to  the  dungeons  of 
the  City  of  Mexico,  made  a  heroic  effort  at  es 
cape  ;  but  were  recaptured,  and  Santa  Anna 
ordered  them  to  be  shot.  On  joint  protest 

i  By  which,  perhaps,  he  meant  the  Nueces,  which 
was  early  known  as  the  Western  Sabine. 


Correspondence  1 87 

of  the  foreign  ministers  he  substituted  deci 
mation.  The  remaining  nine  tenths  were 
condemned  to  servile  labor,  hitched  to  wag 
ons,  and  set  to  hauling  rocks. 

Mayne  Reid  made  the  sufferings  of  these 
prisoners  at  Meir  and  Salado  the  basis  of  his 
story  The  Free  Lances. 

The  consciousness  that  their  country  was 
attracting  the  unfavorable  attention  of  foreign 
powers — to  whom  Houston's  ministers  were 
making  constant  protest  against  the  guerilla 
and  pirate  methods  of  harassing,  rather  than 
attacking,  Texas — must  have  had  a  disquiet 
ing  effect  on  the  nerves  of  Mexican  diplomats. 
The  consciousness  that  its  language  was  de 
served  would  not  have  made  more  palatable 
the  dispatch,  for  instance,  of  Daniel  Webster 
dated  January  31,  1843: 

Mr.  Webster  instructed  the  American  Minister 
at  Mexico  to  remonstrate  in  strong  but  kind 
and  friendly  language  against  the  marauding 
mode  of  warfare  carried  on  against  Texas,  in 
open  violation  of  the  rules  recognized  by  all 
Christian  and  civilized  States  in  modern  times; 
and  further  stated  that  unless  Mexico  in  a 
short  time  made  peace  with  Texas,  or  showed 
a  disposition  and  an  ability  to  prosecute 
the  war  with  a  respectable  force,  the  United 


1 88  The  Mexican  War 

States  had  it  in  contemplation  to  remonstrate 
in  a  still  more  forcible  manner.1 

It  will  require  a  diligent  search  to  find 
anything  in  the  correspondence  any  agent 
of  the  United  States  ever  addressed  to  the 
Mexican  authorities  which  would  cut  deeper 
than  these  words  of  a  most  distinguished 
statesman  and  Secretary  of  State.  The  most 
bitter  significance  in  the  dignified  protest  is 
that  it  was  fully  deserved;  for  in  her  in 
fatuation  Mexico  was  constantly  adding  to 
her  old  list  of  offences  new  affronts  to  civil 
ized  humanity. 

Among  the  early  barbarities  recounted  by 
Yoakum,  as  short-sighted  as  brutal,  was  the 
affair  at  Agua  Dolce;  an  affair  the  effect 
of  which  on  diplomacy  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico  cannot  fail  to  be  imagined 
even  if  not  directly  traced.  There  had  been 
a  sharp  little  battle;  the  regular  programme 
followed,  the  slaughter  of  all  the  wounded 
and  prisoners  that  had  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  the  Mexicans.  Dr.  Grant  alone  was 
made  an  exception.  He  was  detained  as 
a  captive  by  General  Urrea  (the  butcher 

1  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  260. 

Senate  Documents,  1843-4,  Doc.  341,  p.  69. 


Correspondence  189 

of  Goliad)  that  the  Mexicans  might  have  the 
benefit  of  his  services  in  attending  their  nu 
merous  wounded;  for  which  he  was  prom 
ised  a  passport.  After  he  had  done  all  that 
could  be  done  for  their  wounded  comrades,  he 
was  tied  to  a  wild  horse,  told  "  This  is  your 
passport,"  and  torn  to  pieces.1  Urrea  was 
not  present  at  the  actual  murder  of  Dr. 
Grant;  but  it  incapacitated  him,  perhaps, 
even  more  for  a  witness,  or  a  man  of  honor, 
that  he  screened  his  guilty  subordinate  from 
investigation  by  a  false  official  report  of  the 
brutal  murder  of  a  prisoner  who  was  under 
his  own  special  protection,  and  to  whom 
he  was  under  the  most  delicate  debt. 

That  this  particular  case  had  been  brought 
to  the  attention  of  the  Department  of  State 
is  only  a  probability  or  a  conjecture.  That 
it  had  not  been  bought  to  the  notice  of  Mr. 
Powhatan  Ellis  is  next  to  impossible.  That 
it  did  not  put  his  temper,  even  as  a  diploma 
tist,  to  the  severest  strain  is  to  believe  him 
to  have  been  something  more  than  human 
and  less  than  humane. 

If  his  conduct  of  negotiations  was  ever  dis 
courteous,  much  ought  surely  to  be  pardoned 

i  History  of  Texas,  H.  Yoakum,  New  York,  1886,  volf 
ii.,  p.  84. 


1 90  The  Mexican  War 

to  a  man  put  in  his  position.  When  he 
started  an  inquiry  of  the  Mexican  author 
ities  as  to  the  ground  for  detention  of  William 
Hallett  and  Zalmon  Hull,  taken,  under  the 
charge  of  being  spies,  from  the  house  of  the 
United  States  Consul  at  Matamoras — a 
breach,  of  course,  in  itself  of  United  States 
sovereignty — Monasterio,  the  acting  Mexican 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  enclosed  to  Mr. 
Ellis  a  letter  of  instruction  to  himself  from 
Tornel,  Secretary  of  War,  quoting  the  state 
ment  of  General  Urrea,  the  hero  of  Goliad 
(La  Bahia)  and  Agua  Dolce.  There  does 
not  seem  to  be  any  just  ground  of  suspicion 
that  Mr.  Ellis  expressed  disgust  or  incredulity 
in  any  undiplomatic  form.  He  ought  to 
have  kept  a  diary,  like  John  Quincy  Adams. 
Perhaps  he  did. 

It  is  true  that  Mr.  Ellis  demanded  his 
passports  before  negotiations  had  made 
much  progress,  and  somewhat  suddenly. 
December  9,  1836,  the  Mexican  Minister, 
between  whom  and  the  United  States  For 
eign  office  had  been  the  more  important 
correspondence,  withdrew  from  Washington. 
Mr.  Forsyth,  of  course,  immediately  notified 
Mr.  Ellis,  who  received  the  information,  with 
a  well-considered  expression  of  Secretary 


Correspondence  191 

Forsyth's  regret,  December  i3th.  After  the 
Mexican  refusal  to  communicate  with  his 
chief,  Mr.  Ellis  could  not  courteously  re 
main  long  in  Mexico. 

The  correspondence  of  Mr.  Ellis  was  not 
of  grave  importance,  relatively.  The  sus 
picion  of  Professor  Sumner  that  he  ''acted 
by  orders"  is  certainly  a  reasonable  inference. 
A  diplomatic  agent  is  very  apt  to  conform 
to  his  instructions  from  the  Secretary  of 
State,  especially  if  the  Secretary  is  himself 
personally  conducting  the  principal  negotia 
tions. 

There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  proof  offered, 
however,  for  the  intimation  that  under  the 
circumstances  he  "performed  his  duties 
in  a  rude  or  peremptory  manner"1;  and,  so 

>  Since  this  chapter  was  written  Professor  Garrison 
refers  in  Westward  Extension,  New  York,  1907,  p.  190, 
to  House  Executive  Documents,  24th  Congress,  2d 
session,  No.  139,  pp.  60-67,  as  indicating  that  Ellis' 
letters  were  "more  forcible  than  diplomatic."  Pos 
sibly  the  following  extracts  may  seem  more  strenuous 
than  the  letter  quoted  from  on  p.  171  (note)  supra. 
No  others  seem  more  peremptory  than  Ellis  to  Mon- 
asterio,  December  7,  1836: 

Speaks  of  charges  made  by  each  side  against  the 
other,  and  continues:  "Your  excellency  requests  that 
a  full  statement  of  all  claims  on  the  part  of  citizens 
of  the  United  States  may  be  presented  for  consideration; 


192  The  Mexican  War 

far  from  his  being  under  instructions  to  that 
effect,  Mr.  Forsyth's  written  despatches 
were  well-tempered  and  conciliatory. 

From  May  14,  1836,  the  more  important  di 
plomatic  correspondence  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  of  which  Mr.  Ellis'  com 
munications  were  a  supplement,  was  taking 
place  in  Washington  between  Senor  Don 
Manuel  Eduardo  de  Gorostiza,  Envoy  Extra 
ordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the 
Mexican  republic,  and  John  Forsyth,  Secre 
tary  of  State,  until  September  28th,  when  Mr. 
Forsyth  retired  from  personal  conduct  of  the 
correspondence,  and  substituted  for  himself 

but,  from  the  manner  in  which  those  already  in  the 
possession  of  this  government  have  been  disposed  of, 
the  undersigned  can  see  no  good  likely  to  result  from 
such  a  course.  If  those  that  might  be  presented 
should  be  all  acknowledged  as  just,  yet  so  long  as  the 
several  unprovoked  and  inexcusable  outrages  inflicted 
on  the  officers  and  flag  of  this  country  which  have  been 
heretofore  submitted  to  the  Mexican  Executive  re 
mained  unsatisfactorily  answered,  I  would  have  but 
one  course  to  pursue."  .  .  .  Requests  his  passports. 

December  27th,  he  writes  to  Secretary  Forsyth,  for 
warding  copies  of  two  notes  of  Mr.  Monasterio,  one  of 
which  contained  a  request  to  be  informed  of  the  causes 
of  his  proposed  departure  from  the  Mexican  republic. 
He  adds:  "  I  can  view  such  an  inquiry  in  no  other  light 
than  as  an  uncourteous  refusal  of  my  passports,  and 
therefore  I  deem  an  answer  to  it  unnecessary." 


Correspondence  193 

the  Hon.  Asbury  Dickins.  The  only  excep 
tion  taken  to  the  form  of  the  United  States' 
papers  in  this  correspondence  was  the  use 
of  the  phrase  " contested  territory"  instead 
of  "Mexican  territory"  as  applied  to  Texas. 
As  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  had  been  fought, 
and  the  treaty  of  Velasco  signed,  prior  to  the 
opening  of  the  correspondence,  which  related 
chiefly  to  neutral  obligations,  it  would  seem 
to  be  as  far  as  diplomatic  courtesy  could  go, 
to  admit  that  the  territory  was  contested 
at  all  at  that  date.  It  certainly  was  all  that 
could  be  conceded  and  maintain  an  accept 
able  attitude,  as  a  neutral,  to  Texas.  Don 
Gorostiza  demanded  that  a  Texan  vessel 
which  was  said  to  be  armed,  and  to  have 
helped  blockade  a  Mexican  port,  be  seized 
and  its  crew  treated  as  pirates,  which  surely 
would  not  have  been  consistent  with  neutral 
ity  in  the  war  which  Mexico  asserted  was  in 
progress.  His  chief  insistence  was  that 
General  Gaines  should  not  be  permitted  to 
cross  the  Sabine,  that  any  suppression  of 
Indian  raids  must  be  left  to  Mexico  anywhere 
west  of  the  Sabine,  and  that  President  Jack 
son  should  promise  in  no  event  to  send 
troops  to  the  west  of  that  river.  Not  securing 
compliance  with  these  demands,  Don  Goros- 
13 


1 94  The  Mexican  War 

tiza  demanded  his  passports.  Diplomacy 
failed  to  reconcile  wholly  discrepant  views  of 
the  obligations  of  the  two  countries.  It  was 
this  vital  discrepancy  which  terminated  the 
negotiations.  It  was  not  due  to  discourtesy 
of  American  diplomats.  In  his  letter  request 
ing  his  passports,  Don  Gorostiza  added  to  the 
usual  and  formal  compliments  and  assurances 
of  distinguished  consideration,  the  promise 
to  "ever  bear  in  mind  the  frank  and  noble 
manner  in  which  Mr.  Dickins  has  acted 
toward  the  undersigned  on  occasions  which 
were  in  truth  by  no  means  agreeable  and  in 
affairs  which,  from  their  nature,  were  much 
less  so."1  Jackson's  message  informing 
Congress — December  5,  1836 — of  the  close  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  Mexico  was  admir 
ably  conciliatory  in  tone. 

The  gist  of  disagreement  was  the  sending 
Gaines  across  the  Sabine,  into  territory 
which,  as  Texas  had  not  yet  been  formally 
recognized,  was  technically  Mexico's. 

Forsyth's  letter  to  Ellis,  December  gth, 
was  a  well-tempered,  able  exposition  of  why 
it  seemed  necessary  to  make  such  defence 

1  Correspondence  between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States  from  May  14  to  October  20,  1836,  etc.,  Senate 
Documents,  2d  Session,  24th  Congress,  p.  105. 


Correspondence  195 

against  the  Indians  about  Nacogdoches, 
and  hoped  "the  Mexican  government  would 
not  construe  the  justifiable  precaution  for 
frontier  defence  made  necessary  by  its  [the 
Mexican  government's]  known  inability  in 
execution  of  the  stipulations  of  our  treaty 
into  an  encroachment  upon  its  honor." 

The  advance  of  Gaines  was  the  onus  of 
Mexican  complaint.  It  should  be  noted  in 
passing  that  an  administration  really  desirous 
of  bringing  on  a  war  had  several  favorable 
opportunities  offered  in  the  withdrawal 
of  ministers  and  insults  to  the  flag. 

The  writers  of  histories  have  not  failed 
to  charge  the  pro-slavery  administrations 
with  sufficient  blame  for  the  Gaines  invasion. 
Brady  classes  it  with  other  (unspecified) 
"  breaches  of  international  comity  and  fla 
grant  violations  of  international  law  which 
had  aggrieved  Mexico  almost  to  the  breaking 
point."1 

Elson  charges  it  upon  Jackson  that  he 
' '  sent  an  army  under  Gaines  *  to  keep  Texan 
Indians  off  our  soil,'  but  in  fact"  (a  fact 
assumed  by  the  historian)  ' '  to  connive  with 
Houston.  Gaines'  troops  deserted  freely 

1  Conquest  of  the  Southwest,  Cyrus  Townsend.  Brady, 
New  York,  1905,  p.  156, 


196  The  Mexican  War 

and  joined  Houston,"1  a  not  improbable 
circumstance;  soldiers  condemned  to  inac 
tivity  often  desert  to  a  more  active  service 
which  has  their  sympathies. 

Schouler  calls  the  Gaines  ''invasion'* 
"the  Florida  trick  over  again,  conceived 
by  the  same  brain."2 

Gaines'  command  was  used  as  an  army  of 
observation.  Sumner  states  the  facts  fairly.3 
"Jackson  had  ordered  that  General  Gaines" 
(who  was  posted  near  the  Sabine)  "should 
enter  the  territory  of  Texas  and  march  to 
Nacogdoches"  (not  "seize  it,"  as  Brady 
alleges)  "  if  he  thought  there  was  any  danger 
of  hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  Indians 
and  if  there  was  suspicion  that  the  Mexican 
general  was  stirring  up  the  Indians  to  war 
on  the  United  States."  It  is  to  be  supposed 
that  reasonable  suspicion  and  anticipation 
of  danger  is  intended.  Professor  Sumner 
adds  his  own  suspicions,  and  by  way  of 
innuendo:  "Here  we  have  another  remin- 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  Henry  William  Elson, 
New  York,  1904,  pp.  496  and  497. 

2  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Schouler,  Boston, 
1889,  vol.  iv.,  p.  253. 

3  Andrew  Jackson,  William  Graham  Sumner,  Boston, 
1882,  p.  356. 


Correspondence  197 

iscence  of  Florida  revived;  Gaines  under 
stood  his  orders,  and  entered  the  Mexican 
territory."1 

Without  at  this  point  entering  into  the 
question  of  boundaries  on  the  sources  of  the 
rivers  of  the  Gulf  and  of  the  Mississippi 
watershed,  it  is  enough  for  the  present 
purpose  to  remember  that  the  boundaries 
between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  or 
Texas  in  the  Red  River  region  were  uncer 
tain.  When  there  was  an  Indian  uprising  it 
would  be  uncertain  on  whose  territory  a 
defending  or  avenging  column  was  advanc 
ing.  We  have  considered  in  a  former  chapter 
the  especially  dangerous  numbers  and  hos 
tility  of  the  Indian  tribes  which  had  formerly 
driven  back  Mexican  frontiers  to  Chihuahua 
and  Tamaulipas.  A  provision  had  been 
inserted  in  the  treaty  of  1831  agreeing  that 
troops  of  either  nation  would  suppress 
Indian  uprisings  which  threatened  the  inhab 
itants  of  the  other.  Generals  Santa  Anna, 
Cos,  Filisola,  and  Sesma  had  been  pursuing 
Houston  through  Texas,  and  following  close 
on  the  trails  of  old  men,  women,  and  children 
flying  to  Nacogdoches,  when  Jackson  took 
the  first  measures  looking  toward  policing 

i  Andrew  Jackson,  p.  356. 


1 98  The  Mexican  War 

the  Indians  over  the  Sabine.  The  Cam- 
peachy  Indians  had  been  the  Mexican  allies, 
and  perhaps  turned  the  tide  of  battle  at 
Goliad  and  its  accursed  butchery.  Driven 
out  of  Texas  by  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto, 
Mexico  was  keeping  up  a  war  of  words  and 
guerilla  raids  aided  by  Indian  uprisings. 
There  was  especial  danger  at  Nacogdoches. 
"  There  was  an  actual  outbreak  in  which  the 
Caddoes  from  east  of  the  Sabine  were  credibly 
reported  to  have  taken  part . " 1  The  immedi 
ate  peril  was  averted  or  postponed  by  Games' 
crossing  the  Sabine ;  or  the  plans  of  Texas' 
and  America's  enemies  developed  with 
less  rapidity  than  had  been  feared.  That 
there  was  danger  of  greater  outbreak  than 
that  of  the  Caddoes  is  apparent  from  develop 
ments  a  little  later. 2  "In  1838  about  300 
Mexican  settlers  near  Nacogdoches  were 
joined  by  as  many  Indians  in  a  rising  which 
looked  very  dangerous  for  a  time.  Their 

1  Westward  Extension,  George  Pierce  Garrison,  New 
York,  1906,  p.  89. 

2  "May  19,  1836,  several  hundred  Indians  attacked 
Fort    Parker   and    slaughtered   the    garrisons   on    the 
head-waters  of  the   Navallo   about  sixty  miles   from 
the  settlements.    The  defeat  of  the  Mexicans  prevented 
a  general  attack  on  the  frontier." — History  of  Texas, 
H.  Yoakum,  New  York,  1856,  vol.  ii.,  p.  179. 


Correspondence  1 99 

leader,  Vicente  Cordova,  was  said  to  be 
acting  under  a  commission  from  the  Mexican 
General  Filisola."  i 

It  is  no  wonder  that  some  Yankee  soldiers 
in  camp  of  observation,  on  either  side  of  the 
Sabine,  took  absence  without  leave,  to  have 
a  hand  in  suppressing  a  war  party  which 
might  supply  itself  with  scalps  from  the 
dwellings  of  Nacogdoches  in  Texas  or  Natchi- 
toches  in  Louisiana.  The  soldier  cared 
nothing  on  which  side  of  a  little  river  he 
effected  such  result.  Neither  did  Jackson, 
probably,  care  overmuch,  nor  Gaines.  And 
it  was  in  view  of  this  that  Forsyth,  through 
Powhatan  Ellis — who  had  nothing  savage 
about  him  save  the  name  of  a  distant  and 
royal  relative, — was  urging,  somewhat  stren 
uously  for  Hidalgo  notions  of  diplomatic 
dilatoriness,  the  ridiculous  Mexican  travesty 
of  a  government,  and  farcical  belligerent,  to 
remember  that  the  Texan  army  stood  be 
tween  Nacogdoches  and  the  Mexican  forces; 
and  that  it  should  not  be  considered 
meantime  an  encroachment  on  the  honor 
of  Mexico  to  protect  from  destruction  by 

1  Westward  Extension,  George  Pierce  Garrison,  New 
York,  1906,  p.  233,  citing  "  letters  on  file  in  the  diplo 
matic  correspondence  of  the  Republic  of  Texas." 


200  The  Mexican  War 

Indians  the  women  and  children  over  whom 
Mexico  still  claimed  jurisdiction.  But  the 
supercilious  Hidalgo,  with  his  stage-strut, 
preferred  to  permit,  or  incite,  the  ruin  of  his 
dependent  subjects,  rather  than  let  his  honor 
be  infringed  by  the  tread  of  a  neighbor's  sol 
diers  on  the  sacred  soil  from  which  he  was  him 
self  by  this  time  a  fugitive  pursued  by  Texan 
rifles.  And  if  the  storm  of  the  gathering 
fiends  should  first  break  on  the  heads  of  the 
people  of  Louisiana,  the  citizens  of  our  own 
republic?  (For  where  there  was  most  booty 
the  storm  clouds  would  be  apt  to  drift.)  The 
United  States  must  endure  the  peril,  submit 
to  savage  loot  if  it  evaded  her  sentinel  lines, 
and  look  to  Mexico  for  damages.1  That 
was  the  position  taken  by  Don  Gorostiza 
by  the  instructions  of  Santa  Anna.  No 
wonder  he  found  the  "occasions  not 
agreeable." 

For  such  sort  of  mortal  disease  as  Red 
River  Indian  raids,  Jackson  held  to  the 
old-fashioned  doctrine  that  an  ounce  of 


1  There  is  an  interesting  degree  of  parallelism  in  the 
Cananea  affair  in  1906,  in  which  the  interference  of 
American  troops  to  prevent  riot,  until  Mexican  troops 
could  arrive,  was  not  resented  by  the  Mexican  govern 
ment. 


Correspondence  20 1 

prevention  is  worth  a  pound  of  cure,  and  let 
Gaines  administer  it — as  results  proved 
without  bloodshed. 

International  law  is  not  such  an  exalted 
institution  that  it  has  yet  risen  above  the 
precedents  of  the  common  law  which  governs 
the  everyday  life  of  the  citizen.  Indeed,  in 
many  matters  it  is  far  behind  the  practice  of 
our  courts  of  jurisdiction  over  individuals. 

If  A's  barn  is  afire,  and  adjoins  your  house, 
and  endangers  it;  and  you  climb  over  A's 
fence  without  his  invitation  or  permission, 
and  extinguish  the  fire,  you  commit  a  techni 
cal  trespass;  but  any  sane  judge  or  jury 
will  refuse  A  any  other  than  nominal  dam 
ages,  and  will  possibly  find  implied  permission, 
even  if  A  protests  and  resists — in  which  case 
you  knock  A  down  and  put  out  his  fire 
all  the  same.  And  you  would  not  be  made 
to  suffer  unendurably  for  that  either.  There 
is  legal  technicality,  and  there  is  common- 
sense  in  international  law — and  in  the 
police  courts.  And,  practically,  common- 
sense  is  good  law;  technically  good  enough 
in  most  cases  for  really  able  lawyers  and 
sound  judges. 

Jackson  put  out  his  neighbor's  fire,  and 
saved  his  neighbor's  tenants  and  his  own; 


202  The  Mexican  War 

and  can  stand,  or  his  memory  can,  the 
criticism  of  whoever  is  appalled,  and  wounded 
in  his  sense  of  etiquette,  that  Jackson  should 
have  been  capable  of  common-sense  on  a 
national  scale.  Garrison,  who,  as  a  Texan, 
has  grown  up  into  a  fuller  sympathy  with 
the  events  on  Texan  borders  and  a  broader 
view  of  Mexican  affairs  than  others  possess, 
well  says: 

What  the  criticism  would  have  been  if  the 
instructions  to  Gaines  had  been  such  as  to 
prevent  him  from  advancing  to  protect  the  mass 
of  women  and  children  who  fled  before  the 
Mexican  invasion  in  March  and  April,  1836, 
from  the  Indian  attack  that  was  then  feared, 
can  hardly  be  imagined;  and  the  government 
[of  Jackson's  administration]  may  well  have  been 
pleased  to  incur  what  it  did  rather  than  this. * 

There  are  no  considerable  complaints 
as  to  the  conduct  of  other  diplomatic  agents 
of  the  United  States,  until  Mr.  John  Slidell 
of  Louisiana  was  sent  to  Mexico  on  a  delicate 
mission  in  1845 — which  is  to  be  considered 
later.  But  there  were  dissensions  in  the 
diplomatic  correspondence  worth  mention 
partly  because  of  the  shape  in  which  they 

*Texas,  a  Contest  of  Civilizations,  George  Pierce 
Garrison,  Boston,  1903,  p.  254. 


Correspondence  203 

are  made  to  appear  in  some  of  Daniel 
Webster's  letters.  Mexico  querulously  in 
sisted  on  the  United  States  observing  neutral 
obligations  in  accordance  with  Mexican  in 
terpretations  throughout  the  long  periods 
of  Texan  settlement  and  war  for  independ 
ence,  and  during  the  alleged  war  for  resub- 
jugation  of  Texas,  until  annexation.  The 
•impossibility  of  Mexican  demands  was  not 
ended  with  the  answer  made  by  Jackson,  nor 
for  years  after;  and  became,  with  the  Oregon 
question,  a  burden  to  Tyler's  administration. 
Bocanegra  was  Mexican  Minister  to  the 
United  States;  his  complaints  were  in  the 
most  offensive  manner,  inviting  the  reply 
which  Mr.  Webster  made,  that 

the  President  considered  the  language  and 
tone  of  Mr.  Bocanegra's  letter  derogatory  to  .the 
character  of  the  United  States  and  highly 
offensive,  and  directed  that  no  other  answer 
be  given  to  it  than  the  declaration  that  the 
conduct  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  the 
war  between  Mexico  and  Texas,  having  been 
always  hitherto  governed  by  a  strict  and  im 
partial  regard  to  its  neutral  obligations,  will  not 
be  changed  or  altered  in  any  respect  or  degree.1 

1  Letters   and    Times   of   the    Tylers,    Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  259. 


204  The  Mexican  War 

Mr.  Webster  had  urged  that  "  Mexico  had 
been  even  more  diligent  than  Texas  in  clan 
destinely  obtaining  contraband  of  war  from 
the  United  States  and  other  nations, "  in 
cluding  two  armed  vessels.  He  compared 
Mexico  with  herself;  exhibiting  how  ridicu 
lous  was  her  war  against  Texas, 
unsupported  by  anything  but  proclamations  for 
six  years,  aptly  illustrated  by  the  stubbornness 
of  Spain  in  sulkily  declining  to  acknowledge 
the  independence  of  Mexico  herself  until  after 
twenty  years,  during  all  of  which  time  Mexico 
had  opened  her  arms  wide  to  multitudes  from  the 
United  Statesj  England,  Ireland,  France,  and 
Italy  who  nocked  to  fight  her  battles. 1 

Daniel  Webster  has  been  enough  admired 
for  his  command  of  language  to  warrant 
the  expectation  that  he  would  surpass  Mr. 
Powhatan  Ellis  in  formality  of  diction;  but 
he  is  certainly  as  severe. 

In  August,  1843,  the  Mexican  Government 
virtually  put  on  file  a  provisional  declaration 
of  war,  an  ultimatum  couched  in  such 
terms  that  the  passage  of  the  resolution  of 
annexation  by  the  United  States  Congress, 
signed  by  the  President  March  i,  1845,  com 
pleted  the  status  which  constituted  a  condi- 

1  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  vol.  ii.,  p.  258. 


Correspondence  205 

tion  of  war  between  the  two  countries;  and, 
from  any  point  of  view  which  regards  ques 
tions  of  infringement  of  rights  "so  far  as 
Mexico  is  concerned"  (to  borrow  again  the 
language  of  Judge  Niles),  any  advance  of 
troops,  seizure  of  vessels  or  ports,  any  act 
of  war  on  the  part  of  either  nation,  would 
have  been  justified  as  within  the  rules  of 
conduct  of  civilized  war. i  The  Mexican 
Government  declared  in  August,  1843,  that 
the  passage  of  an  act  by  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  at  Washington  to  incorporate 
Texas  with  the  territory  of  the  United  States 
would  be  considered  equivalent  to  a  declara 
tion  of  war. 2 

When  therefore  the  annexation  resolution 
was  passed  by  Congress,  war  existed  by 
sufficiently  formal  declarations  so  far  as 
concerned  the  rights  of  nations;  and  no  act 
of  war  or  advance  into  territory  of  the  enemy 
can  be  condemned  for  breach  of  international 
law.  Constitutional,  humane,  or  political 
objections  are  another  thing. 

1  Until  the    resolution    of   the    Hague   Conference, 
July  16,  1907. 

2  Bocanegra  to  Waddy  Thompson.     House,  Executive 
Documents,  28th  Congress,    ist    Session,    No.    2,    pp. 
26-7  and  41-8. 


206  The  Mexican  War 

The  Slidell  incident  was  therefore,  so  far 
as  any  question  of  international  right  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico  is  concerned, 
a  mere  matter  of  supererogation;  and  de 
serves  little  notice  save  that  it  has  been 
made  a  text  for  a  number  of  slurs  on  the 
diplomacy  of  the  United  States. 

Schouler, 1  Schurz,2  Brady,3  Elson4  find 
in  it  additional  grievance  to  Mexico,  and 
proof  that  a  political  cabal  was  forcing  war 
on  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  robbing  her 
of  California;  although  there  was  pretext 
for  seizing  California  ports  quite  sufficient 
in  the  conditions  of  tyranny  and  abuse  on 
that  coast  without  relying  on  any  Texan 
troubles,  or  diplomatic  provocations. 

As  early  as  December  4,  1841,  Upshur's 
report  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy  exhibited 
1 '  the  necessity  of  naval  protection  to  United 
States  settlers  in  California ' ' ;  and  the  neces 
sity  was  obvious  at  the  time  of  Fremont's 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Schouler,  Boston, 
1889,  vol.  iv.,  p.  524,  note. 

2  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  Boston,  1887,  vol. 
ii.,  p.  277. 

3  The  Conquest  of  the  Southwest,     Cyrus    Townsend 
Brady,  New  York,  1905,  pp.  172  and  173. 

4  History  of  the  United  States,  Henry  William  Elson, 
New  York,  1904,  p.  526. 


Correspondence  207 

expedition,  which  must  be  noticed  later  with 
questions  of  boundary  and  surveys. 

The  passage  of  the  annexation  resolution, 
March  i,  1845,  was  immediately  followed 
by  the  departure  of  the  Mexican  minister, 
March  6th,  and  on  March  28,  1845,  all  diplo 
matic  relations  between  the  two  countries 
had  come  to  an  end. 

But  up  to  October  1 3th,  no  blood  had  been 
actually  shed — not  officially — and,  though 
manifestoes  and  proclamations  went  to  show 
that  Mexico  was  acting  in  accordance  with 
her  threats,  and  regarded  the  annexation  a 
declaration  of  war,  there  was  a  slight  hope 
in  some  pious  minds  that  war  might  yet  be 
averted.  A  request  therefore  was  made  to 
the  Mexican  Government  to  receive  a  special 
envoy  with  power  to  adjust  all  questions  in 
dispute.  The  request  was  granted  by  the 
liberal  Herrera  administration ;  but  a  United 
States  naval  squadron  was  near  Vera  Cruz  for 
the  protection  of  neutral  shipping,  and  this 
was  looked  upon  as  a  menace.  The  squadron 
was  therefore  withdrawn,  and,  November  loth, 
John  Slidell  of  Louisiana  (whose  diplomatic 
qualities  were  such  as  to  make  him,  in  1862, 
the  first  choice  of  the  Confederacy  to  repre 
sent  it  in  Europe)  was  accredited  to  Herrera, 


208          The  Mexican  War 

as  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Pleni 
potentiary.  It  was  objected  that  President 
Polk  transcended  his  permission  in  sending 
a  functionary  so  entitled. 1  But  a  minister 
was  at  that  date  the  highest  diplomatic 
officer  known  to  the  United  States  service 2 ; 
and  there  was  no  appropriation  apparently 
for  payment  of  an  official  of  like  rank  by 
any  other  name.  On  the  recognition  of 
Texas  it  was  necessary  to  pass  a  special 
act  to  pay  a  diplomatic  agent.3 

The  government  of  Herrera,  comparatively 
liberal  and  inclined  to  peace  with  the  United 
States,  was  too  weak  to  dare  oppose  Mexican 
public  sentiment,  and,  December  2ist,  de 
clined  to  receive  Mr.  Slidell.  Brady  says  he 
"left  the  country  in  high  dudgeon."4  In 
fact  he  only  retired  to  Vera  Cruz  and  awaited 
orders.  Without  imputing  lack  of  personal 
courage  to  Mr.  Slidell — or  Mr.  Powhatan  Ellis, 


1  Conquest  of  the  Southwest,  Cyrus  Townsend  Brady, 
New  York,   1905,  p.   172;     Life  of   Henry  Clay,   Carl 
Schurz,  Boston,  1887,  p.  277. 

2  Century     Dictionary     and     American    Diplomacy, 
Eugene  Schuyler,  pp.  108  and  119. 

3  Supra,  p.  137;  and  resolution  of  recognition,  March, 
i,  1837. 

4  Conquest  of  the  Southwest,  Cyrus  Townsend  Brady, 
New  York,  1905,  p.  173. 


Correspondence  209 

or  any  other  American  official  who  may  have 
been  charged  with  haste  in  retiring  from 
Mexico  when  excused  from  duty — it  should 
be  understood  that  when  there  was  an  excite 
ment  in  Mexico — and  that  was  almost 
constantly — it  was  a  very  unsafe  place  of 
residence  for  anybody,  especially  for  an 
American  whose  official  character  was  unrec 
ognized  or  had  terminated,  and  who  was 
likely  to  be  regarded  as  a  spy;  and  without 
reckoning  on  the  value  of  his  own  skin,  a 
diplomat  would  be  forgetful  of  his  official 
obligations  who  did  not  bear  in  mind  that  so 
much  as  an  indignity  to  a  national  repre 
sentative  is,  of  itself,  enough  to  embroil 
nations. 

General  Paredes  succeeded  to  the  Dictator 
ship  of  Mexico,  March  i,  1846;  Slidell 
again  presented  his  credentials  and  was 
again  repulsed. 

When  the  rejection  of  a  United  States 
minister  was  reported  as  * '  another  grievance, ' ' 
Brady  assumes  the  judicial  robe  and  pro 
nounces  it  "of  course  untrue." i 

In  treating  the  Slidell  mission  as  a  part  of 
the  alleged  conspiracy  of  which  Polk  was 
now  the  exponent,  to  force  a  war  and  capture 

1  Conquest  of  the  Southwest,  p.  173. 

14 


210          The  Mexican  War 

California,  the  consensus  of  historians  is 
based  on  their  interpretation  of  a  single 
slender  bit  of  information.  The  charge 
that  a  President  of  the  United  States  used 
his  office  with  the  deliberate  purpose  of 
forcing  his  country  into  what  is  assumed 
to  have  been  a  dishonorable  position,  and  a 
bloody  war, 1  is  asserted,  not  on  the  testimony 
of  some  telepathic  expert,  but  on  the  report 
of  a  witness  that  Polk  once  said :  ' '  There 
are  four  great  measures  which  are  to  be  the 
measures  of  my  administration, — a  reduction 
of  the  tariff;  the  re-establishment  of  the 
independent  treasury;  the  settlement  of  the 
Oregon  boundary;  and  the  acquisition  of 
California." 

Brady  traces  this  important  discovery  to 
Elson,  Elson  to  Schouler,  and  Schouler  says 
he  had  a  letter  in  February,  1887,  from 
George  Bancroft,  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in 
1845,  which  said  that  President  Polk  made 
the  statement  to  him  in  private  conversation. 
Not  a  syllable  is  found  to  intimate  that  there 
was  to  be  any  effort  to  obtain  a  port  which 
Webster  had  said  was  worth  so  many  times 
more  than  all  Texas,  by  any  other  means 

1  The  Foundations  of  American  Foreign  Policy, 
Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  New  York,  1901,  p.  71. 


Correspondence  211 

than  purchase  or  negotiation,  nothing  to 
show  that  the  war,  if  war  was  wanted,  could 
not  have  been  brought  on  just  as  rapidly 
without  a  peace  mission. 

On  the  contrary,  Slidell's  instructions 
were 

to  offer  Mexico  that  the  United  States  would 
assume  the  payment  of  all  just  claims  (of.  her 
own  citizens)  against  Mexico  to  date  (including 
instalment  due  on  adjusted  claims  since  April 
and  September,  1844)  and  adjust  the  western 
boundary  of  Texas,  and  pay  an  amount  to  be 
negotiated. 1 

Mexico  was  too  poor  to  pay  the  judgments 
against  her ;  too  proud  to  say  so ;  and  it  was 
regarded  as  a  graceful  inducement  to  peace 
ful  negotiations  to  become  her  banker. 

But  the  opportunity  is  seized  for  criticism 
of  Slidell  and  a  blow  over  his  shoulder  at 
the  whole  body  of  United  States  diplomats 
concerned  for  six  administrations  with  Mexi 
can  affairs,  by  describing  him  "as  tactful 
as  other  ministers  sent  to  Mexico."  As  he 
was  not  even  received  by  the  Mexican 
Government,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  he  had 

1  Life  of  Buchanan,  George  Ticknor  Curtis,  New 
York,  1883,  vol.  i.,  p.  593. 


212  The  Mexican  War 

occasion  for  showing  himself  to  be  tactful 
or  otherwise. 

When  so  much  is  made  of  so  little  by  such 
distinguished  writers,  it  is  a  natural  infer 
ence  that  there  is  not  much  to  support  an 
untenable  theory. 

Slidell  was  authorized  to  offer  $5,000,000 
for  Texas  and  $25,000,000  for  California. 
But  the  sale  of  either  of  them  was  not  to 
be  made  a  condition  of  peace  negotiations. 
The  amounts  offered  were  to  be 

besides  assuming  the  claims  of  United  States 
citizens  against  Mexico.  .  .  .  He  was  warned  that 
conciliation  of  the  Mexicans  was  indispensable 
to  his  success  .  .  .  [and]  was  to  bear  and  for 
bear  much  in  order  to  accomplish  his  mission. 
Later  Slidell  was  informed  that,  if  he  discovered 
that  the  attempt  to  settle  the  boundary  question 
in  the  manner  indicated  by  his  instructions 
would  endanger  the  two  prime  objects  of  his 
mission — to  counteract  foreign  influence  adverse 
to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  to 
restore  the  old  peaceful  relations  with  Mexico — 
he  was  not  to  sacrifice  these  objects  in  pursuit 
of  the  unattainable. 1 

Other  causes  than  the  unfitness  of  John 

1  Westward  Extension,  George  Pierce  Garrison,  New 
York,  1906,  pp.  215-216-217,  citing  Buchanan  to 


Correspondence  213 

Forsyth,  Daniel  Webster,  and  James  Bu 
chanan  for  maintaining  the  national  dignity 
and  courtesy  in  diplomatic  formalities  were 
the  causes  of  the  war. 

It  was  the  constantly  increasing  number 
and  the  character  of  the  claims  against 
Mexico,  and  the  recurring  offences  on  which 
they  were  based,  and  not  the  manner  of 
their  presentation,  which,  General  Wilcox 
saw,  must  have  eventuated  in  war. 

And  neither  the  claims  nor  the  corre 
spondence  nor  the  desire  for  slavery  exten 
sion  had  served  to  bring  on  armed  conflict 
until  other  causes  had  supervened. 

The  wolf  continued  to  be  harmless. 


Slidell,  Nov.  19,  1845,  and  Dec.  17,  1845,  U.S.  MSS. 
Archives,  State  Dept.:  also  for  complete  exposition 
of  the  peaceful  nature  of  Slidell's  instructions  and 
execution  of  them,  so  far  as  he  was  permitted  by  the 
Mexican  authorities,  see  tyid.,  pp.  214-225.  \ 


CHAPTER  XII 

BOUNDARIES 

IT  would  have  been  with  extreme  difficulty, 
and  by  exercising  more  than  ordinarily 
patient  regard  for  each  other's  convictions, 
that  any  two,  most  civilized,  of  the  nations 
could,  for  a  long  period  of  years,  have 
avoided  quarrelsome  contention  over  bound 
ary  lines  so  undetermined  as  were  those 
between  the  United  States  and  Mexico. 

With  so  ill  controlled  a  disposition  to 
reckon  with  as  that  of  Mexico  has  been 
shown  to  have  been,  it  is  next  to  impossible 
that  the  boundary  question  alone  would  not 
have  brought  the  borderers  of  the  two 
adjacent  nations  to  blows. 

The  Texas  treaty  in  1844  did  not  expressly 

define  the  boundaries  of  Texas;  and  President 

Tyler  said  in  his  message  of  June  10,  1844,  that 

"the    question    was    purposely    left    open    for 

214 


Boundaries  215 

negotiation  with  Mexico,  as  affording  the  best 
opportunity  for  the  most  friendly  and  pacific 
arrangements."  1 

Tyler  did  hope,  and  expect,  to  obtain  Texas 
without  war;  as  is  made  clear  by  his  son's 
able  history;  but  he  blamed  Polk  unjustly 
for  precipitating  hostilities.  For,  as  events 
proved,  it  was  useless  to  have  left  open  in 
1844  the  questions  of  Texan  boundaries. 

The  treaty  of  Velasco,  the  armed  interpre 
tation  and  enforcement  of  it  for  nine  years, 
the  vote  of  the  Texan  Congress  insisting  on 
the  boundary  of  the  Rio  Grande,  Jackson's 
message  announcing  that  insistence,  and  the 
recognition  of  Texas  with  notice  of  the 
boundary  had  made  the  boundary  between 
Texas  and  Mexico — on  the  Rio  Grande 
and  the  Del  Norte,  from  Point  Isabel  to 
Santa  Fe — probably  the  most  clearly  de 
fined  boundary  Mexico  had,  excepting  sea- 
coasts  only.  Three  centuries  of  Spanish 
possession  had  not  served  to  define  the 
limits  of  her  provinces.2 

1  Letters  and   Times   of  the   Tylers,  Lyon   Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  435. 

2  "I  have  found  nothing  to  show  how  far,  in  Spanish 
and  American  opinion,  New  Mexico  was  regarded  as 
extending  west  or  Sonora  south." 

"The  name  Moqui  province  was  sometimes  rather 


216  The  Mexican  War 

There  were  two  irreconcilable  doctrines 
as  to  boundary  or  national  possession;  and 
—unless  the  treaty  rights  of  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  by  which  the  navi 
gation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  and  the  Great 
Lakes  is  shared,  and  the  treaties  by  which 
the  navigation  of  European  rivers  is  mutually 
free  to  the  riparian  nations,  have  crystallized 
the  treaty  obligations  and  practices  of 
civilized  nations  into  conformity  with  the 
American  and  Russian  doctrine,  and  marked 
an  advance  in  the  slow  science  of  international 
law — there  still  are  two  doctrines,  diametri 
cally  opposed,  by  which  boundaries  may 
be  originally  acquired. 

The  old  doctrine — that  under  which  North 
America  had  been  partitioned  among  the 
European  powers — was  as  follows: 

When  any  European  nation  takes  possession 
of  any  extent  of  seacoast  [as  of  New  Orleans, 
Corpus  Christi,  Brazos  Santiago],  that  possession 
is  understood  as  extending  to  the  interior 
country  to  the  sources  of  the  rivers  emptying 
within  that  coast,  to  all  their  branches  and  the 

vaguely  applied  to  the  whole  region  north  of  the  Gila 
Valley." — History  of  the  Pacific  States  of  North  America, 
Hubert  Howe  Bancroft,  San  Francisco,  1882-1890,  vol. 
xvii.,  pp.  344-5- 


Boundaries  217 

country  they  cover  [or  drain],  and  to  give  it  a 
right  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  nations  to  the 
same.  When  the  boundary  between  is  not 
determined  by  this  means,  "  the  middle  distance 
becomes  such,  of  course."1 

This  was  convenient  Viking  law,  and  has 
been  so  pertinaciously  held  to  by  the  owners 
of  war-ships  as  to  be  appealed  to,  for  at 
least  a  rule  for  distribution  of  spheres  of 
influence,  to  the  present.  If  a  pirate  or 
war-ship  or,  indeed,  a  merchantman  could 
run  its  prow  into  a  river-mouth,  or  effect 
a  landing  near  it,  the  sovereign  whose  flag 
the  vessel  carried  took  sovereignty  over  the 
whole  watershed  drained  by  the  river.  So 
that  a  garrison  in  New  Orleans  maintained 
ownership  over  the  Mississippi  Valley  from 
the  Alleghenies  to  the  Rockies,  and  another 
at  Louisburg  commanded  the  Great  Lakes 
and  the  Northwest.  The  doctrine  of  actual 
occupancy  had  begun  to  modify  the  old 
doctrine,  but  had  not  effectively  supplanted 
it. 

When    Kentucky    and    Tennessee    found 

1  Secretary  of  State  to  Don  Luis  de  Onis,  March  12, 
1818;  Pinckney  and  Monroe  to  Spanish  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  April  20,  1805;  American  State 
Papers,  vol.  xii.,  pp.  76,  311,  312. 


2i 8  The  Mexican  War 

themselves  inconvenienced  by  denial  of 
rights  of  reshipment  of  freights  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Mississippi,  George  Washington  and 
his  Secretary  of  State,  John  Adams,  pro 
nounced  a  new  doctrine,  and  set  the  stakes 
for  civilized  claims. 

The  new  doctrine  promulgated  by  Wash 
ington  and  Adams  in  the  interest  of  the  new 
republic  was  :  great  producing  tracts  have 
a  natural  right  of  communication,  and 
passage  for  their  products  to  the  sea;  and  the 
blue  water  is,  of  natural  right,  the  free 
highway  of  all  nations. 

This  new  doctrine  has  been  the  central 
and  dominating  incentive  of  American  foreign 
policy;  and  it  has  been  the  ground  for  the 
necessary  co-operation  of  Russia ;  not  neces- . 
sary  by  reason  of  Romanoff  friendship,  but 
because  of  Russian  needs  being  identical  with 
American.  The  eventual  force  behind  such 
necessity  is  like  the  outward  thrust  of  gla 
ciers,  irresistible,  dangerous  until  it  melts 
into  the  sea.  The  contention  of  the  two 
doctrines  as  to  the  St.  Lawrence  ceased 
with  the  sharing  of  its  commerce  and  that 
of  the  Great  Lakes  between  two  kindred 
peoples.  The  Louisiana  Purchase  avoided 
the  contention  as  to  the  Mississippi  region. 


Boundaries  219 

The  American  doctrine  had  not  been 
acknowledged  at  the  date  of  the  Mexican 
War,  if  it  ever  has  been  formally  acknow 
ledged;  and  questions  of  boundary  with 
Spain  or  Mexico  depended  on  knowing  the 
watershed,  at  least  for  understanding  and 
meeting  the  contentions  of  Mexican  and 
American  settlers,  or  knowing  for  what  it  was 
the  interest  of  either  nation  to  contend. 

How  little  was  known  of  the  boundaries 
has  already  appeared  in  part  from  the  Texas 
Santa  Fe  expedition  having  lost  its  way  and, 
as  related  by  Kendall,  having  been  unable 
to  know  whether  it  was  on  the  upper  forks 
of  the  Red  River,  or  the  Colorado  of  Texas, 
or  the  Canadian  branch  of  the  Arkansas. 

It  is  true  that  by  treaty  the  United 
States  and  Mexico  had  from  the  first  defined 
their  boundary  on  paper.  The  line  could  be 
traced  well  enough  on  a  map  for  the  most 
of  its  length.  The  line  followed  the  river 
Sabine  from  the  Gulf 

to  32°  and  thence  due  North  to  where  it  strikes 
the  Rio  Roxo  of  Natchitoches,  or  Red  River; 
thence  following  the  course  of  the  Rio  Roxo 
Westward  to  100°  west  of  London,  and  23°  west 
of  Washington;  thence  due  North  to  the 
Arkansas  river;  thence  on  the  South  bank 


220  The  Mexican  War 

of  the  Arkansas  river  to  its  Source  in  latitude 
42°  North  and  thence  on  parallel  42°  to  the 
South  Sea,  as  per  Mellish's  map  of  the  United 
States;  but  if  the  source  of  said  river  Arkansas 
shall  be  found  to  fall  North  or  South  of  42°, 
then  the  line  shall  run  from  said  source  North 
or  South  as  the  case  may  be  till  it  meets  42°, 
and  so  west  on  that  parallel. 

For  geographers,  except  for  a  jog  at  42°, 
a  practicable  line.  Nothing  easier  than  to 
lay  a  boundary  line  upon  a  parallel  of  longi 
tude.  But  for  settlers,  hunters,  trappers, 
who  had  gone  into  a  wilderness  following 
the  streams  whose  lower  waters  were  in  the 
possession  of  their  respective  nations,  who 
was  to  set  the  merestones  which  were  to 
mark  the  bounds  within  which  allegiance,  obe 
dience,  and  taxes  were  due  to  one  sovereign 
or  the  other?  And  where  was  the  source  of 
the  Arkansas?  At  what  insignificant  spring 
at  the  head  of  some  inaccessible  runlet  was 
to  be  set  the  corner-stone  of  division  between 
two  mighty  adjacent  territories?  An  addi 
tional  article  by  convention  of  April  21, 1836, 
agreed  on  a  commission  to  run  the  boundary 
line  and  fix  landmarks. 1 

1  Treaties  and  Conventions  between  the  United  States 
and  other  Powers,  Washington,  1889,  p.  675. 


Boundaries  221 

Along  these  enormous  stretches  of  imagin 
ary  lines  which  way  was  access  from  the  sea 
board,  or  from  settled  places,  into  the 
unexplored  fertile  valleys  and  forests  rich 
in  furs,  perhaps  in  gold?  By  what  passes 
and  portages  and  navigable  stretches  of 
their  channels  did  rivers  afford  transportation 
to  centres  of  commerce  present  or  prospec 
tive;  and  in  the  territory  of  which  nation, 
subject  to  what  national  restriction  or  con 
cession?  An  Empire  was  beckoning  and 
calling  to  the  engineer  and  prospector — as 
indeed  it  continues  to  do  to  this  day. 

Out  of  a  vast  unmapped  region  flowed  to 
the  shore  lines  by  not  merely  divergent, 
but  by  opposite  routes  and  tortuous,  dan 
gerous,  mountain-guarded  channels,  many 
mighty  rivers  with  countless  tributaries. 
Eastward  poured  out  from  this  great  and 
inexhaustible  storehouse  of  waters  the  Mis 
souri,  the  Yellowstone,  the  Big  Horn,  the 
Nebraska,  the  Sweetwater,  the  Arkansas, 
Canadian,  and  Red  rivers,  finding  their 
way  to  the  Mississippi  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
through  the  Louisiana  Purchase  of  the  United 
States.  To  the  Northwest  the  Clearwater,  the 
Salmon  River,  Salt  River,  the  Henry  Fork, 
and  other  tributaries  of  the  Snake  or  Lewis 


222  The  Mexican  War 

branch  of  the  Columbia  emptied  into  the 
Pacific  at  Astoria  in  the  Oregon  district 
which  was  being  disputed  with  Great  Britain. 
These  tributaries  of  the  Columbia  almost 
interlace  with  the  upper  sources  of  the 
Humboldt  River,  which  unites  with  the  San 
Joaquin  and  the  Sacramento  and  washes 
the  bay  of  San  Francisco  in  what  was  then 
Mexican  territory.  Another  almost  unknown 
region  was  the  upper  watershed  of  the  great 
Mexican  Colorado,  or  Green  River,  and  its 
branches,  the  Grand,  the  San  Juan,  the 
Chiquito,  and  the  Gila,  divided  by  only 
narrow  ridges  from  the  sources  of  the  Red 
and  Canadian  or  Arkansas  rivers,  the  upper 
waters  of  the  Rio  Grande  del  Norte  and  its 
chief  tributary,  the  Rio  Pecos,  which  empty 
into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  near  the  south 
western  end  of  the  Laguna  del  Madre, 
the  limit  of  Texas. 

The  greater  part,  almost  the  whole,  of 
the  vast  region  where  all  these  rivers  and 
their  branches  have  their  sources  was 
unmapped  and  unknown.  What  priority 
of  occupation,  or  descriptions  in  old  deeds 
or  treaties,  were  to  govern  boundary  ques 
tions,  even  on  which  principle  of  the  law 
pf  discovery  and  national  pre-emption 


Boundaries  223 

ancient  rights  and  titles  of  pioneers  were  to 
be  established,  was  uncertain.  Questions  as 
to  the  limits  of  Louisiana  went  back,  as  had 
questions  of  partition  of  the  Texan  and 
Florida  seaboard,  to  the  travels  of  De  So  to 
and  La  Salle.  The  cession  from  France  had 
not  described  the  territory  conveyed,  other 
than  by  the  quit-claim  description,  "the 
same  tract  conveyed  to  France  by  Spain." 
And  that  conveyance  from  France  had  not 
been  unconditioned.  No  metes  and  bounds 
were  mentioned.  It  has  been  said  that  when, 
after  the  sale  of  Louisiana,  Talleyrand  was 
asked  what  were  the  boundaries,  he  replied 
that  he  did  not  know,  and  Napoleon  added 
that,  "if  they  were  not  vague  it  would  be 
worth  while  to  make  them  so."  And  it  has 
been  believed  that  this  disclosed  a  desire  that 
there  should  be  left  open  a  subject  of  conten 
tion  between  the  bordering  nations.  The 
report  may  be  correct;  but,  if  so,  there  was  a 
duplication  of  the  statements.  Channing 
thinks  that  Napoleon,  convinced  of  Talley 
rand's  avarice  and  willingness  to  convert 
to  his  own  use  a  liberal  commission,  had  not 
trusted  him  with  the  sale.  The  Louisiana 
Purchase  was  arranged  between  Marbois  and 
Livingston.  Talleyrand,  after  the  contract 


224  The  Mexican  War 

was  completed,  was  asked  about  the  bound 
aries  and  answered:  "You  have  made  a 
grand  bargain,  make  the  most  of  it."  When 
it  was  suggested  that  the  boundaries  were 
indefinite,  "Marbois  said  that  'they  were, 
and  that  if  the  language  had  not  been 
indefinite,  it  would  have  been  well  to  have 
made  it  so.'"1 

A  matter  of  probable  contention  was  not 
opened,  but  was  left  open,  between  Spain, 
Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States;  and 
appears  to  have  been  recognized  with  amused 
contentment  by  the  agents  of  France. 

There  has  seldom  existed,  therefore,  more 
urgent  reason  for  surveys  of  unmapped 
wilderness  than  applied  to  the  vast  unknown 
tracts  claimed  by  Texas,  Great  Britain, 
the  United  States,  and  Mexico  with  their 
unmarked  boundaries.  The  energetic  nation 
which  had  despatched  the  Lewis  and  Clark 
expedition  from  the  Mississippi  to  the 
Pacific,  took  up  the  task  of  such  surveys 
with  commendably  undiminished  energy, 
making  surveys  and  maps  in  its  own  evident 
interest  and  in  the  interest  no  less  evident 

*The  Jeffersonian  System,  Edward  Charming,  New 
York,  1906,  p  76;  Histoire  de  la  Louisiane,  Barbe 
Marbois;  Paris,  1829,  p.  311. 


Boundaries  225 

of  all  parties  concerned.  If  delicate  diplo 
matic  discussions  between  rival  powers  were 
to  ensue,  certainly  it  would  be  well  for  the 
possibility  of  anything  like  permanent  adjust 
ment  of  debated  questions,  that  the  parties 
to  the  debate  should  know  what  they  were 
talking  about.  The  history  has  been  written 
of  the  Lewis  and  Clark  expedition,  and 
there  are  reports  of  the  other  expeditions. 
From  these,  and  from  any  reasonable  con 
jectures  founded  on  experiences  of  discoverers 
and  surveyors  who  have  penetrated  into 
savage  regions,  and  encountered  the  savage 
beasts  and  men  that  populate  them,  the 
desolation,  the  distances,  the  pathless  wastes, 
the  cold  or  heat,  the  innumerable  privations, 
it  must  be  believed  that  such  survey  parties 
as  pushed  into  the  great  plains,  the  Sierras 
and  Rocky  Mountains,  and  the  river  gorges, 
must  of  necessity  have  gone  provided  with 
every  equipment  for  averting  anticipated 
exhaustion  and  perils. 

But  that  is  not  the  estimate  of  some  of  the 
historians. 

Dr.  Hart,  Professor  of  History  at  Harvard, 

has  been  among  the  most  eager  exponents 

of  the   theory   that  the  Mexican  War  was 

"waged   to  extend   slavery";   so  much  so 

15 


226  The  Mexican  War 

that  in  speaking  of  it  he  ignores  for  the  time, 
the  influences  of  slaveholding  in  inducing 
the  building  up  of  an  autocratic  class,  the 
clash  in  regard  to  the  Missouri  Compromise, 
the  conflicting  tariff  interests  of  cotton 
planting  and  manufactures,  and  declares 
that  the  war  "  led  to  sectional  rivalries 
which  speedily  brought  on  the  Civil  War"; 
a  short  circle  to  reason  in.  Sectional  rivalries 
brought  on  the  war  and  the  war  led  to 
sectional  rivalries  and  these  to  more  war. 
In  proof  of  his  theory  he  asserts  another 
theory  which  in  its  turn  needs  proof.  ' '  When 
in  1845  annexation  of  Texas  was  accom 
plished,  no  actual  force  was  employed"  (it 
could  not  be  in  passing  a  Congressional 
resolution)  "  because  Mexico  made  no  mil 
itary  resistance;  but  the  principle  of  armed 
intervention  had  been  cynically  avowed, 
and  was  soon  to  be  put  into  active  service."1 
The  avowal,  cynical  or  otherwise,  must 
have  been  Mexico's  announcement  that  she 
would  regard  annexation  a  declaration  of  war. 
Professor  Hart  reports  the  results  of 
unexplained  telepathy:  "  It  was  President 
Polk's  purpose  from  the  beginning  of  his 

i  The   Foundations     of     American   Foreign    Policy, 
Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  New  York,  1901,  p.  71. 


Boundaries  227 

administration  to  provoke  a  war  with  Mex 
ico  in  order  to  have  a  pretext  for  seizing 
California." 

We  have  seen  a  great  deal  of  "  strong 
inference"  used  in  getting  evidence  for  the 
fortification  of  historical  theory.  In  regard 
to  Folk's  action  the  inference  is  that  it  was 
designed  to  bring  on  war,  for  California  as  a 
prize,  simply  because  Polk  had  declared  that 
he  should  make  it  an  object  to  get  California; 
and  that  therefore  sending  a  minister  with 
special  peace  instructions  was  for  a  warlike 
purpose. 

Buchanan's  instructions  as  Secretary  of 
State  to  Slidell  had  been:  "  The  President 
is  sincerely  desirous  to  preserve  peace 
with  Mexico.  Both  inclination  and  policy 
dictate  the  course."  But  the  official  de 
claration  of  a  very  formal  chief  of  the  dip 
lomatic  service  of  the  United  States  need 
not  be  regarded  as  proof  of  anything  as 
against  a  philosophical  theory,  even  although 
the  desire  to  have  California  and  the  desire 
to  keep  peace  with  Mexico  are  made  entirely 
reconcilable  by  Professor  Hart's  own  state 
ment  when  he  is  arguing  the  folly  of  the 
war  and  on  very  tenable  ground :  '  *  Texas 
was  already  secured  and  California  must 


228  The  Mexican  War 

have  fallen  to  the  United  States  without 
war."  And  so  it  would,  perhaps,  but  for 
some  external  pressure  to  be  considered 
in  another  connection.  Polk,  Buchanan, 
and  Slidell  are  however  to  be  regarded  as 
having  had  too  little  acumen,  and  as  having 
been  too  ignorant  of  the  diplomatic  and 
international  relations  intrusted  at  that 
juncture  to  themselves  only,  to  have  seen 
what  could  only  occur  to  the  philosophical 
intelligence  of  a  later  period  and  an  intelli 
gence  not  in  contact  with  all  the  facts  in  the 
case.  For  it  is  the  gravest  difficulty  of 
writing  history  by  inference  of  motives,  that 
some  of  the  chief  facts  about  which  diplo 
matic  differences  occur  are  often  only  known 
by  the  diplomats  themselves,  and  remain 
forever  unrecorded  and  unrevealed. 

But  Professor  Hart  is  equal  to  all  emer 
gencies  for  proving  motive  by  actions  con 
strued  by  assumed  motive:  "  Instructions 
were  issued  to  naval  officers  to  be  ready  to 
seize  California."  The  instructions  might  be 
more  fairly  stated  to  have  been  to  be  ready 
to  anticipate  Great  Britain  if  she  attempted 
to  seize  any  part  of  the  coast ;  but,  to  pass  the 
California  question  until  the  surveying  ex 
peditions  have  been  heard  from:  "Eight 


Boundaries  229 

different  military  expeditions  were  sent  out 
into  Mexican  territory."1  It  is  impossible 
to  consider  at  all  such  a  statement  from  a 
historian,  and  a  teacher  of  how  history 
should  be  written,  without  vigorous  protest 
as  to  its  form.  It  is  worse  than  inference. 
It  is  in  the  form  of  an  attempt  to  beget  a 
reader's  inference.  It  is  put  in  such  words 
that  the  facts  stated  cannot  be  denied  and 
disproved;  but  the  words  are  used  in  such 
connection  (in  a  list  of  "aggressive  expedi 
tions"),  and  the  facts  are  stated  in  support 
of  such  a  theory  (a  theory  already  stated  as 
though  it  were  a  fact) ,  that  a  false  inference 
is  suggested.  The  fact  is  made  a  false  witness 
by  an  innuendo — the  very  last  method  of 
using  language  permissible  to  a  historian  or 
a  pupil  in  history. 

What  is  meant  by  a  "military  expedition  "  ? 
When  the  "Putnam  Phalanx  "  dons  the  uni 
form  of  Washington's  Continentals  of  1780, 
arms  its  rank  and  file  with  flintlock  mus 
kets,  takes  rail  cars  from  Hartford,  in 
vades  Massachusetts,  and  annihilates  the 

1  Foundations  of  American  Foreign  Policy,  Albert 
Bushnell  Hart,  New  York,  1901,  p.  71.  To  make  out 
the  number  eight,  expeditions  "during  the  war"  are 
included. 


230  The  Mexican  War 

commissary  stores  of  the  Ancient  and  Honor 
able  Artillery  of  Boston,  that  constitutes  a 
''military  expedition"  in  the  expressed  opin 
ions  of  the  participants  and  the  vernacular 
of  the  reporter.  The  only  one  of  the  eight 
expeditions  with  which  Polk  invaded  Mexico 
which  seems  to  have  been  worth  particu- 
larization  was  Fremont's  "third  and  most 
belligerent."  "He  had  an  armed  party  of 
sixty  men,  and  on  his  arrival  in  California 
was  warned  off  by  the  Mexican  authorities 
and  betook  himself  for  the  time  to  Oregon." 1 
In  numbers,  then,  the  most  belligerent 
of  these  expeditions  was  about  equal  to  the 
Putnam  Phalanx,  was  equally  armed,  was 
less  warmly  received,  and  as  peaceably 
retired  to  a  neighboring  State,  but  without 
an  invitation  to  call  again;  although  soon 
after  it  did  make  another  call  and  in  different 
manner.  Indeed  sundry  "military  expedi 
tions"  under  Taylor  and  Scott  and  Fremont 
and  Kearney  a  year  later  were  sent  out 
into  Mexican  territory,  were  warned  off  by 
the  Mexican  authorities,  but  betook  them 
selves,  not  to  Oregon,  but  (with  much 
bloodshed)  to  the  Mexican  capital,  and  to 

1  Foundations  of  American  Foreign  Policy,  p.  71- 


Boundaries  231 

the  strategic  strongholds  of  her  provinces. 
So  wide  is  the  scope  of  meaning  attachable 
to  the  simple  words  by  which  a  historian 
may  by  insinuation  make  accounts  of  national 
activities  fit  a  theory,  without  laying  himself 
open  to  conviction  of  direct  misstatement, 
or  mistake. 

The  survey  expeditions  went  armed1  but 
they  were  not  therefore  military  expeditions 
irTa  ne^s¥arny~blTerrsTve  sense.  TEere  are 
grizzlies  enough  left  in  the  regions  surveyed 
to  insure  travellers  therein  going  armed  to 
the  present  day.  The  Santa  Fe  expedition, 
which  did  not  aim  at  Mexican  territory, 
was  overcome  by  Indians.  And,  as  if  com 
ment  of  the  sort  was  not  unheard  of  by 
Kendall,  or  in  anticipation  of  the  histories  to 
be  written  after  him,  he  says: 

It  cannot  be  considered  very  strange  that  a 
military  force  accompanied  the  expedition. 
The  number  of  men  [about  300]  was  not  really 
larger  than  that  which  accompanied  the  earlier 
Missouri  enterprises ;  and  did  not  prove  sufficient 
against  the  Indians.  These  remarks  I  have  made 
to  counteract  assertions  put  forth  by  the  ignorant 
few,  that  the  very  fact  of  a  military  force  being 
sent  with  the  expedition  was  a  proof  of  its 
hostile  intentions.  They  would  have  had  us, 


232  The  Mexican  War 

forsooth,  start  off  with  walking-sticks  and  um 
brellas,  and  been  scalped  to  a  man  in  order  to 
prove  our  object  pacific.1 

It  is  not  difficult  to  give  the  facts  about 
Fremont's  expedition  in  brief.  His  appoint 
ment  to  the  command  had  been  in  part 
for  political  effect,  and  eventuated  in  a 
great  political  effect  not  intended. 

An  expedition  was  fitted  out  for  Oregon  in  the 
summer  of  1843  ;  and  the  conciliation  of  Benton 
[his  father-in-law]  was  one  of  the  reasons  which 
induced  the  administration  to  make  John  C. 
Fremont,  apart  from  his  own  pre-eminent 
fitness  for  the  place,  the  commander  of  the 
enterprise.2 

In  Fremont's  third  expedition  his  line  of 
observation  would  lead  him  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean  through  a  Mexican  province — through 
the  desert  parts  first  and  the  settled  part 
afterwards  of  the  Alta  California.  Approach 
ing  the  settled  parts  of  the  province  at  the 
commencement  of  winter,  he  left  his  equipment 
of  60  men  and  200  horses  on  the  frontier  and 
proceeded  alone  to  Monterey, 

1  Narrative  of  the  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition,  George 
Wilkins  Kendall,  New  York,  1844,  vol.  i.,  p.  17. 

2  Letters   and   Times   of   the    Tylers,  Lyon   Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  292. 


Boundaries  233 

where  he  obtained  permission  to  pass  the 
winter  and  refresh  his  men  and  horses. 
On  the  permission  being  revoked  he  started 
for  Oregon,  but  was  recalled  from  the  Great 
if^lamath  Lake  by  instructions  from  Mr. 
Buchanan  to  watch  and  counteract  any 
foreign  scheme  in  California.  *  The  impor 
tance  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  reasons  for  such 
instructions  will  be  made  obvious  in  the 
next  chapter;  but  the  finish  of  the  work  of 
the  expedition  may  be  given  in  this  place, 
although  a  climax  in  the  recital  of  the  most 
important  cause  of  the  war  is  anticipated. 

Butler,  relating  that  "war-ships  of  the 
British  and  American  navies  were  hovering 
off  the  coast,  each  anxious  to  find  an  op 
portunity  to  land,  run  up  a  flag,  and  take 
possession  in  the  name  of  its  government," 
cites  Mrs.  Jessie  Benton  Fremont  for  the 
following  statement:  McNamara,  a  British 
subject, 

"working  in  the  interest  of  a  project  originated 
at  Rome  to  checkmate  the  growing  Protestant 
ism  of  the  United  States,"  had  authority  from  the 
Mexican  Government  to  establish  10,000  families 


i  Thirty  Years'  View,  Thomas  H.  Benton,  New  York, 
1854,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  688  and  689. 


234  The  Mexican  War 

with  a  grant  of  13,500,000  acres,  on  the  express 
condition  "to  keep  out  the  Americans."  The 
valley  of  the  San  Joaquin  was  selected  for  the 
beginning  of  the  settlement.  General  Castro 
had  armed  the  Mexican  Californians  and  had 
engaged  the  Indian  tribes  to  help  to  exterminate 
the  American  settlers.  Hence  [says  Butler]  the 
attempts  to  hasten  the  British  Admiral,  Sey 
mour,  to  land  in  California. 

Fremont's  advance  "routed  the  Mexican 
force,  broke  up  the  junta,  and  on  July  5,  1846, 
having  learned  of  the  declaration  of  war 
between  Mexico  and  the  United  States, 
Fremont  ran  up  the  stars  and  stripes."1 

There  is  an  amusing  feature  in  Prof. 
Hart's  use  of  Fremont's  expedition  as  a 
proof  of  the  wicked  and  warlike  conspir 
acy  of  the  slaveholders.  The  people  were 
captivated  by  the  brilliant,  picturesque  sur 
vey,  ending  in  a  short,  decisive  campaign — 
great  war  news  from  the  remotest  point  of 
contact  with  an  enemy,  a  port  secured  on  the 
disputed,  far  Pacific  coast,  opening  a  vista 

1  Mexico  in  Transition,  William  Butler,  New  York, 
1892,  pp.  87-90. 

New  York  Evangelist,  June  30,  1887.  Paper  of 
Rev.  Dr.  Ellinwood  to  General  Presbyterian  Assembly, 
1 88 1,  is  cited. 


Boundaries  235 

of  empire  a  thousand  times  more  important 
than  a  dozen  archipelagoes;  and  all  with  a 
handful  of  exhausted  engineers  and  rod-men. 
The  first  great  shock  thereby  came  to  the 
citadel  of  slaveholding  domination.  The 
Free-soilers,  who  were  to  break  the  road 
for  the  election  of  Lincoln,  made  the  pioneer 
of  California  their  pioneer  in  politics  >  and 
followed  him  almost  to  a  victory ;  the  '  *  Wide- 
A  wakes" — torch-bearers  in  the  picturesque 
campaign — singing  with  strained  throats 
and  smoke-roughened  voices,  to  the  music 
of  Hail  Columbia, 

"He  made  the  wide  Pacific  free, 
The  shores  of  that  vast  ocean  free." 

And  there  was  no  philosophical  historian 
by  to  tell  them  he  was  only  the  tool  of  a 
slavery  plot,  or  if  there  were,  he  was  not 
listened  to  by  the  great  Republican  party. 

But  it  was  not  the  survey  expedition  or 
expeditions,  nor  boundary  disputes,  which 
brought  the  great  republic  to  blows. 

When  war  broke  loose,  and  of  a  sudden, 
the  surveyors  came  handy;  and  some  of 
them  were  in  place  to  act  with  advantage. 
But  it  was  a  matter  of  far  greater  significance 


236  The  Mexican  War 

than  more  or  less  slave  States,1  claims  for 
spoliations,  river  boundaries,  or  Mexico's 
resentment  of  military  expeditions,  which 
roused  the  American  nation  to  the  war 
point. 

1  "The  annexation  of  Texas  was  logical  and  delayed 
only  by  the  accidental  connection  with  slavery." — 
National  Ideas  Historically  Traced,  Albert  Bushnell 
Hart,  New  York,  1907,  p.  26. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

FOREIGN    INTERVENTION,   AND   ANNEXATION 

IF  Carl  Schurz  had  been  as  universally 
known  as  a  historian  as  he  was  on  the 
stump  or  in  statesmanship,  the  caricaturists 
who  formerly  delighted  in  distorting  his 
strong  German  face,  and  gleaming  eye 
glasses,  would  have  found  a  choice  opportu 
nity  for  their  unholy  glee  in  his  commentary 
on  Daniel  Webster's  simplicity  and  unsus 
pecting  innocence  amid  diplomatic  and 
political  intrigues.  The  honest  and  over- 
impetuous  Teuton  with  his  hammer-and- 
tongs  hitting  is  a  ludicrous  tutor  in  craft 
for  the  finished  statesman  and  experienced 
master  in  diplomacy. 

As  early  as  1835  Webster  had  declared  in  the 

Senate,  that  he  had  no  doubt  that  attempts 

would  be  made  by  some  European  government  to 

obtain  a  cession  of  Texas  from  the  government 

237 


238  The  Mexican  War 

of  Mexico.  It  was  natural  to  fear  that  if  she 
[Mexico]  negotiated  a  loan  in  England  some 
condition  fatal  to  the  independence  of  Texas 
might  be  demanded.1 

And  Schurz  writes: 

Webster  said  that  if  the  people  of  Texas  had 
established  a  government  de  facto,  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  United  States  to  recognize  it. 
He  was  alarmed  by  rumors  "that  attempts 
would  be  made  by  some  European  government 
to  obtain  a  cession  of  Texas  from  the  government 
of  Mexico."  It  has  frequently  been  observed 
in  the  history  of  this  Republic  that  those  who 
agitate  for  a  territorial  acquisition  spread  the 
rumor  that  European  powers  are  coveting  it. 
It  is  strange  that  Webster  should  have  failed 
to  penetrate  that  shallow  device.2 

It  would  have  indeed  been  strange,  had 
there  been  nothing  in  it  but  a  shallow  device, 
and  Webster  had  not  penetrated  it.  There 
was  something  more,  which  the  multitude  of 
historians  do  not  seem  to  have  penetrated, 

»  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner  Tyler, 
Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  271.  That  is,  that  Great 
Britain  would  treat  Texas  just  as  later  she  did  treat 
Egypt. 

2  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  Boston,  1887,  vol. 
ii.,  p.  91. 


Intervention  and  Annexation    239 

although  facts  were  accessible,  facts,  how 
ever,  which  unfortunately  do  not  corre 
spond  with  already  accepted  theories. 

The  danger  grew  more  imminent  every  day 
that  foreign  powers  would  step  in.1 

At  this  very  moment  Great  Britain,  whose 
national  policy  the  President  regarded  as  one  of 
aggrandizement,  was  engaged  in  the  iniquitous 
war  upon  China,  to  force  upon  her  the  opium 
trade.2 

She  was  also  engaged  in  the  attempt  to 
seize  the  Sandwich  Islands. 

Her  attempts  to  make  herself  mistress 
of  Oregon  had  been  such  as  to  have  aroused 
the  American  people  to  the  extent  of  electing 
Polk  on  the  issue  of  "the  re-annexation  of 
Texas  and  fifty-four  forty  or  fight."  The 
presence  of  a  British  squadron  off  Monterey, 
and  the  scheme  which  Fremont  defeated, 
have  been  noticed  in  a  preceding  chapter; 
also  a  plan  for  British  anti-slavery  men  to 
extend  British  influence  into  Texas.  Years 
after  the  close  of  the  war  of  1776  had  seen 
Great  Britain,  in  defiance  of  the  treaty  of 
Paris,  holding  forts  and  strategic  positions 

» Letters  and   Times   of   the   Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  vol.  ii.,  p.  255. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  272. 


240  The  Mexican  War 

on  our  western  frontiers,  including  some  in 
Texas.  "  The  British  ministry  encouraged 
General  Miranda  in  his  designs  to  revolu 
tionize  Venezuela,  aided  the  premature  ex 
pedition  which  he  fitted  out  in  1801,  and 
furnished  the  funds  for  that  in  I806."1 

While  the  War  of  1812  was  being  brought 
to  a  close  by  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  the  British 
diplomatists,  by  a  trick  in  the  wording  of  the 
treaty,  were  endeavoring  to  seize  the  whole 
of  the  territory  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase. 

"The  British  Government  was  signing  a 
treaty  with  one  hand,  while  with  the  other 
behind  its  back  it  is  despatching  Paken- 
ham's  army  to  seize  the  fairest  of  our 
possessions." 

"I  have  learned  from  diplomatic  sources 
of  the  most  unquestionable  authority" — 
it  is  General  Jackson,  in  the  second  term 
of  his  presidency,  who  is  talking,  to  Gov 
ernor,  and  Senator,  William  Allen  of  Ohio — 
1  'that  the  British  ministry  did  not  intend 
the  treaty  of  Ghent  to  apply  to  the  Louisiana 
Purchase.  .  .  .  The  whole  corporation  of 
them,  from  Pitt  to  Castlereagh,  held  that 
we  had  no  right  to  that  territory." 

1  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  John  M. 
Niles,  Hartford,  1838,  vol.  i.,  pp.  90  and  91. 


Intervention  and  Annexation    241 

To  this  Dr.  Brady  adds :  ' '  It  is  indubitably 
true  that  if  the  British  had  succeeded  in 
defeating  Jackson  and  seizing  Louisiana  they 
would  have  held  it,  treaty  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding."1  But  Jackson  at  New 
Orleans  defeated  Pakenham  and  the  scheme 
of  the  ministry  with  him. 

An  American  Commodore,  Thomas  Jones, 
had  heard  that  there  was  an  agreement  for 
British  occupation  of  California;  had  landed 
at  Monterey,  and  had  run  up  a  flag.  Mexico 
had,  in  correspondence,  made  a  declara 
tion  of  war;  "  but  there  was  nevertheless 
peace,"  Jones  hauled  down  his  flag  within 
twenty-four  hours,  and  sailed  away;  and 
the  United  States  apologized.2 

All  this  the  historians  who  are  tied  to 
theories  of  a  war  for  slavery  extension  ignore 
or  construe  as  evidence  of  provocation  to 
Mexico.  But  there  is  evidence  not  so  easily 
set  aside. 

"  Mexico  was  in  debt  to  British  capitalists 

»  The  True  Andrew  Jackson,  Cyrus  Townsend 
Brady,  Phila.,  1906,  pp.  105-8,  quoting  largely  from 
Colonel  Augustus  C.  Buell. 

2  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  266  and  267. 

History  of  the  United  States,  James  Schouler,  Boston, 
1889,  vol.  iv,  p.  446. 

16 


242  The  Mexican  War 

some    £10,000,000,     secured    on    lands    in 
Sonora,  California,  and  New  Mexico." 

John  Quincy  Adams  was  as  dull  as  Webster 
in  failing  to  perceive  that  dread  of  foreign 
unfriendliness  was  a  fake: 

I  distrust  the  designs  of  Great  Britain  alto 
gether.  I  believe  their  real  policy  far  from  desir 
ing  the  abolition  of  slavery  either  in  our  Southern 
States  or  in  Texas.  I  suspect  on  the  contrary 
that  for  a  suitable  equivalent  they  will  readily 
acquiesce  both  in  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and 
to  the  perpetuation  of  slavery,  to  weaken  and 
rule  us. 1 

President  Tyler  was  kept  informed  of  the 
machinations  of  the  British  envoy  in  Texas 
to  prevent  annexation.2  He  had  informed 
the  Senate  that  he  had  reason  to  fear  foreign 
occupation  of  Texas.3 

Benton  complained  that  Texas  was  not 
left  to  make  peace  with  Mexico:  " under 
the  powerful  mediation  of  Great  Britain 
and  France  the  establishment  of  peace  was 

1  Letters  and  Times  of   the   Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  260. 

2  Supra,  "Mixed  Motives,"  p.  157. 

3  28th  Congress,  ist  Session  Documents,  from  which 
the  seal  of  secrecy  had  been  removed. 


Intervention  and  Annexation  243 

certain/'1  The  sort  of  peace  which  would 
exist  under  a  French  and  English  protectorate 
was  not  likely  to  be  pleasing  to  the  United 
States. 

Houston  played  his  diplomatic  cards  boldly. 
He  threatened  the  United  States,  in  case 
his  overtures  for  annexation  were  rejected, 
with  an  empire  of  which  the  eastern  boun 
dary  was  to  be  the  Rocky  Mountains,  and 
the  northern  British  America,  cutting  off 
Oregon.2 

'  The  project  on  foot  was  to  establish  a 
French  monarchy  under  Marshal  Soult."3 
An  unpleasant  outlook,  and  very  likely  only 
conjecture,  but  not  so  wild  as  not  to  have 
been  realized  almost  exactly  in  the  later  king 
dom  of  Maximilian,  and  as  much  a  war  incen 
tive  if  mistakenly  believed  as  though  actual. 

»  Thirty  Years'  View,  Thomas  H.  Benton,  New  York, 
1854,  vol.  ii.,  p.  644. 

2  "Houston  directed  his  Secretary  of  State,  Anson 
Jones,  to  close  with  the  offer  "  (of  a  virtual  protectorate 
by   Great   Britain   and   France   to  be   established  by 
Lord  Aberdeen's  diplomatic  act).    .    .  "Jones  however 
suppressed  the  order,  which  did  not  come  to  the  light 
till   four   years  later." — Westward   Extension,   George 
Pierce  Garrison,  New  York,  1906,  p.  154,  citing  Niles' 
Register,  Ixxiv.,  p.  413. 

3  Speech  of  Hon.  Orlando  B.  Ficklin  of  Illinois,  House 
of  Representatives,  Washington,  March  2,  1848. 


244  The  Mexican  War 

It  is  not  necessary  to  expend  many  words 
in  the  reminder  that  the  American  nation 
and  people  have  always  been  quite  sensitive 
to  any  indications  that  a  foreign  nation  was 
likely  to  become  a  neighbor  on  this  continent. 
Before  Monroe  and  Canning  had  conferred 
on  this  subject,  induced  thereto  by  the  threat 
to  free  governments  of  the  Holy  Alliance, 
the  general  doctrine  had  been  announced. 
October  29,  1808,  President  Jefferson  wrote 
to  the  Governor  of  Louisiana: 

The  patriots  of  Spain  have  no  warmer  friends 
than  the  administration  of  the  United  States. 
We  should  be  well  satisfied  to  see  Cuba  and 
Mexico  remain  in  their  present  dependence ;  but 
very  unwilling  to  see  them  in  that  of  France  or 
England;  we  consider  their  interests  and  ours 
as  the  same,  and  that  the  object  of  both  must 
be  to  exclude  all  European  influence  from  the 
Hemisphere.1 

The  attention  of  Mexico  had  been  formally 
called  to  the  message  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  December  2,  1823,  in  which 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  it  is  generally  called, 
was  stated.2  The  advice  of  Washington's 

1  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  Gorham  D.  Abbot, 
New  York,  1869,  p.  317. 

2  Treaties  and  Conventions  of  the  United  States,  Dept. 
of  State,  1889,  p.  1357, 


Intervention  and  Annexation  245 

Farewell  Address,  to  keep  out  of  foreign 
entanglements,  had  been  so  closely  followed, 
or  had  been  so  fully  in  accord  with  the 
sentiment  of  the  people,  that  it  was  with 
reluctance  that  our  diplomats  committed 
the  nation  to  act  in  concert  with  another 
nation,  or  put  itself  into  a  position  which 
might  import  the  suspicion  of  any  obligation 
to  it.  The  distaste  of  doing  otherwise  than 
strictly  minding  one's  own  business  had 
resulted  in  an  established  foreign  policy 
which,  expressed  in  euchre  dialect,  was, 
"I'll  go  it  alone." 

Whether  Houston  liked  the  first  office  in 
an  independent  republic  so  well  as  to  have 
lost  his  inclination  to  become  only  a  citizen 
or  a  Senator  of  the  United  States,  and  was 
really  willing  to  enter  into  a  combination  with 
one  or  more  European  powers  for  guarantee 
of  Texan  independence  and  promise  of 
Texan  aggrandizement,  may  be  left  to 
conjecture.  The  assistance  from  the  United 
States,  or  the  friendly  relations  with  her 
administrations,  had  been  sufficient  to  barb 
the  arrows  of  anti-slavery  orators  and  the 
historians,  but  had  not  served  to  make 
Texas  prosperous.  It  is  not  to  be  thrown 
aside  as  an  impossible  notion,  that  Texas 


246  The  Mexican  War 

felt  that  foreign  support  was  her  necessity. 
At  all  events,  Houston  went  through  the 
motions  of  inviting  the  co-operation  of 
France  and  England;  and  Benton  says  he 
had  secured  it. 

If  this  was  all  intended  as  a  bluff  to  startle 
the  American  people,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  it  was  well  played,  and  nations  other 
than  the  United  States  were  led  to  the  be 
lief  that  they  could  at  least  obtain  a  sphere 
of  influence  in  Texas. 

After  the  treaty  of  annexation  was  rejected 
in  the  United  States  Senate,  June,  1844,  Lord 
Aberdeen  proposed  to  pass  a  "diplomatic  act" 
in  which  five  powers  should  be  invited  to  par 
ticipate,  to  wit,  Great  Britain,  France,  the  United 
States,  Texas,  and  Mexico,  to  guarantee  peace 
between  Texas  and  Mexico. 

The  plan  was  cunningly  conceived.  The 
British  Foreign  Office  was  always  well 
posted  on  the  characteristics  of  an  opposed 
diplomacy,  especially  was  it  well  informed 
of  the  peculiar  views  of  the  United  States; 
Great  Britain  had  come  into  too  frequent 
and  violent  contact  with  us  not  to  know. 

The  United  States  would  be  invited  to  be  a 
party  to  this  [diplomatic]  act;  but  it  was  not 


Intervention  and  Annexation  247 

expected  that  they  would  accept  the  invitation.  It 
was  believed  Mexico  would  participate,  but  in 
case  of  her  refusal,  England,  France,  and  Texas 
having  passed  the  act  as  between  themselves, 
Mexico  would  be  immediately  forced  to  abide 
its  terms.  The  act  if  passed  by  only  the  three 
powers  would  not  be  abandoned;  it  would  be 
maintained. 1 

That  the  United  States  would  know  of  this 
diplomatic  act  when  invited  to  join  in  it,  is  a 
matter  of  course;  but  the  attention  of  the 
Senate  was  called  to  it  by  Calhoun,  who 
represented  that  "this  policy  of  Great 
Britain  made  it  necessary  to  annex  Texas  as 
a  measure  of  self-defence." 2  Von  Hoist  with 

1  "On  June  24,  1844,  Aberdeen  told  Ashbel  Smith 
that  England  and  France  would  be  ready,  if  the  treaty 
of  Annexation  failed  (and  it  had  been  already  voted 
down  in  the  Senate  June  8),  to  join  the  United  States 
and  Texas  in  a  diplomatic  act  settling  the  boundaries 
and  guaranteeing  the  independence  of  the  republic,  in 
which  Mexico  should  if  necessary  be  forced  to  acquiesce." 
— Westward  Extension,   George   Pierce  Garrison,   New 
York,  1906,  p.  154,  citing  "Smith  to  Jones,  June  24, 
1844,    in    MSS.  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  Texas, 
file  1714-"     "British  Dipl.,"   Texas  Historical  Series, 
No.    i,    published   by   the    Texas    Historical   Society, 
Galveston,   Tex.,    1876.     Reminiscences    of    the    Texas 
Republic,  Ashbel  Smith,  Dec.    13,   1875. 

2  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Ford  Rhodes, 
New    York,  1900,  vol.  i.,  p.  81,  quoting   Von    Hoist's 
Life  of  Calhoun,  p.  232. 


248  The  Mexican  War 

his  charming  politeness  says  of  this:  "A  lie 
is  a  lie ;  and  Calhoun  knew  that  there  was  not 
one  particle  of  truth  in  these  assertions." 
There  is  always  room  for  differences  of 
opinion:  "that  is  what  makes  horse-races," 
as  they  used  to  say  in  Kentucky;  and  Mr. 
Von  Hoist  has  a  right  to  his  opinion  that 
there  was  no  necessity  of  annexing  Texas  as 
a  measure  of  self-defence.  But  a  comparison 
of  the  officially  accurate  report  of  Lord 
Aberdeen's  action  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  its  notions  of  self-defence  for  the  United 
States  would  indicate  not  merely  that 
Calhoun  also  had  a  right  to  his  opinion 
without  being  charged  in  the  grossest  terms 
with  falsification,  but  that  his  opinion  was 
one  likely  to  be  shared  by  the  vast  majority 
of  the  American  people. 

There  are  other  evidences  that  the 
administration  had  reliable  information  of 
steps  being  taken  by  foreign  nations  which 
would  not  be  in  conformity  with  our  own 
wishes  as  to  foreign  influence  too  near  to 
our  possessions. 

April  25,  1845,  King,  United  States 
Minister  to  Paris,  wrote  to  Buchanan, 
Secretary  of  State:  "  There  is  scarcely  any 
sacrifice  which  England  would  not  make 


Intervention  and  Annexation  249 

to  prevent  Texas  from  coming  into  our 
possession." 1 

The  British  and  French  agents  in  Texas, 
in  conjunction  with  certain  of  the  principal 
officials  of  that  country,  were  making  efforts 
to  produce  dissatisfaction  with  the  terms  of 
annexation  proposed  by  the  American  Gov 
ernment  March  25,  i845.2 

There  was  trouble  brewing  of  wHicE 
Folk's  administration  was  probably  advised, 
but  in  regard  to  which  little  would  be 
said  outside  of  diplomatic  circles  so  long  as 
war  with  Great  Britain  and  Mexico  at  the 
same  time  was  not  coveted.  'Friends  of  the 
United  States  in  Texas  would  have  been 
likely  to  see  to  it  that  the  administration 
knew  confidentially  what  it  was  their  interest 
to  know,  and  of  Texas  that  it  should  be 
known. 

Among  such  friends  was  Ashbel  Smith. 
Born  in  Hartford,  Connecticut,  in  1805,  he 
graduated  from  Yale  in  the  class  of  1824, 
and  from  the  Medical  School  in  1828,  after 
a  course  in  law  study.  He  became  noted  for 
a  medical  practice  in  which  he  gave  his 

»  Life  of  James  Buchanan,  George  Ticknor  Curtis, 
New  York,  1883,  vol.  i.,  p.  585. 
2  Ibid. 


250  The  Mexican  War 

services  free,  and  for  volunteer  work  during 
epidemics  in  different  cities.  He  served  as  a 
volunteer  through  the  Mexican  War,  and  in 
1860  he  raised  a  regiment,  the  26.  Texas, 
and  served  with  the  Confederates. 

Houston  sent  him  abroad  as  Minister 
from  Texas ;  and  under  the  Jones  presidency 
he  continued  to  represent  Texas  at  various 
times,  in  the  United  States,  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Spain.  He  was  at  one  time  the 
Texan  Secretary  of  State,  and  went  as 
Special  Envoy  to  close  up  the  Texan  legations 
in  Europe  after  the  annexation. 

His  testimony  is  full  as  to  what  was  the 
actual  position  of  affairs  relative  to  a  foreign 
protectorate  of  Texas ;  he  says  he  personally 
"saw  Louis  Philippe  and  Monsieur  Guizot 
and  received  the  absolute  assurance  that 
France  would  unite  with  the  British  Cabinet 
in  the  'diplomatic  act'  proposed  by  Aber 
deen."  The  British  Foreign  Office  at  that 
time  "sought  only  peace  with  Texas  and  a 
free  market  for  its  cotton  without  having 
to  climb  over  a  United  States  Tariff."  But 
it  sought  peace  with  a  protectorate. 

There  had  been  other  unpleasant  features 
in  proposed  foreign  intervention. 

It  is  hardly  supposable  that   anti-slavery 


Intervention  and  Annexation  251 

societies  in  the  United  States,  or  Mr.  Adams 
— who  had  been  in  more  or  less  correspon 
dence  with  the  British  and  Foreign  Anti- 
slavery  Society, — were  kept  informed  of 
some  of  its  activities,  as  reported  by  Mr. 
Smith.  That  society, 

having  its  seat  in  London,  .  .  .  entered  with 
strange  eagerness  into  the  cause  of  Mexico,  at 
an  early  period,  against  Texas;  they  promoted 
the  building  and  fitting  out  of  Mexican  war- 
steamers  designed  to  ravage  the  coasts  of 
Texas.  These  war-steamers  were  light-draught 
vessels  built  on  models  furnished  by  the  Admi 
ralty;  carried  each  two  68-pounder  Paixhan 
pivot  guns  besides  lighter  armament;  and  were 
commanded  by  two  distinguished  British  offi 
cers — Captains  Cleveland  and  Charlwood  of  the 
Royal  Navy — by  permission  of  the  Admiralty, 
to  serve  in  the  Mexican  Navy;  manned  by 
British  seamen,  recruited  mostly  in  London 
and  Portsmouth.1 

Should  such  an  exhibition  of  British 
neutrality  seem  incredible  to  any  one,  let 
him  read  in  McCarthy's  History  of  Our 
Own  Times  of  the  building  and  equipment 
and  manning  of  the  Alabama.  The  stories 

1  Texas  Hist.  Series,  No.  i.,  Galveston,  1876;  Remin 
iscences  of  the  Texas  Republic,  Ashbel  Smith,  p.  39. 


252  The  Mexican  War 

are  almost  identical  except  for  change  of 
dates. 

There  was  plenty  of  reason  for  John  C. 
Calhoun — whatever  his  sins  against  the 
republic,  and  he  surely  had  enough  to 
account  for, — there  was  reason  enough  for 
any  citizen,  to  believe  that  the  danger  of  a 
European  government  or  protectorate  of 
Texas,  or  California,  indeed  of  both,  was  so 
great  as  to  make  it  necessary  in  self-defence 
to  undertake  the  protection  of  Texas  our 
selves,  and  not  leave  it  to  another.  At  any 
rate  the  representatives  of  the  people  appear 
to  have  so  believed;  and  the  nation  which 
for  nine  years  had  refused  to  take  Texas 
into  the  Union,  whose  Senate,  April  22,  1844, 
had  voted  by  more  than  a  two- thirds 
majority  not  to  ratify  a  treaty  to  annex 
Texas,  had,  on  May  i,  1846,  learned  so  much 
of  some  new  reason,  Lord  Aberdeen's  ''diplo 
matic  act"  or  something  else,  that  Congress 
passed  a  joint  resolution  to  annex  Texas, 
with  the  boundary  of  the  Rio  Grande  still 
claimed  by  her;  virtually  joining  war  with 
Mexico,  who  had  formally  declared  that  such 
a  resolution  would  be  regarded  as  equivalent 
to  a  declaration  of  war. 

There  had   been   plenty  of  other  provo- 


Intervention  and  Annexation  253 

cations,  motives,  causes  for  war;  and,  with 
a  patience  almost  unparalleled  in  the  history 
of  nations,  the  great  republic  had  forborne 
to  join  issue  of  battle  with  a  weaker  neighbor ; 
had  refused  to  extend  slave  territory;  had 
refused  to  punish  insults  to  the  flag,  seizure 
of  ships,  murder  and  robbery  of  citizens; 
had  refused  to  collect  just  and  long-past-due 
claims  for  spoliations  except  in  court  of 
arbitration;  or  to  do  battle  for  unsurveyed 
boundaries.  But  a  French  and  Mexican 
empire  or  a  British  suzerainty  on  our  im 
mediate  borders  the  United  States  would 
not  have.  Texas  was  made  a  State  of  the 
Union,  Fremont  was  ordered  to  the  Pacific, 
and  the  war  which  had  been  held  back  for 
a  decade,  as  too  inglorious  with  a  weaker 
nation,  was  at  last  offered  unhesitatingly 
to  three. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  WAR  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES 

IT  has  been  very  generally  asserted  by 
historians  that,  all  else  having  failed,  the 
Mexican  War  was  finally  forced  upon  Mexico 
by  the  advance  of  General  Taylor  to  the 
Rio  Grande.  Tyler  asserts  that  "there  was 
no  necessary  connection  at  all  between 
annexation  and  a  war  with  Mexico.  War  f 
was  precipitated  by  Taylor's  advancing  his 
troops  to  the  Rio  Grande  where  the  Mexi 
cans  had  a  few  scattered  settlements."1 
Noll  adds  to  a  similar  assertion:  "  He  sought 
the  opportunity  to  cross  the  Rio  Grande  and 
take  possession  of  Matamoras,"2  although, 
as  events  proved,  the  opportunity  sought 
him,  at  Resaca  de  la  Palma.  Schurz  waxes 

1  Letters   and   Times  of   the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  416. 

2  From  Empire  to  Republic,  Arthur   Howard    Noll, 
Chicago,  1903,  pp.  1 60  and  161. 

254 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    255 

oratorical  and  says:  "  The  country  between 
the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande  had  been 
wildly  claimed  by  the  Texans,  although 
really  looked  upon  as,  at  most,  disputed  terri 
tory.  But  Folk's  administration  assumed 
to  decide  the  boundary  question  by  force." 
"The  eastern  bank"  [of  the  Rio  Grande] 
"was  dotted  with  Mexican  villages  and 
military  posts."  1 

None  of  these  posts  were  in  possession  of 
Mexico2;  not  an  armed  Mexican  had  been 
allowed  to  remain  east  of  the  Rio  Grande 
for  nine  years,  except  for  the  brief  period 
required  to  hunt  him  out;  but  it  is  easy  for 
theorists  to  forget  it. 

Distinction  should  be  made  between  the 
Rio  Grande  to  El  Paso,  and  the  Rio  Grande 

1  The  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  Boston,  1887, 
vol.  ii.,  p.  273. 

2  The    Secretary   of   War,   Mr.   Marcy,   in    ordering 
General  Taylor  to  the  Rio  Grande,  July  30,  1845,  did 
except  from  his  instructions  to  "extend  protection  up 
to  this  boundary,  .  .  .  posts  in  the  actual  possession 
of  Mexican  forces."     But  I  have  seen  no  account  of 
Taylor  having  found  any.    The  inference  from  General 
Grant's  memoirs  is  that  there  were  none    observable 
from  the  line  of  march.    Also  see  speech  of  Hon.  James 
Dixon  of  Connecticut  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
a  brilliant  Whig  attack  on  Polk,  exhibiting  that  Taylor 
was  ordered  to  the  Rio  Grande  by  his  first  orders. 


256  The  Mexican  War 

del  Norte  above  that  village.  The  country 
west  of  the  del  Norte  Texas  could  not  control 
at  that  period,  nor  could  Mexico.  But  that 
does  not  prove  that  Texas  had  not  enforced 
her  possession  between  the  Nueces  and  the 
Rio  Grande. 

' '  July  3  °  [ x  8  4  5  ] ,  General  Taylor  was  ordered 
to  defend  Texas  as  far  as  occupied  by 
Texans."  August  23d  he  was  instructed  that 
if  a  large  Mexican  army  should  cross  the 
Rio  Grande,  and  August  3oth  that  if  there 
were  an  attempt  to  cross  by  a  large  Mexican 
force,  the  President  would  regard  it  as  an 
act  of  war.  Mr.  Schurz  adds  another  scrap 
of  history  by  innuendo:  "  Taylor  began  to 
understand  what  was  required  of  him." 
In  proof  of  which  he  says:  "In  October 
Taylor  asked  more  definite  instructions." * 

Thus  the  question  of  boundary  is  renewed 
in  such  shape  that  it  must  be  met  in  a  new 
point  of  view,  in  connection  with  Taylor's 
occupation  of  the  Nueces  territory  and  his 
advance.  Schurz  continues  : 

Texas  never  succeeded  in  establishing  her 
claim  to  territory  west  of  the  Nueces,  although 
she  had  tried  to  seize  Santa  Fe\  and  had  failed 

1  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz,  Boston,  1887,  vol. 
ii. ,  pp.  274  and  275. 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    257 

lamentably.  It  is  as  certain  as  anything  can 
be  that  the  Texan  boundary  line  never  had 
been,  and  was  not  at  the  time  of  the  annexation, 
the  Rio  Grande. 1 

Orators  of  presidential  campaigns  have 
been  proverbially  surest  of  doubtful  points; 
but  that  is  not  good  form  in  the  historian. 
Kendall  tells  truly  what  was  the  expedition 
to  Santa  Fe — which  made  no  attempt  at 
seizure.2 

And  Santa  Fe  had  about  as  much  to  do 
with  the  dispute  concerning  the  boundary 
west  of  the  Nueces  as  St.  Louis  did.  Santa 
Fe,  in  what  is  now  New  Mexico,  is  on  the 
east  of  the  Rio  Grande  del  Norte  near  the 
springs  of  the  Rio  Pecos  and  of  the  Canadian 
branch  of  the  Arkansas;  and  the  failure  of 
Texas  to  occupy  it  was  easily  understood 
when  the  United  States  was  later  com 
pelled  to  build  a  dozen  forts  from  Fort 
Fillmore  to  Forts  Union  and  Defiance,  to 
protect  that  country  from  the  Indians. 
Santa  Fe  is  about  noo  miles  up  river  from 
Taylor's  point  of  contact  with  Mexican 

1  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  vol.  ii.,  p.  178. 

2  Very  likely  because  it  was  not  strong  enough,  after 
the  Indians  had  well-nigh  destroyed  it. 

17 


258  The  Mexican  War 

forces  at  Palo  Alto,  and  not  far  from  900  miles 
to  the  north  of  the  northernmost  sources 
of  the  Nueces. 

It  is  true,  as  Garrison  says,  that  "  Texas 
had  failed  to  establish  its  jurisdiction  over 
such  Mexican  settlements  as  lay  along  that 
river  on  its  hither  side."  So  it  is  true 
that  neither  had  Mexico  established  her 
jurisdiction  there,  or,  it  may  be  said,  any 
where  else,  so  far  as  exercising  any  govern 
ment  was  concerned. 1 

In  much  the  same  sense  it  is  true  that 
there  are  tracts  in  the  Adirondacks  and  in 
the  Katahdin  region  over  which  New  York 
and  Maine,  or  the  United  States,  have  even 
hitherto  ''failed  to  establish  their  juris 
diction."  But  of  the  tract  below  El  Paso, 
between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande, 
although  the  Texans  had  not  interfered 
with  the  few  miserable  Mexican  settlers — 
* '  many  of  them  hiding  under  ground  for  fear 
of  the  Indians,"  as  General  Grant  tells  us— 
it  was  within  the  military  jurisdiction  of 
Texas;  and  had  been  so  since  San  Jacinto. 

When  Tyler,  as  he  submitted  in  his  Texas 
treaty  message,  "  left  open  the  question  of 

»  Unless  possibly  in  enforcing  some  taxes  or  church 
tithes  when  the  Texans  did  not  happen  to  be  looking. 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    259 

boundary  purposely  for  negotiation  with 
Mexico,"  Schouler  says:  ''This  meant  that 
he  adopted  the  fraud  of  the  Texas  revolu 
tionists  in  voting  to  themselves  the  whole 
domain  of  Mexico  to  the  Rio  Grande,  whereas 
the  original  and  uniform  southwestern  boun 
dary  of  the  Texas  province  was  admitted  to 
be  the  river  Nueces."  *  In  this  short  sentence 
there  are  three  unwarrantable  assumptions 
in  the  three  words  "fraud,"  "revolutionists,  " 
and  "voting,"  the  latter  ignoring  the  Velasco 
treaty,  and  nine  years'  occupation,  as  it  is 
extremely  convenient  for  Mr.  Schouler's 
school  of  objectionists  to  do.  But  he  quotes 
Austin  as  his  authority  for  his  theory  of 
boundary,  and  Austin,  when  correctly  quoted, 
is  an  accurate  witness.  Mr.  Schouler  of 
course  intended  to  quote  correctly,  but 
apparently  was  misled  by  some  publishers1 
date.  For  his  authority  he  adds  a  note :  "  See 
Austin's  map  of  Texas  published  in  1837." 
Now,  if  Austin  had  made  a  map  in  1837 
which  set  the  boundary  of  Texas  on  the 
Nueces,  it  would  mean  that  he  acknowl 
edged  the  invalidity  of  the  peace  of  Velasco 
and  the  boundary  therein  mentioned.  If 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  James  Schouler,  Bos 
ton,  1889,  vol.  iv.,  p.  519. 


260  The  Mexican  War 

he  made  it  prior  to  May  14,  1836,  he  would 
at  any  later  date  have  said  of  his  map,  as 
Napoleon  said  of  an  old  map  of  Europe, 
"But  we  have  changed  all  that."  In  the 
"List  of  American  Maps  in  the  Library  of 
Congress,  P.  Lee  Phillips,  F.  R.  G.  S.,  Chief 
of  the  Division  of  Maps  and  Charts,  Wash 
ington,  1901,"  there  is  no  mention  of  any 
map  of  Austin's  published  in  1837.  Prob 
ably  a  date  of  republication,  or  of  a  second 
edition,  may  have  been  given  to  the  copy 
Mr.  Schouler  consulted,  which  it  would  seem 
probable  must  have  been  a  copy  of  that 
indexed  in  the  Congressional  Library  as  a 
"Map  of  Texas  with  parts  of  adjoining 
states,  Compiled  by  Stephen  F.  Austin,  en 
graved  by  John  &  Wm.  W.  Warr,  Philadel 
phia,  30  X24J,  Philadelphia,  H.S.  Tanner,  1836. 
Note:  Copyrighted  183$  by  H.  S.  Tanner." 

Unless  Austin  hastened  to  get  out  a 
fresh  map  to  emphasize  the  old  original 
boundary  (for  Schouler  is  right  as  to  the 
boundary  of  Mexican  provinces)  and  to  set 
himself  down  in  record  evidence  as  agreeing 
that  it  was  "uniform"  after  a  splendid 
campaign  had  removed  it,  the  Austin  map 
cannot  be  said  to  show  what  was  the  Texan 
boundary  in  1837  or  1846. 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    261 

So  far  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Rio 
Grande  being  "dotted  with  military  posts," 
all  the  Mexican  military  posts,  important 
enough  to  be  indicated  on  a  map,  in  that 
section  or  near  it,  were  Manclova,  Santa 
Rosa,  San  Fernando,  and  Rio  Grande,  pro 
tecting  the  Mexican  frontier;  and  they  were 
all  four  located  in  the  hill  country  well  to  the 
westward  or  Mexican  side  of  the  Rio  Grande ; 
while  the  tract  lying  between  that  river 
and  the  Nueces,  instead  of  being  "dotted 
with  Mexican  villages,"  has  a  legend  printed 
across  it  in  Austin's  map  of  1835:  "Droves 
of  Wild  Horses"1;  also  across  Coahuila  and 
Tamaulipas,  neighboring  Mexican  provinces, 
is  printed  "Droves  of  Wild  Horses." 

"The  territory  claimed  by  Texas  was 
bounded  west  by  the  river  Bravo  del  Norte 
[Rio  Grande]."2 

But  questions  of  boundary  between  Texas 
and  Mexico  are  futile.  They  had  already 
been  determined,  so  far  as  the  right  of 

1  North  Mexican  States  and   Texas,    Hubert  Howe 
Bancroft,  San  Francisco,  1882-90,  vol.  ri.,  p.  79. 

History  of  Texas,  David  B.  Edward,  with  map, 
Cincinnati,  1836,  Hartford,  1837. 

2  History  of    South  America   and    Mexico,  John    M. 
Niles,  Hartford,  1838,  vol.  i.,  p.  213. 


262  The  Mexican  War 

American  officials  to  question  them  was 
concerned,  by  the  admission  of  Texas  with 
the  expressed  claim  of  the  boundary  of  the 
Rio  Grande.  Furthermore  the  so-called 
disputed  territory  was  now  a  tax  district 
of  the  United  States  by  act  of  Congress. i 
Neither  Polk  nor  Taylor  was  in  a  position 
to  dispute  its  nationality.  A  tax  collector 
for  it  had  been  appointed  and  his  appoint 
ment  confirmed  by  the  Senate.  If  Tyler  was 
at  fault  in  the  matter  as  chief  executive,  it 
was  for  leaving  the  question  of  boundary 
open  for  negotiation  at  all;  although  the 
resolution  by  which  Texas  was  annexed 
was  conditioned  on  ' '  the  adjustment  by  this 
government  of  all  questions  of  boundary 
that  may  arise  with  other  governments."2 
As  soon  as  annexation  was  accomplished, 
indeed  as  soon  as  Congress  had  passed  the 
resolution  proposing  to  Texas  terms  of 
annexation,  the  two  nations  were  in  a  state 
of  war  by  virtue  of  the  Mexican  declaration 
through  Bocanegra.  It  was  the  duty  of  an 
executive  to  protect  at  once  that  territory 
and  its  inhabitants  whether  in  Texan  settle- 

1  Act,  December  i,  1845. 

2  28th  Congress,  ad  session,  House  Journal,  p.  260. 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    263 

ments  or  Mexican.  He  had  no  option.  And 
since  Mexico  had  declared  that  annexation 
would  be  regarded  as  a  declaration  of  war, 
there  would  have  been  no  breach  of  inter 
national  etiquette  had  an  expedition  been 
launched  at  once  against  the  Mexican  cap 
ital  itself. 

Yet  in  the  hope  of  peace  Slidell  was  sent 
on  his  special  mission,  and  Taylor  was 
only  given  instructions  "to  occupy  the 
disputed  territory  to  the  same  extent  for 
defence  and  protection  that  the  Texans  had 
occupied  it."  But  the  Paredes  government 
sent  back  Slidell;  the  Mexican  minister 
had  long  ago  demanded  his  passports;  the 
American  delegation  in  Mexico  was  notified 
that  Mexico  closed  all  relations  with  the 
United  States;  this  was  formally  made 
known  to  the  other  foreign  representations; 
proclamations  summoned  the  Mexican  people 
to  take  up  arms;  and  a  thousand  regulars 
of  the  Mexican  army  were  ordered  to  the 
frontier  of  Texas.  Nevertheless  Taylor 
was  held  in  check.  The  instructions  stood 
(October  16,  1845,  Secretary  of  War  William 
L.  Marcy  to  General  Zachary  Taylor) : 
"Probably  no  serious  attempt  will  be  made 
by  Mexico  to  invade  Texas  although  she 


264  The  Mexican  War 

continues  to  threaten  incursions. "  Mexico 
had  warred  with  Houston  by  proclamations 
for  so  many  years  as  to  have  established  a 
character  for  waging  that  sort  of  hostilities. 

Meantime  Fremont's  little  company  of 
engineers  made  safe  the  American  settlers 
on  the  Pacific — or  with  the  naval  squadron 
at  hand  virtually  had  them  under  protection. 
When  Slidell  was  definitely  sent  home  August 
i,  1846,  General  S.  W.  Kearney,  pushing 
into  New  Mexico,  took  possession  of  its 
capital,  August  i8th.  The  manner  of  his  oc 
cupation  is  too  illustrative  of  why  American 
institutions  take  root  and  grow  where 
Spanish  domination  withers,  not  to  demand 
space  for  the  telling.  September  26th 
(within  forty  days)  he  proclaimed  an  organic 
law  and  general  code,  compiled  by  Colonel  A. 
W.  Doniphan,  ist  Missouri  Mounted  Volun 
teers,  and  private  Willard  P.  Hull  of  his  regi 
ment;  part  Mexican  laws  with  modifications 
made  necessary  by  the  United  States  Constitu 
tion  ;  part  laws  of  Missouri  territory ;  part  laws 
of  Texas,  or  Texas  and  Coahuila;  part  from 
Missouri  statutes;  and  part  from  the  Liv 
ingston  code. 

The  chances  for  a  war  by  paper  proclama 
tions  only  on  the  part  of  Mexico,  diminished. 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    265 

On  receiving  news  of  the  treaty  [of  annexa 
tion]  Santa  Anna  made  preparations  for  a 
vigorous  and  extensive  invasion  of  Texas. 
Adrian  Woll,  the  commander  at  Mier  on  the 
Rio  Grande,  issued  an  order  that  "any  person 
without  discrimination  of  sex  or  nationality 
who  should  be  found  within  one  league  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  river  should  be  shot  as  a  traitor 
on  a  summary  court-martial."1 

It  was  fully  time  for  the  United  States  to 
protect  the  inhabitants  of  its  territory,  or 
of  a  disputed  territory,  or  an  enemy's  terri 
tory.  Even  a  river  bank  ''dotted  with 
Mexican  villages,"  as  Schurz  says  it  was, 
would  be  entitled  to  protection  from  Mexican 
clemency  as  administered  by  Santa  Anna 
and  Adrian  Woll,  if  within  reach  of  civilized 
soldiers. 

And  the  only  feasible  way  of  extending 
that  protection  was  by  advancing  a  little 
army  like  Taylor's  to  a  position  where  his 
skirmishers,  reinforced  by  gunboats,  could 
have  a  great  river  in  their  front. 

When  the  last  hope  of  the  success  of 
Slidell's  mission  expired  (and  he  was  not 
even  permitted  to  submit  his  credentials  to 

1  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Lyon  Gardiner 
Tyler,  Richmond,  1885,  vol.  ii.,  p.  334. 


266  The  Mexican  War 

Paredes1),  August  i,  1846,  Taylor  was  again 
ordered  to  the  boundary.  As  commander 
of  a  department,  he  would  have  been  justified 
in  taking  the  responsibility  of  this  advance 
without  waiting  for  instructions,  or  even  in 
disobedience  of  them,  when  Woll  issued  his 
manifesto;  it  was  so  obvious  that  he  could 
not  perform  the  main  duty  assigned  to  him 
with  a  base  at  Corpus  Christi.  Besides  need 
ing  better  sanitation  for  his  command,2 
Taylor  found  the  port  of  Corpus  Christi 
otherwise  impracticable  as  a  base.  To  begin 
with,  a  look  at  the  map  of  Texas  is  enough 
to  show  it  to  be  evidently  unsafe  from 
the  point  of  view  of  naval  strategy.  With 
the  exception  of  about  fifty  miles  in  all,  the 
coast  of  Texas  is  screened  by  islands.  From 
the  western  end  of  the  Laguna  del  Madre 
stretching  eastward  a  hundred  miles  with  its 
estuaries  (the  Salt  Lagoon,  Nueces  Bay,  and 
Corpus  Christi  Bay),  the  bays  of  Aranzas, 
St.  Charles,  Espiritu  Santo,  Matagorda, 

1  Probably  by  the  influence  of  the  British  minister. 
See  Westward  Extension,  George  Pierce  Garrison,  New 
York,  1906,  p.  225. 

2  "You  will  occupy  on  or  near  the  Rio  Grande  del 
Norte    such    a  site  as  will  consist  with  the  health  of 
your  troops." — Bancroft,  Assistant  Secretary  of   War, 
to  Taylor,  June  15,  1845. 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    267 

Galveston,  and  its  flanking  West  Bay  and 
East  Bay,  and  Sabine  Lake  and  Pass,  are 
screened  by  outlying  beaches  or  islands  in 
such  manner  as  to  afford  perfect  shelter 
and  hiding  for  hostile  or  pirate  craft,  of  light 
draught  and  swift,  such  as  were  constructed 
for  Mexican  use  by  the  British  Anti- Slavery 
Society,  capable  of  destroying  transports 
or,  in  numbers  and  issuing  from  tortuous 
and  shallow  inlets,  capable  of  attacking 
unexpectedly  and  overpowering  ships-of- 
war. 

There  was  no  port  safe,  no  water  fit  for 
manoeuvring  a  fleet,  short  of  Brazos  Santiago 
and  Point  Isabel. 

The  landing  at  Corpus  Christi  was  eighteen 
miles  up  a  shallow  channel  and  the  outer 
channel  was  impassable  for  vessels  draw 
ing  over  three  feet  of  water. 1  "  When  near 
Matamoras  General  Taylor  with  the  cavalry 
went  forward  to  Point  Isabel  to  meet  the 
transports  which  were  expected  to  arrive 
with  troops  and  stores.  Finding  these  already 
in  harbor  he  immediately  established  Point 
Isabel  as  a  depot  of  supplies." 

Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma  were 

1  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,  New  York,  18^5, 
vol.  i.,  p.  39. 


268  The  Mexican  War 

battles  fought  to  repel  attempts  to  cut  him 
off  from  this  base. * 

"He  was  to  hold  Point  Isabel  and  maintain 
the  use  of  the  Rio  Grande  for  navigation."  2 
"Ships  of  war  were  to  cover  the  base  at 
Point  Isabel."3 

To  secure  a  practicable  base  was  Taylor's 
object  in  selecting  his  position  on  the  Rio 
Grande,  and  not,  as  has  been  frequently 
asserted,  an  attack  on  Matamoras,  which 
was  relatively  of  no  importance,  although 
he  did  in  one  of  his  despatches  inform  the 
Secretary  of  War  that  Matamoras  was 
within  range  of  his  guns.  The  attacks  on 
his  communications  Taylor  promptly  re 
pulsed  and  punished  at  Palo  Alto  and 
Resaca  de  la  Palma;  and  Polk  in  his  message 
to  Congress  very  truthfully  and  properly 
described  the  ambuscade  and  destruction  of 
a  small  body  of  Taylor's  dragoons  by  a  su 
perior  Mexican  force — which  was  the  open 
ing  of  those  battles,  and  occurred  in  a  tax 
district  of  the  United  States — as  "the 
shedding  of  American  blood  on  American 

1  History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Horatio  O.  Ladd, 
New  York,  1883,  p.  42. 

2  Ibid.,  p.   38. 

3  The  History  of  the  Mexican  War,  General  Cadmus 
M.  Wilcox,  Washington,  1892,  p.  32. 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    269 

soil";  and  deserved  nothing  of  the  obloquy 
thrown  upon  him  for  "an  untruthful  and 
frantic  war  message,"  a  message  which  was 
approved  by  the  House  of  Representatives 
by  a  vote  of  174  to  14  and  by  the  Senate 
40  to  2.1 

The  war  once  begun  was  rapidly,  skilfully, 
and  bravely  fought  to  a  finish  against  enor 
mous  odds  in  numbers;  against  Mexican 
regulars;  against  great  natural  obstacles; 
in  the  enemy's  territory.  From  a  purely 
military  point  of  view  it  has  not  been  often 
disputed  that  the  Mexican  War  was  a  glorious 
triumph  of  American  soldiership  and  leader 
ship.  There  is  no  occasion  for  a  review  of  the 
reports  of  it.  The  full  story  of  its  campaigns 
is  recorded  ably  and  satisfactorily  by  General 
Wilcox,  General  Scott,  Documents  of  24th 
to  3oth  Congresses,  Professor  Garrison,  and 
the  complete  bibliography  in  his  Westward 
Extension. 

So  far  from  this  war  having  been  an 
incentive  to,  or  in  any  way  bringing  on,  the 
later  desperate  war  with  the  Confederacy 

*  The  vote  in  the  House  was  1 74  to  14  on  the  resolution 
proclaiming  war.  But  65  had  voted  for  an  amendment 
refusing  an  indorsement  of  Folk's  reasons  given  in 
his  message. — Speech  of  Hon.  James  Dixon,  House  jf 
Representatives,  Jan.  24,  1848. 


270  The  Mexican  War 

of  the  Southern  States,  the  intimate  knowl 
edge  it  gave  to  the  officers  of  each  other 
and  of  the  troops  from  the  two  sections 
of  the  country  which  they  led  in  Mexico  did 
much,  though  unavailingly,  to  avert  the 
later  strife,  and  to  advise  each  section  of  the 
other's  resources.  And  through  the  four 
years  of  battle  for  the  nation's  life,  the 
brotherhood  and  respect,  amounting  in  many 
cases  to  almost  reverence,  maintained  by  and 
between  the  leaders  who  inevitably  rose  from 
their  lieutenancies  and  captaincies  in  Mexico 
to  the  command  of  corps  and  armies  and 
departments  in  the  war  for  the  Union, 
became,  especially  among  the  West  Point 
graduates,  the  greatest  of  all  the  forces  which 
held  enraged  sections  to  amenities  of  civilized 
war  and  unexampled  forbearance  on  either 
side  at  its  close ;  on  the  one  side  a  forbearance 
from  punishment  or  requirement  of  indem 
nity  ;  on  the  other  a  refraining  from  guerilla 
fighting  and  an  honorable  respect  of  parole. 
It  was  the  Mexican  War,  as  an  early  school 
of  American  soldiership,  which  has  its  fruition 
idealized  in  such  a  picture  as  Mrs.  Longstreet 
paints  of  Grant  with  his  hand  on  Long- 
street's  shoulder  at  Appomattox,  saying, 
'  *  Well,  Old  Pete,  how  about  a  game  of  poker  ? " 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    271 

One  must  look  deeper  than  to  the  rude 
familiarity  this  might  suggest  to  an  outsider. 
In  a  moment  the  broken-hearted  Lieutenant- 
General  of  the  Confederacy  was  a  boy  once 
more,  the  interval  of  years  and  hostility  was 
bridged,  victor  and  vanquished  were  once 
again  in  the  palaces  of  the  Montezumas, 
comrades,  no  longer  foes,  nor  under  restraint 
of  official  etiquette. 

From  Cerro  Gordo  to  Churubusco  covered 
the  time  only  from  April  18  to  August  20, 
1847;  and  Mexico  was  prostrate  before 
the  power  of  the  United  States.  Unwilling 
to  further  impoverish  and  wound  a  con 
quered  adversary,  General  Winfield  Scott 
himself  proposed  an  armistice;  and  Nicholas 
P.  Trist,  who  had  been  present  with  the  army 
from  its  first  advance — so  great  had  been 
Folk's  desire  to  save  the  Mexicans  from 
the  consequences  of  the  corruption  and 
folly  of  their  officials, — was  sent  as  a  com 
missioner  to  treat  with  Mexico  for  terms  of 
peace. 1 

It  is  of  no  profit  to  review  the  proposals 

1  Life  of  James  Buchanan,  George  Ticknor  Curtis, 
New  York,  1883,  vol.  i.,  p.  601. 

Westward  Extension,  George  Pierce  Garrison,  New 
York,  1906,  p.  248,  citing  Senate  Documents,  3oth 
Congress,  vii.,  No.  52,  pp.  85-89. 


272  The  Mexican  War 

and  counter-proposals,  the  gist  of  the  mat 
ter  being  that  there  was  no  conclusion 
reached;  and  General  Scott,  learning  that 
Santa  Anna  with  his  habitual  treachery 
was  making  use  of  the  interval  of  armistice 
to  strengthen  his  fortifications,  terminated  it 
September  yth. 

September  i3th,  Chapul tepee  was  taken  by 
storm,  and  September  i4th,  the  City  of  Mex 
ico  was  captured  by  assault.  Texas  and  Cali 
fornia  and  the  intervening  territory  were 
taken  into  the  United  States,  and  twenty 
millions  of  dollars  paid  to  Mexico,  less  three 
millions  of  claims  the  payment  of  which 
was  assumed  and  made  by  the  United  States ; 
the  war  thus  ending  with  the  treaty  of 
Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  February  2,  1848.  The 
Texan  claim  of  a  boundary  on  the  Rio 
Grande  was  maintained. 1 

On  this  Dr.  Brady  indignantly  and  most 

»  Treaties  and  Conventions  of  the  United  States  with 
other  Powers,  p.  682. 

Mr.  Henry  M.  Morfitt  was  American  Agent  in  Texas. 
He  writes  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  August  27,  1836: 
"The  Rio  Grande  was  made  the  western  line  by  impli 
cation,  as  Article  III.  of  the  agreement  stipulates  that 
the  Mexican  troops  should  evacuate  the  territory  of 
Texas,  passing  to  the  other  side  of  the  Rio  Grande  del 
Norte "  (British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  London, 
1853,  vol.  xxv.,  p.  1365). 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    273 

unjustifiably  comments:  ''In  an  attempt 
to  justify  a  high-handed  proceeding  and 
change  a  theft  into  a  forced  sale,  he  [Nicholas 
P.  Trist,  United  States  Commissioner]  was 
authorized  to  offer  a  sum  not  exceeding 
twenty  millions  of  dollars."1  Dr.  Brady's 
language  is,  from  any  point  of  view,  amus 
ingly  ill-chosen;  there  is  nothing  furtive  or 
concealed,  or  of  the  nature  of  theft,  in  a 
high-handed  proceeding;  and  a  victor's 
treatment  of  the  vanquished  and  prostrate 
is  necessarily  high-handed,  if  it  is  only  to 
lift  up  the  fallen. 

Indeed,  Dr.  Brady  virtually  retracts  his 
accusation : 

Inasmuch  as  we  had  the  power  to  impose  our 
own  terms  upon  Mexico,  which  was  completely 
prostrate  and  absolutely  helpless,  there  is  a 
certain  amount  of  magnanimity  in  our  volun 
teering  the  sum  of  money  in  payment  for 
territory  we  had  taken,  and  for  which  we  need 
not  have  paid  a  cent. 2 

In  fact  not  only  California,  New  Mexico, 
and  Texas — sections  of  territory  which 
Mexico  had  exhibited  her  total  incapacity 

1  Conquest  of  the  Southwest,  Cyrus  Townsend  Brady, 
New  York,  1905,  p.  230. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  246. 

18 


274  The  Mexican  War 

to  govern — were  in  possession  of  the  United 
States  at  the  close  of  the  war;  but  her  capital, 
and  every  post  capable  of  being  made  a 
strategic  base,  she  had  lost  beyond  hope  of 
recovery,  unless,  possibly,  Oaxaca  under 
Juarez  should  be  excepted.  Commodores 
Stockton,  Shubrick,  and  Biddle  held  every 
Mexican  port,  and  were  in  mastery  of  her 
whole  coast.  Every  foot  of  her  soil  or  waters 
that  Mexico  holds  to-day  was  a  free  gift  from 
the  United  States.  And  so  broken  and 
dissolved  were  her  institutions  of  govern 
ment  in  1848 — if  she  may,  strictly  speaking, 
be  said  to  have  ever  had  any, — so  irretrieva 
bly  ruined  were  her  finances,  and  instru 
mentalities  for  collecting  any,  that  it  was 
necessary  to  put  a  provisional  government 
temporarily  and  immediately  in  funds  for 
Mexico's  housekeeping,  or  be  responsible 
for  utter  riot  and  anarchy  in  the  districts 
given  back  to  her.  Furthermore,  as  the 
imperfect  government  of  Mexico  had  long 
exhibited  an  entire  lack  of  capacity  to  provide 
a  decent  administration  (certainly  for  regions 
so  far  remote  from  its  capital  as  were  Cali 
fornia,  Colorado,  and  Texas),  to  have  left 
them  in  the  possession  of  Mexico — and 
Mexico  bankrupt — would  not  only  have  been 


The  War  and  Its  Consequences    275 

inhumane  to  the  inhabitants  of  those  regions 
and  their  neighbors,  but  would  have  been 
to  invite  their  cession  to  foreign  powers 
for  necessary  loans;  indeed,  with  Mexico 
indebted  in  the  sum  of  £10,000,000  to 
Great  Britain,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
United  States  took  the  mortgaged  pro 
vinces  from  Great  Britain  rather  than  from 
Mexico. 

Three  times  in  her  history  has  the  United 
States  made  Mexico  a  present  of  herself— 
yes,  four:  Once  when  volunteers  from  the 
United  States  helped  her  throw  off  the  yoke 
of  Spain,  and  prompt  recognition  of  her 
attempted  republic  discouraged  Spanish  re- 
subjugation;  again  when  she  was  set  up  in 
business  by  the  reverse  of  a  demand  for 
indemnity  in  the  peace  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo ; 
again  when  at  her  own  peril  the  United  States 
from  1857  to  1861  held  Mexico  under  a  vir 
tual  protectorate  against  half  of  Europe1; 
and  yet  again  when  Sheridan  massed  a 
matchless  army  of  veterans  on  the  Rio 

1  "  During  the  whole  of  Buchanan's  administration 
our  relations  with  Mexico  were  in  a  complicated  and 
critical  position,  in  consequence  of  the  internal  con 
dition  of  that  country  and  of  the  danger  of  interference 
of  foreign  powers." — Life  of  James  Buchanan,  George 
Ticknor  Curtis,  New  York,  1883,  vol.  ii.,  p.  215. 


276  The  Mexican  War 

Grande,  and  restored  Mexico  to  herself, 
free  from  the  grip  of  France  and  Maximilian. 

This  review  will  have  failed  of  its  purpose 
if  it  shall  not  have  prompted  the  investi 
gation  of  some  future  historian,  and  the 
questioning  of  some  honest  American  boys, 
whether  the  treatment  of  the  people  of 
Mexico  by  the  United  States  (for  it  is  always 
witri  peoples  and  not  with  their  despotic 
rulers  that  the  people  of  the  United  States 
affiliate)  has  not  been  marked  and  exceptional 
in  the  record  of  nations,  for  friendliness  and 
forbearance  to  a  weaker  power. 

Nor  will  this  review  have  attained  its 
end  unless  some  warning  be  served  upon  dis 
tinguished  writers — especially  such  authors 
as  the  labors  of  professorships  hamper  in 
the  labor  of  independent  historical  investi 
gation — not  to  be  blinded  by  the  glamour  of 
great  names  and  the  opinions  of  great  and 
noble  men,  and  not  to  follow  the  multi 
tude  into  the  error  of  construing  facts  into 
conformity  with  somebody's  preconceived 
theory. 


INDEX 


277 


INDEX 

Abbot,  G.  D.,  Mexico  and  U.  S.  cited,  73,  244 
Aberdeen,  Lord,  proposal  for  Texan  protectorate,  246, 

247 

Adams,  Pres.  J.  Q.,  bias  on  Mexican  War,  i;  cited,  45; 
attempts  to  purchase  Texas,  86-7 ;  on  attempts  to 
bring  on  war,  144;  denied,  145;  characterized,  169— 
70;  Diary  not  authority  for  censures,   171;  as  to 
foreign  designs  on  Texas,  242 
Agua  Dolce,  butchery  at,  188-9 
Aguayo,  Marquis  de,  rule  in  Mexico,  93,  94 
Alamo,  the,  defence  of ,  114-18;  "  Remember,"   117,153 

Amijo, ,  hideous  savagery,  91 ;  cruelty,  179 

Anti-Slavery  Society,  British  and  Foreign,  aid  to  Mex 
ico  against  Texas,  251 
Archer,  B.  T.,  59 

Arizpe,  Ramon,  and  Mexican  constitution  of  1824,  64 
Armijo,  see  Amijo 
Austin,  Moses,  career,  61-2 

Austin,  S.  F.,  sides  with  Mexico,  54;  career,  62  /"/.; 
drafts  constitution  of  1824,  64,  90  ;  on  Indian 
ravages,  95,  96-7;  works  for  separate  government 
for  Texas,  is  imprisoned,  101;  raises  revolt,  103-4; 
military  acts,  106;  commissioner  to  U.  S.,  106; 
great  speech  at  Nashville  cited,  42,  62,  65,  70,  95, 
96-7,  ni;  Texan  Secretary  of  State,  128;  map  of 
Texas,  259-60 

Bacon,  Leonard,  denounces  missionaries  taking  slaves 
with  them,  73 

279 


280  Index 

Bancroft,  George,  favors  Texas  annexation,  sends  Tay 
lor  to  Rio  Grande,  14;  authority  for  Folk's  policy, 
210;  orders  to  Taylor,  266 

Bancroft,  H.H.,  Hist.  Pacific  States  cited,  44, 63,  215-16; 
N.  Mex.  States  and  Texas  cited,  261 

Barbe~-Marbois,  F.  de,  on  Louisiana  Purchase,  224 

Barradas,  Isidro,  expedition  against  Mexico,  80 

Bennett,  Major,  treatment  by  Mexicans,  181 

Benton,  T.  H.,  on  J.  M.  Niles,  25;  deprecates  "manifest 
destiny,"  34;  Thirty  Years'  View  cited,  147,  154, 
233, 243-4, 246 

Bocanegra, ,  Mexican  minister,  203,  205 

Boundary  doctrines,  215  ff. 

Bowie,  James,  early  career,  57;  at  Mission  Concepcion, 
106;  wins  the  "grass  fight,"  107;  killed  at  the 
Alamo,  117 

Brady,  C.  T.,  bias  on  Mexican  War,  i;  Conquest  of 
Southwest  cited,  31,  40,  43,  55,  62,  195,  196, 
206,  208,  209,  210  (on  Polk);  True  Andrew  Jack 
son  cited,  241  (on  Louisiana),  273  (on  terms  of 
peace) 

Buchanan,  Pres.  James,  as  diplomatist,  168-9;  instruc 
tions  to  Slidell,  227;  to  Fr6mont,  233 

Burleson,  Edward,  succeeds  Austin,  107;  captures  San 
Antonio,  108;  succeeded  by  Houston,  114 

Burnet,  D.  G.,  59 

Burton,  I.  W.,  and  his  "horse  marines,"  128 

Bustamante,  Anastasio,  Niles  on  his  dictatorship,  27; 
set  up  by  Santa  Anna,  82,  99;  cruelties  and  depo 
sition,  82-3;  oppresses  Texas,  99 

Butler,  William,  Mexico  in  Transition  cited,  73,  233-4 

Calhoun,  J.  C.,  on  J.  M.  Niles,  24;  on  foreign  protec 
torate  of  Texas,  248 

California,  assumed  intrigues  to  obtain,  226  ff.  ;  Fr6- 
mont's  expedition  to,  232-4 


Index  281 

Calleja,  P.  del  R.,  cruelties,  78-9 

Canada,  good  U.  S.  relations  with,  39 

Castrillo,  General,  intercedes  for  prisoners,  115—16 

Chambers,  T.  J.,  59 

Channing,  Edward,  on  Louisiana  Purchase,  224 

Chapultepec  monument,  16 

Charles  V.,  Emperor,  reform  decree  of  1542,  75 

Clay,  Henry,  instructions  to  purchase  Texas,  86-8;  on 
decadence  of  slavery,  151 

Coahuila,  Texas  joined  to,  97;  anarchy  in,  101 

Connecticut  favors  Texan  recognition,  136 

Corpus  Christi,  defects  as  a  base,  266-7 

Cos,  -  — ,  Santa  Anna's  lieutenant,  101;  attempts 
treachery,  103;  marches  on  Bexar,  104;  at  San 
Antonio,  106;  captured  by  Burleson,  108;  generous 
terms  to,  108-9;  breaks  parole  and  takes  field,  122 

Crockett,  David,  early  career,  5  7 ;  killed  at  the  Alamo,  117 

Cuba,  reasons  for  recognizing,  weaker  than  for  Texas, 
I36ff-,  I59~I63 

Curtis,  G.  T.,  Life  of  Buchanan  cited,  169,  211,  249,  271 

Gushing,  Caleb,  mention,  14 

Dickins,  Asbury,  chief  clerk  State  Dept.,  193,  194 
Dixon,  James,  cited,  269 

Edward,  D.  B.,  Hist.  Texas  cited,  261 

Edwards,  Hayden,  54 

Ellis,  Powhatan,  action  as  charge  d'affaires  on  Mexico, 
167,  171-2,  189  ff.,  194,  i99 

Elson,  H.  W.,  Hist.  U.  S.  cited,  44,  167  (on  Mexican 
claims),  196  (on  Games'  "invasion"),  206,  210  (on 
Polk) 

England,  international  results  of  constitutionalism,  35; 
wars  compared  with  U.  S.,  40 ;  designs  on  California, 
234;  on  Texas,  237  ff.;  on  Sandwich  Islands,  239; 
on  Oregon,  239;  on  Louisiana  Purchase,  240-1 ;  con 
duct  as  to  Venezuela,  240;  mortgage  on  Mexico,  275 


282  Index 

Fannin,  J.  W.,  at  Mission  Concepcion,  106;  evacuates 

Goliad,  1 1 8;  butchery  of  forces,  119 

Filisola,  Gen., ,  accepts  Texan  treaty,  126 

Fiske,  John,  on  purchase  of  Indian  lands,  37 

Forsyth,  John,  Sec.  State,  diplomatic  conduct,  190-2, 

194-5,  199 

France,  part  in  proposed  protectorate  of  Texas,  250 
"Fredonian  War,"  54 
Fremont,  J.  C.,  expedition  to  California,  230-232  #., 

264;  personal  results,  235 

Gaines,  Gen.  E.  P.,  "invasion"  of  Mexico,  47,  194  jf. 

Galvez,  Jose  de,  beneficent  administration,  76 

Garrison,  G.  P.,  on  S.  F.  Austin,  63;  Southwestward 
Extension  cited,  126,  155,  161,  191,  198,  199, 
271;  Texas  cited,  127,  202;  on  Tyler  vs.  Polk, 
156;  on  Powhatan  Ellis  and  Mexican  claims,  171, 
191;  on  Gaines'  action,  202;  on  Slidell's  mission, 
212;  on  foreign  protectorate  of  Texas,  243,  247; 
on  Rio  Grande  boundary,  258;  on  British  intrigue, 
266 

Gates, ,  torture  by  Mexicans,  180-1 

Goliad,  captured  by  Texans,  109;  massacre  after  evacu 
ation  of,  119 

Golpin, ,  murdered  by  Mexican  commander,  180 

Gonzales,  Mexican  assault  on,  105 ;  men  from,  join  band 
at  the  Alamo,  115 

Gordon,  J.  B.,  on  A.  S.  Johnston,  58 

Gorostiza,  M.  E.  de,  Mexican  plenipotentiary,  192  ft., 
200 

Grant,  Dr., ,  horrible  murder  at  Agua  Dolce,  189 

Grant,  U.  S.,  bias  on  Mexican  War,  i,  11-12;  mention, 
14;  on  Taylor's  army,  48;  Memoirs  cited,  52,  267; 
on  A.  S.  Johnston,  59;  on  Monterey,  108;  on  tract 
east  of  Rio  Grande,  258 

Griffith, ,  murder  by  Mexicans,  180 


Index  283 

Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  treaty  of,  28,  272 
Guerrero,  Vicente,    43;    set    up  by  Santa  Anna,  81; 
forced  out  and  murdered,  82 

Hart,  A.  B.,  change  of  view  on  Texas,  154,  210,  236; 

old  view,  226-7;  on  California,  227-8,  228-9,  23° 
Hawley,  J.  R.,  on  U.  S.  fairness,  19 
Herrera,  J.  J.  de,  Mexican  president,  208-9 
Hoist,  H.  von,  on  Mexican  War,  2;  criticised  by  L.  G. 
Tyler,  145;  on  Ellis'  Mexican  diplomacy,  167;  on 
bogus  claims,  1 68 ;  on  foreign  protectorate  of  Texas, 
247-8 

Hopkins,  J.  H.,  on  Whig  platform  of  1844,  J56 
Houston,  "Sam,"  figments  concerning  Texas  career, 
44-7;    real  career,  57-8;    command  in  1835,  106; 
succeeds  Burleson,  114;  orders  Goliad  and  San  An 
tonio  evacuated,  114;  retreat  justified,  120-1 ;  pres 
ident  of  Texas,  128;  paper  war  with  Santa  Anna, 
1 86,  264;  retreat  through  Texas,   197;  threatens 
foreign  protectorate  of  Texas,  243,  245-6 
Humboldt,  A.  von,  Essai  Politique  cited,  73 
Hunt,  Memucan,  3;  Texan  minister  to  U.  S.,  97;  com 
missioner,  128 

Indians,  fairness  of  national  dealings  with,  36-9;  of 
Mexico,  danger  to  Texas,  70,  92-6,  102,  127,  149, 
186,  197^.,  199  (commissioned  by  Mexico).  See 
also  Mexico. 

Iturbide,  Agustin,  64;  treaty  of  1821,  79;  seizure  of 
authority,  79-80;  supplanted,  81 

Jackson,  Andrew,  "intrigue"  with  Houston,  46-9;  pol 
itics  of  his  administration,  49-50;  hesitates  over 
recognition  of  Texas,  129;  suspicion  of  motives  un 
just,  130;  possible  motives,  132-3,  134-5;  reports 
Texas  claim  of  boundary,  135;  and  close  of  diplo- 


284  Index 

Jackson,  Andrew — Continued 

matic  relations  with  Texas,  194;  orders  to  Gaines 
proper,  202;  results  of  battle  of  New  Orleans,  241 
Jay,  William,  on  Mexican  claims,  167,  168 
Jefferson,   Pres.  Thomas,  on  foreign  protectorates   in 

America,  244 

Johnson,  W.  F.,  on  Tyler  vs.  Polk,  157 
Johnston,  Alexander,  Am.  Political  Hist,  cited,  154 
Johnston,  A.  S.,  characterized,  58-9 
Jones,  Com.  T.  ap  C.,  on  Pacific  coast,  174,  241 

Kearney,  Gen.  S.  W.,  occupies  Santa  Fe",  264 
Kendall,  G.  W.,  179;  Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition  cited; 
on  peonage,  66,  67-9;  on  constitution  of  Mexico, 
90;  on  Mexican  military  savageries,  91 ;  on  Mexican 
people,  92;  narrative,  105,  178  ff.,  231-2 
King,  Rufus,  on  foreign  protectorate  of  Texas,  248-9 

Ladd,  H.  O.,  Hist.  War  with  Mexico  cited,  49,  50-1  (un 
just  slur  on  Texans),  90—1,  127,  142,  173,  174,  268 

Lafitte,  Jean,  his  pirates,  52  (in  Jackson's  army),  69 

La  Salle,  R.  C.  de,  policy,  89 

Llano, ,  murder  of  prisoners,  77 

Louisiana  Purchase,  31,  32;  indefinite  boundaries, 
223-4;  saved  by  victory  of  New  Orleans,  241 

Lowell,  J.  R.,  Biglow  Papers  quoted,  12-13;  not  au 
thority,  13,  14 

Lyell,  Sir  C.,  not  authority  on  Mexican  War,  13-14 

MacDonald,   William,  Jacksonian  Democracy   quoted, 

J33,  *5o 

McMaster,  J.  B.,  Hist.  U.  S.  cited,  101,  102,  no 
Maine,  the,  blowing  up  of,  161—2 
Matamoros,  Mariano,  execution  of,  77 
May,  T.  E.,  Constitutional  History  cited,  35 
Mayo,  Dr.  Robert,  value  of  his  evidence,  45-6 


Index  285 

Mexican  War,  area  added  to  U.  S.  by,  32;  a  certainty 
independent  of  Texas  question  184;  course  and 
conduct,  266  ff.;  results  in  national  unity,  269-71; 
terms  of  peace,  272  ff. 

Mexico,  acts  compared  with  Texas,  50-1 ;  early  efforts 
to  settle  Texas,  51-3 ;  failure  to  give  protection,  52 ; 
condition  under  Spain,  73  ff.;  Indians  of,  75;  gains 
independence,  79-80;  recognized  by  U.  S.,  80-1 ; 
under  Iturbide,  Victoria,  and  Santa  Anna,  79-85; 
no  effective  occupancy  of  Texas,  89-91,  112;  sav 
agery  of  officials,  91;  ferocious  proclamation,  113, 
118;  treaty  with  Texas  made  and  broken,  125-6; 
anarchic  condition,  127-130;  reasons  for  recogniz 
ing,  weaker  than  for  Texas,  138-9,  159-63;  cruel 
ties  in  Texas  of  long  standing,  162-3;  U.  S.  claims 
against,  164  ff. ;  English  and  French,  165;  conduct 
to  U.  S.,  1 73-4 ;  obstructiveness  on  claims  question, 
176-7;  contrast  of  people  and  rulers,  181-2;  U.  S. 
diplomatic  correspondence  with,  185  ff. ;  paper  war 
with  Texas,  186,  264;  breaks  off  diplomatic  rela 
tions  with  U.  S.,  190-1 ;  demands  that  U.  S.  outlaw 
Texans  and  suppress  no  Indian  raids,  193-4;  boun 
daries  with  U.  S.,  197  ff.;  absurd  claims  of  dignity, 
200;  provisional  declaration  of  war,  204-5,  262—3; 
again  breaks  off  relations,  207;  refusal  of  Slidell 
mission,  208  ff.;  offers  from  U.  S.  212;  boundary 
questions,  214  ff.;  "military"  expeditions  into, 
228  ff.;  losses  by  the  war,  272  ff.',  anarchy  after  it, 
274 

Milam,  Benjamin,  capture  of  San  Antonio,  108;  killed, 
109 

Mina,  Gen.  F.  J.,  insurrection,  52-3;  execution,  78 

Monasterio, ,  Mexican  minister,  171,  191-2 

Monroe  Doctrine,  244-5 

Morelos,  J.  M.,  defeat  at  Pascuaro,  77;  execution,  78 

Morfitt,  H.  M.,  on  Rio  Grande  boundary,  141,  272 


286  Index 

Niles,  J.  M.,  direct  authority  on  Mexican  War,  v.,  26-8; 

character  and  authority,  21  ff.\  Civil  Officer,  26; 

Hist.  S.  Amer.  and  Mexico,  27;  cited  on  Mexican 

history,  26-7;  justifies  Texas  annexation,  28,  50; 

and   boundaries,    28-9;    disfavors   annexation   of 

Mexico,   29;  deprecates  "manifest  destiny,"   34; 

History  cited,  42,  43,  54,  60,  62,  64,  66,  72,  74,  75, 

76,  77,  78,  79,  80,  83,  85,  95, 101,  no,  113,  115, 116, 

206,  240,  261 

Noll,  A.  H.,  From  Empire  to  Republic  cited,  254 
Nueces  River,  reasons  for  making  boundary,  132,  134; 

confused  with  Sabine,  186;  question  of  boundary, 

255  ff* 

O'Donoju,  Juan,  signs  treaty  with  Mexico,  80-1,  139 
Oregon  question  entangled  with  Texas,  151,  152 
Owen,  C.  H.,  personal  note,  16-19 

Paredes,  Mariano,  dictatorship,  209 
Pascuaro,  battle  of,  massacre  of  prisoners,  77 
Pease,  L.  T.,  direct  authority  on  Mexican  War,  v.,  26 

Pedraza, ,  presidency,  83 

Peonage,  shocking  conditions  of,  16,  65-9 
Point  Isabel,  Taylor's  base,  267-8 

Polk,  Pres.  J.   K.,  3;  meaning  of  election,  30-1 ;  acqui 
esces  in  Tyler's  course  on  annexation,  157;  reported 
on  proposed  measures,  210 
Porter,  Com.  David,  Foxardo  affair,  48 
Press,  Hartford,  foundation  and  auspices,  24 

Quautla  [Cuautla],  massacre  at,  79 

Reid,  Mayne,  57;  The  Free  Lances,  187 

Remedios,  massacre  at,  78 

Rhodes,  J.  F.,  not  authority  on  Mexican  War,  v. ;  frivo 
lous  choice  of  authorities,  11-15;  cited,  42,  45,  147, 
169  (on  J.  Q.  Adams),  247 


Index  287 

Rio  Grande,  as  boundary,  94,  108,  no,  126,  127,  131, 

134,  140-1,  215,  254  ft. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  on  "manifest  destiny,"  34 
Rusk,  T.  J.,  59;  on  "Mexican  government,"  126 

Sabine  River  as  boundary,  53,  121,  198-9 

Salazar, ,  murder  of  prisoners,  180 

San  Antonio  de  Bexar,  captured  by  Texans,  108;  the 
Alamo  and  its  heroes,  114-18 

San  Jacinto,  battle  of,  122-5 

Santa  Anna,  A.  L.  de,  Niles  on  his  presidency,  27;  estab 
lishes  Guerrero,  81 ;  and  Busta^mante,  82;  succeeds 
him,  83;  coup  d'  etat,  83-5;  atrocities  at  Zacatecas, 
84-5;  uses  Texas  as  base  of  revolution,  99-100; 
advance  on  San  Antonio,  113;  capture  of  the 
Alamo,  115-18;  orders  all  prisoners  of  war  butch 
ered,  118;  carries  it  out  on  Fannin's,  119;  crosses 
Brazos,  121;  burns  Harrisburg,  122;  battle  of  San 
Jacinto,  122-5;  prisoner  and  signs  treaty  of  Texan 
independence,  125-6;  breaks  it  as  soon  as  free,  126; 
paper  war  with  Houston,  186,  264;  murder  of 
prisoners,  186,  264;  ferocious  orders  for  Mexican 
War,  265 

Santa  Fe,  257-8;  expedition,  178  /f.,  219,  232-3 

Schouler,  James,  on  Folk's  war  message,  2;  acknow 
ledgment  of  bias,  9-1 1 ;  blindly  followed,  1 1 ;  on 
"wolf  and  lamb,"  33;  cited,  43  (on  Virginia),  45, 
no,  116  (on  Santa  Anna),  137,  165,  166  (on  Mex 
ican  claims),  168  (on  diplomacy),  196  (on  Games' 
"  invasion"),  206,  210  (on  Polk),  241,  259  (on  Rio 
Grande  boundary),  260 

Schurz,  Carl,  cited,  44;  on  haste  in  recognizing  Texas, 
137;  on  motives  for  annexation,  142;  on  Clay's 
belief  in  decay  of  slavery,  150;  on  Polk  issues, 
153;  on  Van  Buren  and  annexation,  162;  on 
Mexican  claims,  169,  175,  176,  206;  on  Webster 


288  Index 

Schurz,  Carl — Continued 

and  foreign  designs  on  Texas,  237-8;  on  Rio 
Grande  boundary,  255,  257,  265;  on  Taylor's 
movement,  256 

Schuyler,  Eugene,  cited,  208 

Slavery,  Mexico  and  Texas,  43 ,  44 ;  compared  with  peon 
age,  65-9;  part  in  forwarding  annexation,  143-4, 
145-7, 150 

Slidell,  John,  mission  to  Mexico,  206  ff.;  slur  on,  211,  263 

Smith,  Ashbel,  on  foreign  protectorate  of  Texas,  247; 
career  and  authority,  249-50;  cited,  251 

Smith,  "Deaf,"  107,  123  (cuts  bridge  at  San  Jacinto) 

Smith,  Gold  win,  on  "wolf  and  lamb,"  3;  on  Houston's 
expedition,  44 

Smith,  Henry,  of  Ky.,  60 ;  Texan  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury,  128 

Spain,  home  and  foreign  contrast,  72-3;  colonial  sys 
tem,  73-5 ;  policy  in  colonizing  Texas,  89 

Sparks,  E.  E.,  United  States  cited,  45;  on  exaggerated 
Mexican  claims,  166 

Stiles'  Hist.  Ancient  Windsor  cited,  25 

Strother,  D.  H.,  on  Mexican  peonage,  66-7 

Sumner,  W.  G.,  on  Jackson's  Texas  "conspiracy,"  45-9; 
on  military  demoralization,  47-8;  on  Texas  boun 
dary  claim,  135;  on  forcing  on  of  Mexican  War, 
156;  on  Mexican  claims,  166-7;  on  Games'  "inva 
sion,"  196 

Taylor,  Zachary,  state  of  army  in  Mexican  War,  48; 
preliminary  orders,  263-4,  266;  operations,  266  ff. 

Texans,  unjust  slur  on,  50-1,  109 

Texas,  area  annexed,  32;  foundation  of,  42  ff. ;  Mexican 
anti-slavery  decree  rescinded  for,  43,  44;  early 
Spanish  settlements  in,  51-3;  Mexico  extended  no 
protection  to,  52,  70-1;  refugees  in,  54-5;  fighting 
adventures  in,  55-60;  early  U.  S.  attempts  to  pur- 


Index  289 

chase,  86-8;  not  effectively  occupied  by  Mexico, 
89,  93-6,  112;  joined  with  Coahuila,  97;  aids  in 
setting  up  Santa  Anna,  100;  petitions  for  separate 
government,  101 ;  left  without  any,  101—3;  ordered 
disarmed,  102;  first  war  at  Gonzales,  104—5;  con 
quers  to  Rio  Grande,  no;  war  ended  at  San  Ja- 
cinto,  113-25;  maintains  boundary  of  Rio  Grande, 
127;  proclaims  it,  134;  claim  to  water-shed  of  Rio 
del  Norte,  133;  delays  in  recognition,  129-40; 
recognized,  137;  claim  stronger  than  Cuba  or  Mex 
ico,  138-9,  159-63;  cf.  Grant  and  Lee,  139;  mo 
tives  for  annexation,  142  ff.;  advantage  for  trade, 
151;  methods  of  annexation  debated,  155-6;  rea 
sons  why  hastened,  157  ff . ;  paper  war  with  Mexico, 
1 86;  boundaries  with  U.  S.,  I97/7-",  threatened 
foreign  protectorate,  243  ff. 

Travis,  W.  B.,  career,  57;  drives  out  Mexican  officials, 
103;  at  the  Alamo,  114-18 

Trist,  N.  P.,  commissioner  to  Mexico,  271,  273 

Turner,  F.  J.,  Rise  of  New  West  cited,  170 

Tyler,  Pres.  John,  3;  on  Texas  annexation,  145;  secret 
message  of  1844,  148-9;  utterances  and  character, 
149-50;  reason  for  hastening  Texas  annexation, 
157;  course  defended,  157-8;  on  Texas  boundary 
question,  214-15,  258-9;  fears  foreign  occupation 
of  Texas,  242 

Tyler,  L.  G.,  Life  and  Times  of  the  Tylers  cited,  50,  89, 
145,  146,  147,  150,  152,  153,  157,  183,  184,  188,  203, 
204,  232,  238,  239,  241,  242,  254,  265 

United  States,  credit  to  officials,  3-6;  justice  of  wars, 
8-9;  honor  of  dealings,  19;  oldest  constitutional 
government,  35;  good  international  record,  35-6, 
39—40 ;  and  Indian  record,  36-9 ;  pioneer  in  civilized 
warfare,  40;  in  arbitration,  41;  forbearance  in 
Texas  case,  110-12,  163;  general  sympathy  for 


290  Index 

United  States — Continued 

Texas,  128-9;  sl°w  to  recognize  Texan  independ 
ence,  129-31;  claims  against  Mexico,  164  ff.;  for 
bearance  in  pushing,  175-6;  slackness  in  defending 
citizens,  182-3;  diplomatic  correspondence  with 
Mexico,  185  ff. ;  offer  to  pay  claims,  211;  boundaries 
with  Mexico,  214  ff, ;  cause  of  annexing  Texas,  237— 
53 ;  takes  Texas  war  and  all,  204-5,  262-3 ;  repeated 
generosity  to  Mexico,  275-6 

Upshur,  A.  P.,  on  J.  Q.  Adams'  charges,  145;  on  Cali 
fornia,  206 

Urrea,  Gen.,  orders  all  prisoners  of  war  butchered,  1 18; 
executes  it  on  Fannin's  command,  119;  butchery 
at  Agua  Dolce,  188-9 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  on  J.  M.  Niles,  25;  declines  annex 
ing  Texas,  162 

Velasco,  treaty  of,  125-6,  139,  140 
Victoria,  Guadalupe,  presidency  of,  81 

Webster,  Daniel,  on  J.  Q.  Adams'  charges,  145;  on  value 

of  San  Francisco,  152,  210;  as  Secretary  of  State, 

158;  remonstrance  with  Mexico,  187-8  203—4;  as 

to  foreign  designs  on  Texas,  237-8 
Welles,  Gideon,  on  J.  M.  Niles,  25 
Wells,  D.  A.,  on  injustice  of  Mexican  War,  15-16;  on 

peonage,  66-7 

Wharton,  W.  H.,  59;  Texan  minister  to  U.  S.,  128 
Whartons  in  Texas,  59 

Wilcox,  C.  M.,  Hist.  Mexican  War  cited,  48,  184,  268 
Williams,  A.  M.,  direct  authority  on  Mexican  War,  v., 

mention,  3;  5am  Houston  cited,  53,  60,  84,  119 

128,  140 
Woolsey,  T.  D.,  judgment  in  Mexican  War  casual,  v., 

135-6;  admits  extreme  value  of  territory,  135,  150; 

reasons    in  Cuban    case  weaker   than   in  Texan, 

136  #.,  159 


Index  291 

Wosten,  W.  G.,  Hist.  Texas  cited,  94 
Wright,  Silas,  on  J.  M.  Niles,  25 

Yoakum,  H.  K.,  direct  authority  on  Mexican  War,  v., 
mention,  3 ;  Hist.  Texas  cited,  58,  117,  188,  189,  198 

Zacatecas,  betrayal  and  massacre  at,  84-5;  American 
citizens  involved,  178 


YB  37447 


U.C.BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


